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Abstract 
This dissertation seeks to exp and our understanding of variation in foreign 
policy. Although we have a series of large, extant literatures dealing with the 
sources of foreign policy, there has been less attention paid over the last decade to 
understanding why states change their behavior. At the same time, the thesis 
argues that foreign policy change is best understood as a result of the role of 
individual decision-makers and the role that emotion plays in their foreign policy 
calculations. 
Foreign policy depends on the decisions made by individualleaders. The 
type of individual thus determines the specifie policy. Here individuals are 
categorized as ideological or adaptable. Ideological individuals are more rigid in 
their belief structures, are more likely to select policies that fit with their extant 
understandings of the world and the position of their state in it, and more likely to 
rely on the emotional or affective appeal an object or issue holds for them. 
Adaptable leaders are more flexible, not tied to specifie ideologies or reliant on 
emotion to guide their thinking, and thus more likely to choose or leam ideas that 
best respond to changing environmental conditions. At the same time, how a 
state's decision-making institutions are structured tells us how likely it is that an 
individual's own predilections matter. In polities where decision-making is 
centralized (e.g., in the office of the prime mini ster) , individuals have greater 
leeway to put their ideas (whether based on their ideological outlooks or shifting 
environmental circumstances) into practice, while in de-centralized polities other 
actors constrain the leader from autonomous decision-making. In such cases, it is 
ii 
likely that an individual's ideas will conform to those of the constraining actors. 
Finally, the role of ideas is taken into consideration, as the dominant national 
ideas about foreign policy regarding a specifie issue-area he1p us better 
understand the context in which individuals make (or change) foreign policy. 
This mode! is tested against altemate explanations-systemic imperatives, 
Constructivism, public opinion, poliheuristic theory, and prospect theory-in two 
case studies: the Israeli decision to pursue and sign the 1993 Oslo Accords, and 
the 2002 decision by the Islamist govemment in Turkey to actively lobby for 
rnernbership in the European Union. Both foreign policies represent significant 
variation, and both provide important theoretical and empirical puzzles for 
scholars. 
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Résumé 
Cette dissertation cherche à augmenter notre arrangement de variation de 
la politique étrangère. Bien que nous ayons une série de grands, literatures 
existants traitant les sources de politique étrangère, il y a eu moins d'attention 
prêtée pendant la dernière décennie à l'arrangement de pourquoi les états changent 
leur comportement. En même temps, la thèse argue du fait que la modificaton de 
police étrangère est mieux est comprise en raison du rôle de différents décideurs 
et le rôle d'émotion joue dans leurs calculs de politique étrangère. 
La politique étrangère dépend des décisions prises par différents chefs. Le 
type d'individu détermine ainsi la politique spécifique. Ici des individus sont 
classés par catégorie soit idéologiques ou adaptables. Les individus idéologiques 
sont plus rigides en leurs structures de croyance, sont plus pour choisir les 
politiques qui équipent de leurs vues existantes du monde et de la position de leur 
état dans lui, et plus probable pour compter sur l'appel émotif ou affectif d'un 
objet ou d'une issue qui se tient pour elles. Les chefs adaptables sont plus 
flexibles, non attachés aux idéologies spécifiques ou dépendant sur l'émotion pour 
guider leur pensée, ainsi plus probable pour choisir ou apprendre les idées qui 
répondent mieux à changer des conditions environnementales. En même temps, 
comment des établissements de la prise de décision d'un état sont structurés nous 
indique comment probablement c'est que les propres prédilections d'un individu 
importent. Dans les polities où la prise de décision est centralisée (par exemple, 
dans le bureau du premier ministre), les individus ont une plus grande marge de 
sécurité pour mettre leurs idées (soit basé sur leurs outlooks idéologiques ou 
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circonstances environnementales de décalage) en pratique, alors que dans des 
polities décentralisés d'autres acteurs contraignent le chef de la prise de décision 
autonome. Dans ces cas-ci, il est probable que les idées d'un individu se 
conforment à ceux des acteurs de contrainte. En conclusion, le rôle des idées est 
pris en compte, comme idées nationales dominantes au sujet de la politique 
étrangère concernant un issue-secteur spécifique aidez-nous à mieux comprendre 
le contexte dans lequel les individus définissent (ou changement) la politique 
étrangère. 
Ce modèle est examiné contre des impératifs explication-systémiques 
alternatifs, le Constructivisme, l'opinion publique, la théorie poliheuristic, et la 
perspective théorie-dans deux études de cas: la décision israélienne pour 
poursuivre et signer les ententes 1993 d'Oslo, et la décision 2002 par le 
gouvernement islamiste en Turquie pour inciter activement à l'adhésion dans 
l'union européenne. Les deux politiques étrangères représentent la variation 
significative, et toutes les deux fournissent des casse-têtes théoriques et 
empiriques importants pour des disciples. 
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Chapter One 
Explaining Foreign Policy Variation 
Introduction 
Foreign policy analysis (FPA) and International Relations (IR) have given little 
consideration to foreign policy variation. Sorne attention was paid to it in the 
1980s and early 1990s (see Carlsnaes 1993; Goldmann 1988; C. Hermann 1990; 
K. Holsti 1982; and Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994). But despite the slim hope 
acknowledged by sorne that, by the mid-1990s, this was beginning to change 
(Rosati, Sampson, and Hagan 1994, 7-8), this early anticipation has not panned 
out. Rosati, Sampson, and Hagan's earlier assessment that "the study of foreign 
policy change remains largely an unexplored area of great significant and promise 
as a tool to enhance the understanding of the dynamics of world politics" (1994, 
14) is nearly as accurate today as when it was first noted. Foreign policy variation 
remains an under-studied phenomenon in IR and FP A because most research in 
this area focuses on explaining a specifie foreign policy without necessarily 
placing it in a historie al context, that is, whether or not the policy is new or 
different from older policies. AIternately, studies concentrate on foreign policy 
continuity, particularly those that stem from domestic-Ievel factors such as culture 
or institutions. Where research has incorporated a discussion of a state's foreign 
policy changes over time, it has tended to be descriptive and, certainly, without a 
rigorous theoretical analysis of change. 
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This study will fill this gap by developing a decision-making model for 
understanding foreign policy change. The model argues that there are two types of 
leaders: ideological and adaptable. It has been weIl established for several years 
now that individuals' cognitive processes and belief structures are the key to 
unlocking why individuals engage in specifie policies. What is less weIl known, 
and what is under-studied in the foreign policy decision-making literature, is the 
role of emotion in this decision-making process. Emotion, or affect, conditions 
how much meaning events and objects hold for leaders; in turn, these leaders 
make decisions based on the affective meaning these events or objects hold for 
them. This is how individuals choose among the various policy options available 
to them. At the same time, even when individuals pre fer one policy idea to 
another, it may not matter for foreign policy. Only leaders who occupy the central 
position in a polit y' s decision-making institutions matter. Thus we need to 
examine the relevant individuals, the structures of decision-making, and the 
various foreign policy ideas available to them. Two empirical case studies will be 
used to judge the strength of the model. 
This chapter sets out the parameters of the dissertation. The first section 
will examine the role of individuals in foreign policyrnaking, highlighting the 
importance-indeed, necessity-of studying individuals in both foreign policy 
analysis and International Relations. The following part notes the difference in 
this study from the common tactic of studying whether or how decisions are made 
that are bad, or suboptimal. Instead, the study examines just the decision itself, 
without judging its appropriateness or effectiveness-which, in any case, is not 
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easily done so by external standards. The next section will present the argument in 
brief, by examining the role of individuals, institutions, and ideas. After that, the 
chapter addresses the question of the case studies and methodology used, by first 
presenting the empirical puzzles that form the basis for theory development. 
Finally, the last segment will describe in more detail the structure of the 
dissertation. 
The Role of Individuals in Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
There are large extant literatures arguing that individuals, in fact, are not 
the key elements in foreign policymaking. They are, it is posited, surrounded and 
affected by bureaucracies, small groups of advisors, domestic political forces, and 
broader global influences that remove an independent causal role for individuals. 
It is certainly true that sorne leaders, in sorne contexts, are less causal in foreign 
policy decision-making than others. And there should be no doubt that individuals 
do not make foreign policy decisions in a vacuum; there would be no theoretical 
bene fit-and it would be completely out of touch with empirical evidence-to 
argue that they do. AH other factors play sorne role, even where leaders are 
strongly autonomous. But if we are to properly construct a workable theory we 
must identify general patterns of cause-effect, and in the study of foreign policy a 
close examination reveals that individuals occupy a central role in this process. 
In focusing on individuals this study addresses a main difference between 
the FP A and IR literatures. In the former, individuals have long been recognized 
as being the very center of the foreign policymaking process (Hudson 2005; 
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Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962). Substantial research in the later 1970s and 1980s 
has demonstrated the importance of persona1ity and individua1 psychological 
characteristics and cognitive processes on foreign policy decision-making (see as 
examples Brecher 1975, 1972; Falkowski 1979; M. Hermann 1984, 1978, 1977; 
Hermann and Hermann 1989; Herrmann 1985; Jervis 1976; Larson 1985; 
Steinbruner 1974; Stoessinger 1985 1). State behavior is the result of choices made 
by individual policymakers who interpret their environments and make decisions 
based on these interpretations. Understanding who these policymakers are and 
what drives their decision-making is considered to help observers better 
understand state behavior. This is of even greater relevance when we con si der 
foreign policy change: as Lebow and Stein put it, "[i]ndeed, policy change can be 
viewed initially as a function of cognitive change by individuals" (1993, 95). Or, 
as Y oung and Schafer assert, if there were no differences between leaders, "there 
would be no unanticipated actions by states or policymakers" (1998, 64). 
But IR has tended to neglect the role of the individual in determining state 
behavior. Partly this is because IR is more about general group interaction, while 
FPA is about individual government (or leader) actions. Lake and Powell (1999, 
13) assert that "the study of international politics wou Id be hopelessly 
complicated if every international outcome had to be traced back to the goals and 
actions of individuals." The trick, they continue, is to abstract from the individual 
into groups ofindividuals, as firms, states, and so on (ibid., 14). A major criticism 
of prospect theory (which has been used to explain the decisions of individual 
1 Studies before the second half of the 1970s were generally less rigorous and more anecdotal 
(Brecher and Steinbruner are key exceptions). See O. Holsti (1976) for a good critique of earlier 
works. 
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leaders), for example, has been that it has failed to develop a theory of inter-state 
interactions at the international level (see Levy 1998, 113; Levy 2000, 200; and 
McDermott 2004, 305-306). 
But this lacuna is also the result of what have become the leading 
approaches in IR. IR theory in the 1980s was dominated by debate between two 
structural theories, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, which focused on patterns at 
the level of the global system (see, e.g., Baldwin 1993). In the 1990s, these 
theories were supplemented by Constructivist approaches, which also focused on 
international structure but in terms of norms and social relations rather than power 
(e.g., Wendt 1999). Additionally, state behavior was increasingly seen as the 
result of collective discourses such as national identity and culture (e.g., 
Katzenstein 1996). In aIl of these approaches, individuals are subsumed under 
more macro structures and processes, playing at most an intervening role. They 
are dismissed as having any causal role in the determination of state behavior. 
The main problem with these approaches is that while structural or social 
mi lieus matter, they do not of themselves cause a particular foreign policy 
decision. Sorne have begun to recognize the inappropriateness of the prevailing 
environment and called for greater attention to the study of individuals in IR (see 
Byman and Pollack 2001). But there is still much room for improvement. There is 
no good reason why theories at the level of foreign policy should not also be 
relevant for IR (see Elman 1996). Tetlock and Goldgeier (2000) argue that even 
systemic theories of world politics are unconsciously based on motivational and 
psychological approaches. And, after aIl, the foreign policies of states can have a 
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c1ear impact on the international system in general. The best example is the most 
dramatic: Gorbachev's foreign pohcies contributed to the end of the Cold War by 
creating a less hostile relationship with the United States, allowing former Soviet 
satellite states to remove their Communist govemments without Soviet military 
intervention, and not opposing the American invasion of a former ally (Iraq). 
Though several other individuals and groups did have input into his thinking on 
foreign affairs, it was Gorbachev's individual predilection to these types of 
changes in international politics. and his own preferences and objectives that 
mattered. The attempt by hard-hne Communists, in August 1991, to reverse 
Gorbachev's changes further illustrates the critical importance played by 
Gorbachev as an individual as leader? 
We can, therefore, best understand foreign policy variation by tracing the 
decision-making process behind specifie foreign policy decisions. This process 
involves the central role of individuals in positions of power who choose to 
incorporate incoming information from their environments and utilize it to make 
decisions. It also involves the decision-making institutions of the polit Y that 
provide these individuals with (or withhold from them) the capacity to put their 
decisions into practice. 
Not Good or Bad Decisions, Just Decisions 
In the study of foreign policy, it is critical that we identify the specifie 
foreign policy or foreign policy variation that we are trying to explain-that is, 
2 For more detailed discussion of the importance of Gorbachev in changing Soviet foreign policy 
and ending the Cold War, see Checkel (1997), Risse-Kappen (1994), and Stein (1994). 
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the dependent variable (see C. Hermann 1995, 253, 1978). Having a clear 
dependent variable, which in this study is foreign policy change, allows for more 
effective theoretical formulation and empirical research. 
This study is different from previous studies on the effect of individuals on 
foreign policy decision-making. Any focus on the causal role of individuals must 
include an analysis of an individual's cognitive processes; how individuals 
process incoming information is widely recognized in the psychology and 
decision research literatures as the key to understanding decision-making. IR 
scholars studying foreign policy decision-making have adopted this method. 
There are three problems with this approach that this study tries to resolve. 
First, there has been little attention to variation in decision-making, in foreign 
policy or other areas; instead, attention has focused on explaining decisions, that 
is, specific choices made by individuals. When considering policy of any kind, 
policy change is neglected in favor of simply policy. 
Second, there is a tendency in the decision-making literature-whether in 
psychology, decision research, or IR-to focus on suboptimal decisions; that is, 
on explaining how and why individuals make "bad" de~isions. 3 l am not 
concemed with whether a decision is good or bad, or whether the decision-
making process was effective or not. My concem is only to explain why a 
particular foreign policy decision is made over others, and in this context how 
variation in state behavior can be explained. Too often the judgment that a 
decisionlpolicy is bad is too subjective-what a decision-maker thinks is a good 
3 For noted psychologist Reid Hastie, for example, the starting point for an exarnination of 
decision-making is that hurnan behavior is "frequently errorful, imprecise, and haphazard" (1986, 
29). 
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decision might not be the same as what a researcher does, even if the 
consequences of the decision have become known and appear negative in other 
areas. What matters to the decision-maker is not the same thing that matters to the 
observer. Most members of the CUITent Bush Administration, for example, 
continue to believe that the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein was a good 
one, regardless of the problems it has led to for the American military, Iraqi 
society, and in American-European relations. 
Third, arguing about whether a decision is good or bad assumes a rational-
objective type of framework that, like any rational choice framework, may not be 
appropriate to understanding individual decision-making, which often varies from 
what is expected as rational (see Chapter 2). But we can only judge the 
effectiveness or "good-ness" or "bad-ness" of a decision according to the goals 
individuals set out for themselves-not those determined by observers. Simon 
(1985, 298) recognized this early on but few political analysts have heeded his 
caution. Moreover, as this study demonstrates, individual decision-making is 
often driven by emotion, which structures decisions in a subjective framework for 
the one making the decisions but may seem "off' or inconsistent to observers 
working from a set, "objective" standard. Different individuals value different 
things, and it is not the researcher's place to decide whether a decision is thus 
appropriate or not. 
8 
The Argument in Brief 
This section presents an outline of the dissertation' s argument. Above an, 
it is an attempt to explain foreign policy variation by studying the process of 
foreign policy decision-making. It also only examines one stage of the decision-
making process: the point at which a foreign policy decision is made. How that 
decision is implemented and how it impacts on future policyrnaking is not 
addressed here. 
The model is an attempt to integrate various levels of analysis, theoretical 
explanations, and insights from different literatures.4 It also tries to combine area 
studies with IR ,theory (see Chapter 8). In addition, it is dynamic: it seeks to 
explain variation in state behavior by reference to individual leaders, whose 
decisions are based their own capacity for leaming or adopting new ideas. The 
result is a model of foreign policy change that focuses on the importance of 
individuals in the foreign policyrnaking process, underlines the conditions under 
which individuals matter, and highlights variation in foreign policy. 
The model integrates three elements: individuals, institutions, and ideas. 
Individuals matter in the foreign policyrnaking process because they make the 
decisions about which ideas become policy. Not an individuals matter in foreign 
policy; when trying to understand foreign policy in general, and foreign policy 
variation in particular, we must know which individuals are in positions of power 
to make foreign policy decisions. For this we need to study the institutions in 
4 The idea that the complexity of politics cannot be explained in many cases by a single theoretical 
framework, and hence the need for synthe sis between approaches, has been highlighted many 
times before. See Brecher (1999); Legro and Moravcsik (1999, 50); Ruggie (1998, 859). See 
Hudson (2005) for this contention in regard to foreign policy analysis. 
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which individuals operate. FinaIly, there are always ideas about foreign policy 
floating around; which ideas are chosen to become policy-which ideas "win" 
over others in a world of competing ideas-are determined by the individual 
leader who makes foreign policy decisions. On a methodological note, ideas are 
also important for comparison: they illustrate to the observer whether or not a 
change in policy takes place. It is to be expected that when new leaders come to 
office, there will be at least sorne changes in policy, however minor (see Bunce 
1981). But foreign policy variation is more significant when the new policy 
contradicts previously long-held policy or general ideational structures. This 
makes the variation that much more of a puzzle, and indeed empirically has a 
greater effect on international politics. 
First, we can distinguish between ideological and adaptable individuals.5 
Which category leaders faIl into tells us how likely they are to engage in foreign 
policy variation. Ideological leaders are individuals who maintain more rigid 
belief structures. These types of leaders are more "emotional" than adaptable 
leaders. That is, certain events or objects, or classes of events or objects, hold 
deep personal meaning for them, which condition their own cognitive processes 
by filtering out incoming information that does not fit with their extant, affect-
laden belief structures. The only policy ideas that are adopted are those that fit 
with pre-existing understandings of the world. 
In contrast, adaptable individuals are more flexible. They do not re1y on 
firm cognitive structures to tell them what information to assimilate and what 
5 The distinction is similar to Margaret Hermann's classification (1993; Hermann and Hermann 
1989). Like Hermann, 1 use these as ideal-type categories (see M. Hermann 2003). 
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decisions they can take. They are less emotional about events or objects because 
they are more flexible; they are not tied down by emotional attachment to certain 
conditions and so can more easily adapt to circumstances, making decisions based 
on what best fits with contemporaneous situations and problems. 
Second, we must examine the decision-making institutions of the 
particular polit Y under study. Because individuals matter for foreign policymaking 
only when they have the capacity to translate these ideas into policy, we must 
understand how centralized a polity's institutions are. 
The relevant institutions are the formaI decision-making structures of a 
polit y, particularly the office(s) that must be occupied in order to put ideas into 
practice. In democracies, for example, the primary decision-makers are presidents 
or prime ministers. Institutions are thus "transmission belts" carrying policy ideas 
through the policymaking process toward a final political outcome. When 
institutions are centralized, the primary decision maker is more able to translate 
ideas into policy, because other political actors do not block her from doing so. 
When institutions are de-centralized, other actors can have a greater influence on 
policymaking, and thus potentially block or limit an individual's ideas from 
becoming policy. 
Third, we must account for the ideas present in the polit y and society. The 
role of ideas in the foreign policymaking process received much attention in the 
1990s (see, for examples, Checkel 1997; Goldstein 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 
1993b; McNamara 1998; and Parsons 2003). But problems have continued to 
plague the incorporation of ideas in the study of state behavior that make it 
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difficult to theorize an autonomous role for ideas. These problems include: a 
focus on the abstract concept of interests, as opposed to the more concrete and 
proper unit of analysis, the individual; an emphasis on the institutionalization of 
ideas in political, cultural, and social structures-which in essence becomes an 
analysis of the institutions themselves rather than the ide as (see Blyth 1997,243; 
Yee 1996, 89);6 and a pronounced inability to explain causality, which is, in 
Parsons's view, "the large st remaining obstacle to the broad acceptance of ideas 
as major causes in politics" (2003, 11).7 These difficulties mean that ideas must 
be attached to sorne other element, to help us understand when they matter. This 
study attaches them to individuals, who are more or less willing to adopt different 
policy ideas, depending on their own emotional and cognitive natures. 
A consensus has been reached in the ideationalliterature that defines ideas 
as strategies for obtaining specified goals,8 and ideas are defined here in similar 
terms. They are strategic models: judgments about the ultimate national security 
objectives of a state, the specific policy methods required to achieve them, and 
how these policies fit with the national identity or value system of the state. In this 
sense, they provide a blueprint for policymakers regarding specific foreign policy 
situations that they must address. We must specify the available strategic models 
6 This is precisely why Blyth (2002, 18-27) classifies ideational studies as part of the historical 
institutionalism literature. It is also why he talks about institutional change, rather than the specifie 
role of ideas. 
7 Sorne have also criticized ideas as being too "fuzzy" or ambiguous for definition and 
measurement, or simply epiphenomenal to state behavior (see for instance Brooks and Wohlforth 
2000/01; Desch 1998, 150-152). 1 do not believe this critique is valid: virtuaUy aU ideational 
studies have been explicit about both defining and measuring ideas and in underlining the 
importance of doing so. 
8 The two most explicit and easily rendered categorizations are HaU's "policy paradigms" (1993) 
and Goldstein and Keohane's "road maps" (1993a, 12). 
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that are presented to decision-makers, if only to provide more context to the 
changes in foreign policy we are explaining. 
The Empirical Puzzles: Case Study Selection and Methodology 
The development of this model of foreign policy variation is built on two 
empirical puzzles. In order to better demonstrate the utility of the model not only 
to FP A but also to IR, the case studies focus on the high political decisions often 
considered part of the core interactions in IR: accommodation and confrontation 
with one's enemies and antagonists. They are therefore not only critical foreign 
policy decisions, but important in an IR sense as weIl since they helped lead to a 
change in international political relations and the regional structures in which they 
took place. 
The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords 
In September 1993, Israel-under Prime Minister yitzhak Rabin-signed 
the Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an agreement 
that was a giant step toward resolving their conflict. The Declaration of Princip les 
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP-the official name of the Oslo 
Accords) was signed in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993.9 Although it 
was only a general, interim framework (much of the nuts and bolts of the DOP 
were negotiated throughout 1994 and signed in Washington on 28 September 
1995, while several issues were left for final status negotiations), it entailed direct 
9 Foreign Minister .Shimon Peres had initialed it on behalf of Israel in a secret ceremony in Oslo, 
in the early morning hours of 20 August, nine days before the Israeli Cabinet was informed of it. 
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negotiations with the PLO and laid the groundwork for an independent Palestinian 
state. 10 
What is puzzling here is that Oslo entailed two features that went against 
decades of official government policy, inc1uding the policy under Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir, Rabin's immediate predecessor: direct negotiation with the PLO 
and setting the foundation for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. The treaty came, moreover, at a moment of unprecedented Israeli 
standing in the region, as a result of the dec1ine of the Soviet Union, the defeat of 
Iraq by the American-led coalition in 1991, and the reduction in importance of the 
Palestinian intifada to global audiences. This was paralleled by the position of the 
PLO having reached its nadir as a result of, in addition to these same factors, its 
support for Saddam Hussein against the coalition. Why would Israel agree to 
work under these conditions with an organization it regarded as an enemy 
dedicated to its destruction, and more importantly lay the groundwork for an 
independent Palestinian state, when there seemed to be little incentive to do so? 
The 2002 Turkish Effort to Join the European Union 
The second puzzle is the decision by Turkey's second Islamist government 
in November 2002 to actively seek membership in the European Union (EU). 
Membership in the EUll has existed as an option for Turkish policymakers for 
decades. What is new in the context of this discussion is that the 2002 decision 
10 For good discussions on the Oslo process, the lead-up to and the details of it, see Corbin (1994) 
and Makovsky (1996). As weU, various participants have written their own rnernoirs of the 
negotiations: see Abbas (1995); Beilin (1999, Part 2); Peres (1995, Chapters 24-27); Savir (1998). 
Note that there are sorne discrepancies arnong the accounts on various dates. 
Il In order to avoid confusion and streamline the discussion, the EU will be taken to rnean aU 
previous similar institutions-the European Economic Community and the European Cornrpunity. 
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marked the first time an Islamist leader decided to aggressively pursue a policy 
that previously only Kemalists and pro-Westernists had called for. Since the 1963 
Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU, the expectation among many 
Kemalists in Turkey was that Turkey would eventually become part of the EU. As 
global and domestic (in both the EU and in Turkey) changes developed during the 
mid- to late-1990s, Turkish laicist govemments began to push harder for EU 
membership, by both pressing their case directly to EU govemments and by 
engaging in domestic reforms designed to bring Turkey's legal and political 
structures in line with EU standards. But the first Islamist govemment (1996-
1997) bucked the trend: although he did not severe relations with the EU, Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan all but ignored the EU and put relations with the 
Islamic world instead at the top of his agenda. In contrast, his Islamist successor 
in 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,12 went even beyond the Kemalist policy to 
aggressively push for membership. 
This decision presents a puzzle to analysts in two ways. First, an Islamist 
pnme minister in 2002 went against the long-standing Islamist agenda-an 
agenda that he himself had vocally supported earlier in his political career-and 
which had adamantly opposed membership on the grounds that it was both 
harmful to Turkey' s interests and did not coincide with Turkey' s own identity, 
which they argued was Islamic and Eastern, rather than Western. Second, the 
12 Erdogan is the focus of this study since he is the primary leader of the Islamist party and 
government, though technically speaking, Erdogan was not the country's second Islamist prime 
minister; it was his colleague, Abdullah Gül. Erdogan was convicted in 1998 of religious 
incitement, and the Constitution stipulates that individuals convicted of a crime cannot enter 
parliament. A constitutional amendment in December 2002 allowed him to compete in a by-
election in March 2003, which he won. Gül then resigned and was replaced by Erdogan. 
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vigorous appeals for membership he engaged in were in dichotomous opposition 
to the policy of the first Islamist prime minister (1996-1997), who actively 
neglected Europe in favor of the Islamic world. There was, therefore, a stark 
difference in policy between two Islamist politicians. Why would this governrnent 
engage in pronounced and vigorous efforts, that even sorne non-Islamist 
governrnents had avoided, to join an institution that it had long considered would 
subsume Turkish structures in its own and thus quite possibly underrnine the long-
held Islamist agenda? Although they were not in power during consecutive terrns, 
it is important to compare them because: (a) they corne from the same (Islamist) 
background and so pro vide for useful comparison; and (b) comparing individual 
leaders from the same movement/political party helps identify and emphasize the 
critical differences between individuals. 
Studying Middle Eastern Parliamentary Systems 
These are puzzles that have not been adequately untangled by existing 
analyses and theoretical frameworks. 1 argue that the best way to understand these 
shifts in foreign policy is by focusing on the four relevant prime ministers and 
comparing their foreign policies. Using two case studies also enhances the 
comparative method. Both the similarities and differences between the case 
studies strengthen the applicability of the model. The similarities allow for 
conclusions to be drawn regarding states with comparable polities and analogous 
divisions or non-divisions within society, while the differences indicates that the 
model' s basic components can be applied to states with diverse institutional, 
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political, and historical circumstances. All of this underlines that the model can 
"travel" easily to other explanations of foreign policy change. 
Israel and Turkey aré both states in the Middle East that share similarities 
and differences. Belonging to the same region allows for sorne similarity in 
regional circumstances (recognizing that each state faces its own particular set of 
foreign policy problems, as well). This allows for better theory development and 
theory testing. 
At the same time, both Israel and Turkey are democratic parliamentary 
systems in which the primary decision-maker is the prime minister. 13 This 
controis for politicai structure and permits better understanding of centralization. 
Altogether, the study of two states from the same region and with similar political 
structures allows for better comparative analysis. A focus on prime ministers in 
parliamentary systems fills a gap in the study of individuals in democracies, 
which has tended to focus on presidents (especially American presidents) (see 
Kaarbo and Hermann 1998).14 To further strengthen our understanding of foreign 
policymaking in parliamentary, systems, this study compares prime ministers 
within the same country-a method used too infrequently in the study of prime 
ministers in parliamentary systems (Kaarbo 1997). 
In addition, the countries examined here are somewhat in-between places: 
democracies located in the developing world and faced with a set of foreign and 
\3 It is recognized that there have been many criticisms ofboth the breadth and depth of Israeli and 
Turkish democracy, regarding the Arab and Kurdish segments of the population, respectively. 
Certainly, there are questions regarding the social and civil aspects of democracy, as opposed to 
the political facet, but democracy in both countries remains "real" enough. Moreover, the fact that 
such criticism extends to both states actually controls for the type of democracy. 
14 Where the literature has looked at prime ministers, the emphasis has been on Britain. 
17 
domestic problems unusual for modem democracies (conditions of prolonged 
conflict or antagonism with neighboring states, serious domestic divisions, and in 
the case of Israel and only recently less so in Turkey, violent challenges to the 
state by groups operating within their spheres of control). 
Finally, Israel and Turkey are important states in the Middle East and in 
the broader global system. They are the preeminent military powers in their 
region. Israel is at the center of one of the longest, most intense and violent 
conflicts in the international system. Its clashes with the Arab states and the 
Palestinians has had worldwide consequences, including bringing the 
superpowers close to a nuclear confrontation. For its part, Turkey is strategically 
situated at the crossroads of several volatile regions-the Middle East, the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Its role in a variety of international 
issue-areas is critical for international stability and development in these areas and 
more widely. It, too, is engaged in a series of disputes with its neighbors, 
including Greece, Syria, Iran, and Armenia. Understanding the changes in Israel's 
and Turkey's foreign policies will provide a better understanding oftheir behavior 
in international politics, and offers a way of explaining the behavior of other 
states also engaged in conflict. 
Methods of Investigation 
A study that focuses on individuals requires an in-depth analysis of the 
individuals in question. In order to understand whether or not individuals are 
ideologicalor adaptable we need to trace both the individuals' behavior and their 
policies. This requires in-depth understanding of leaders' personalities-without 
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close examination of their personality, past expenence, belief structures, and 
emotional attachments, we cannot explain how likely it is that they would choose 
the specifie foreign policies they did. To explain foreign policymaking we must 
also examine the polity's decision-making institutions to determine how 
centralized they are, and whether they allow (or do not allow) for autonomous 
policymaking. Finally, in order to judge how significant foreign policy variation 
is (for instance, we are not interested here in minor tactical shifts), we must also 
examine the prevailing ideational structures of a society-polity. This study is, 
therefore, a qualitative comparative analysis ofIsrael and Turkey's ideational and 
institutional structures, and of the two prime ministers relevant for each state's 
variation in foreign policy. 
For an understanding of the four leaders involved in this study (Yitzhak 
Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin, Necmettin Erbakan, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan) 1 have 
relied on their public speeches, statements, and interviews. This method of 
analysis is well proven in psychological investigations of individuals (see 
Suedfeld, Guttieri, and Tetlock 2003). 1 have also used other analysts' published 
works on these leaders, for both their own impressions of them and direct quotes 
provided in their works. In addition, for the Israeli case study, 1 conducted 
fieldwork interviews with former aides and advisors to both Shamir and Rabin. 
By comparing these two cases studies, and the two prime ministers in each, 1 can 
better highlight the model's validity. 
To understand the development and contemporary manifestations of the 
decision-making institutions and various policy ideas in Israel and Turkey 1 have 
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used secondary sources by other scholars who have studied the history, politics, 
culture, and development of these states. 
Plan of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the 
introduction to the study, discussing the importance of individuals in policy 
making and setting out the argument in brief. Chapter 2 contains the alternative 
arguments that might be used to explain the two case studies and against which 
the model is tested. The theoretical and empirical weaknesses of these alternate 
accounts are highlighted here. Chapter 3 moves on directly from Chapter 2, 
providing a more in-depth examination of the model that forros the theoretical 
basis for this study. It constructs a model of foreign policy change, drawing out 
three hypotheses that better operationalize the model. 
The next four chapters deal with the case studies. Chapters 4 and 5 
examine the Israeli case study, the variation in policy that was the Oslo Accords. 
Through a historical account of the relevant institutional and ideational 
developments in Israel, Chapter 4 develops the institutional variable of the model, 
and examines the dominant ideational structures in the country. Doing so helps us 
identify when the variation that occurred in foreign policy on the relevant issues, 
and why Rabin's decision was so anomalous and puzzling. By examining the 
decision-making institutions of Israel, we can identify Israel as astate with 
centralized decision-making structures. Chapter 5 discusses the dynamic variable 
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of the model, the role of individuals, by comparing the emotional and belief 
structures and policies of Prime Ministers Shamir and Rabin. 
Chapter 6 is the Turkish counterpart of Chapter 4. It discusses the 
development of Turkey' s institutional and ideational structures. Again, 
understanding how Turkey' s decision-making structures developed provides 
greater appreciation for the constraints facing contemporary Turkish prime 
ministers. The chapter also explains the development of Turkey' s ideational 
structures, dichotomized as Westernism versus Islamism. This allows us to 
understand why alid how much the 2002 decision to join the EU by an Islamist 
prime minister is a puzzle. Chapter 7 examines the differences between the two 
prime ministers, their different cognitive and affective structures, and how these 
impacted on their policy toward EU membership. 
The conclusion, Chapter 8, compares the two case studies, and offers 
suggestions for further empirical and theoretical research to illustrate the 
applicability of the model to both foreign policy analysis and International 
Relations. Finally, it discusses the empirical, theoretical, and policy implications 
of the model. 
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Chapter Two 
Alternate Explanations 
Introduction 
This chapter sets the foundation for the rest of the dissertation, by highlighting 
aIternate explanations for the two case studies and why they do not provide much 
insight into foreign policy variation. This moves the dissertation into the 
presentation of a better explanation based on the model set out in Chapter 3. At 
bottom, variation in foreign policy cannot be understood through existing 
approaches; these have a series of theoretical weaknesses, and the empirical 
conditions that made up the foreign policy decisions highlight the indeterminacy 
or inaccuracy of these approaches. It is necessary to show why these accounts fail 
to pro vide an effective explanation of the puzzle. 
The first three alternate explanations examined are Structural Realism, 
Constructivism, and public opinion. It might be argued that none of these is an 
appropriate foil for the argument presented in this study, since they are macro-
structural processes that are not suitable for examining specific foreign policy 
decisions. This is not true for two reasons: First, aIl three are habitually used to 
explain state behavior. Since the model presented here is designed to help us 
better understand the conduct of international politics, it is useful to compare the 
model with other common approaches. Second, and as is dealt with in greater 
detail below, they are specifically used to explain the case studies examined here, 
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particularly in the Israeli case. Therefore, highlighting their inadequacies provides 
for a more useful comparison for the model, and illustrates the effectiveness of the 
model on the same "territory" used by these altemate explanations. 
The last two contending accounts are poliheuristic theory and prospect 
theory. Both are considered to be theories of decision-making; that is, they focus 
on the specific decisions themselves (rather than the macro-structural procesSes 
that force decisions) and those who make them. As such, they provide a stronger 
test for my model since they operate on the same theoretical terrain (cognitive 
processes and the role of individuals). Although there are several other theories of 
decision-making, these are currently the most exciting and expansive research 
programs in this area, and so provide a useful test of contemporary approaches. 
All five approaches are inadequate for explaining the variation in foreign 
policy examined in the study. The first three shed light on sorne motivations and 
influences behind foreign policy, but they are far weaker at helping us understand 
why foreign policy changes, and in particular the substance of these differing 
foreign policies-they are indeterminate. Though they may help explain the 
timing and general direction of foreign policy, on their own they do not make the 
ultimate outcome of foreign policy inevitable, nor do they tell us anything about 
the process of change (Hall 1993, 284).1 The last two are more effective, in that 
they incorporate individuals and their specifie views on foreign policymaking. 
But they, too, are deficient because they focus only on rigid pre-set decision-
making forms, and they ignore the specifie and diverse motivations that drove the 
individuals studied here in their policymaking. Moreover, they cannot account for 
1 See Fearon (1991, especially 184-185) for a conceptual discussion on this type of reasoning. 
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changes in individuals' thinking as they respond to changes in environment. 
Finally, each approach can shed sorne light on at best only one leader' s actions. 
But because they cannot account for the foreign policy decisions across leaders, 
they cannot account for foreign policy variation. They are thus limited in their 
usefulness as explanations for state behavior. 
Bach section below explains the specifie alternate approach, then 
discusses its theoretical weaknesses as weIl as its inability to successfully account 
for the actual empirical conditions they seek to explain. 
Structural Realism 
An explanation of foreign policy based on external stimuli or structural 
imperatives is typically Realist-based, with a focus on the distribution of power 
among state actors in the international system (usually referred to as Structural 
Realism) (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994/95). These accounts 
argue that the system's structure constrains the choices available to states, making 
them act in predictable ways that do not change as states' internaI make-up and 
conditions change (either over time or cross-nationaIly). 
Yet although aIl states do share sorne minimal common objectives, such as 
ensuring their survival as political/territorial units and enhancing theirprosperity, 
there are many other actions that states engage in that are not shared with aIl other 
states in the way that structural explanations posit. Structural Realist explanations 
fail to capture the relevant dynamics of foreign policy making, because of their 
assumption that structural forces compel aIl states to respond similarly to the same 
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events.2 Its emphasis on structural forces has led it to ignore domestic variables, 
designating them as sinful "reductionism" (Waltz 1979), but making it 
underspecified in the determination of state behavior. Even other Realists have 
recognized that this neglect of non-systemic factors is damaging to Structural 
Realist theories, since they cannot account for changes that result from non-
material factors (see Walt 1987; Wohlforth 1994/95).3 Moreover, Structural 
Realism has been singled out for criticism for an inability to explain political 
change, because of its focus on continuity: the end of the Cold War is the most 
frequently cited example of this.4 The Realist contention that change is the direct 
result of "the rise and de cline of states' relative power conditioned by the nature 
of the overall distribution of capabilities" (Wohlforth 1994/95, 105) is not borne 
out by the empirical evidence. 
At the same time, while international factors are relevant they are in many 
cases only enabling factors. Systemic theories in general are thus too 
indeterminate; they cannot account for causality. They help us identify general 
constraints and opportunities generated by international forces, but they cannot 
2 There is debate about whether systemic theories like Structural Realism can be used to explain 
individual states' foreign policy: Elman (1996), Farkas (1998), and Fearon (1998) argue that it 
cano For an opposing view, see Waltz (1996). Both Duffield (1999, 766) and Fearon (1998) make 
the compelling point that structural theories are in actuality theories of foreign policy, since the 
outcomes that systemic theories seek to explain (such as the balance ofpower, major power war, 
and so on) are thernselves actual foreign policies-or the direct result of foreign policy, even if 
unintended. It has also become common for scholars focusing on foreign policy in the security 
area to set their approaches and models up in opposition to Structural Realism; Katzenstein's 
edited 1996 volume, for examp1e, is explicit about doing this. 
3 One might argue that Realist attempts to incorporate non-structural or -materialist factors into a 
Realist framework effectively counters this criticism. As Legro and Moravscik (1999) argue, 
however, efforts to bring perceptual, cognitive, or other psychological or domestic political factors 
into a Realist framework dilutes Realism to the point where the core elements of the paradigm no 
longer operate-making it problematic to refer to such arguments as Realist. 
4 For criticisms of Structural Realism on these grounds, see Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994); 
Lebow (1994); and Risse-Kappen (1994). For a spirited defense of Realism against these attacks, 
see Wohlforth (1994/95). 
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tell us anything about the specific decisions that are taken, or the processes by 
which these decisions are arrived at.5 Finally, the parsimonious nature of such 
accounts may sacrifice too much explanatory power, because of its reduction in 
the number and scope of variables included (on this point see also Checkel1997). 
Structural Realism and the Oslo Accords 
Analyses of Israeli foreign policy have long focused on the causal impact 
of systemic pressures such as external threats (from the Arab states), inter-state 
enmities, superpower competition, and related influences (see for ex amples Bar-
Siman-Tov 1987; Inbar 1997; Safran 1978; Telhami 1990; Yaniv 1987). While it 
is true that these factors matter, it is less certain that they are causal in instances 
of foreign policy decision-making. For example, Bar-Siman-Tov (1987) makes a 
compelling argument that during wartime, superpower pressures can have a 
profound impact on the specific poli ci es of their clients and allies. Aside from the 
questions such an analysis raises on its own (and even Bar-Siman-Tov admits 
these are qualified conditions [239]), not all foreign policy decisions are about 
war. 6 More importantly, the consistency highlighted by structural explanations 
does not account for changes in Israeli foreign policy. 
5 In Stephen Haggard's words, "[i]t is undeniably true that the distribution of capabilities 
influences behavior, but these c1aims are not illuminating unless it is specified when these factors 
matter, how much they explain, and over what range of outcomes" (1991, 405; emphasis in 
original). See his chapter for a good critique of structural theories in general. See Gause (1999) 
and Noble (2004) for good discussions on the limitations of systemic theories in the context of 
Middle East foreign policies. 
6 The period under examination here also offers another empirical problem with superpower 
pressure as a foreign policy influence: US President George H.W. Bush put significant pressure on 
the Shamir government to make changes to its peace policy, even threatening at one point to 
withhold $10 billion in loan guarantees iflsrael did not move into line with Washington's wishes. 
Shamir resisted these pressures to the end, and they had no effect on his policy (see Arens 1995, 
Chapter 10). For a more detailed discussion of the loan guarantees dispute, see Rusonik (1992). 
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In the period examined here, profound regional and global changes had 
occurred that lasted through both the Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin prime 
ministerships. The dissolution of the Soviet Union by the beginning of the 1990s 
and the subsequent emergence of unchallenged American dominance meant 
Israel's primary enemies in the region (especially Syria) were left without a 
superpower patron. The defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War meant an end to one 
of the more serious military threats to Israel. And the PLO, after opting to support 
Saddam Hussein in the confrontation with Kuwait and then the United States, 
earned the hostility and anger of even its former Arab supporters. Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf states withdrew millions of dollars that supported PLO activities, 
and thousands of Palestinian workers were kicked out of the Persian Gulf states, 
meaning a loss in remittance income from these sources as well. At the same time, 
the effects of the intifada were tapering offin several areas: the shock value of the 
uprising had begun to wear off of international audiences because the violence 
had dragged on for so long, and Israelis and Palestinians were already negotiating 
with each other through the Madrid process, so there was no outside pressure on 
Israel to engage in immediate, drastic change. The onset of the Gulf crisis in 
August 1990 further diluted the attention paid to the Palestinian uprising. 
It would seem, then, that Israel was in a far stronger position in the 
regional balance of power in 1992 (the year of the Israeli elections that brought 
Rabin to power) than at any time since 1967. Structural Realist-based 
explanations would thus expect Israel to maintain the status quo, there being no 
reason to engage in bargaining with actors demonstrably weaker than it. This 
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helps to explain Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's policy, at least in part (see 
below). Alternately, the changes in the distribution of power in the international 
system, represented by the end of the Cold War, have been argued as changing the 
calculations of Israel, by providing it with an opportunity to impose terms more 
favorable to it (Smith 1996, 322). 
But the distribution of power was a constant among both Shamir and 
Rabin: these external changes cannot tell us why one prime minister chose to 
engage in negotiation, while the other did everything he could to avoid engaging 
in direct negotiations with the PLO that might result in anything other than the 
status quo (see also Telhami 1996,38-39). They also cannot explain why the Gulf 
War and its aftermath had no effect on Shamir, who continued to maintain the 
same position on dialogue with the PLO and peace talks in general. Focusing on 
external elements also ignores the relative importance of domestic features that 
matter: there would not have been such a profound shift in Israeli policy if a 
national election had not replaced the Shamir govemment with a Rabin 
government. A Structural Realist account is thus not very useful. 
Structural Realism and Lobbying for EU Membership 
There is no doubt that strategie considerations have pushed Turkey toward 
the West; the Soviet threat during the Cold War was a powerful motivator and 
helped cement ties with the United States and Western Europe. The end of the 
Cold War increased Turkey's threat perception, with the emergence of unstable 
and volatile regions on all sides of it, inc1uding the Middle East, the Balkans, and 
the Caucasus and Central Asia (Barkey 1996; Fuller 1993; Makovsky and Sayan 
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2000b; and Nachmani 2003; on the relationship between security and foreign 
policy in Turkey in general, see Robins 2003, Chapter 5). The Persian Gulf War 
in 1991, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
ethnic wars in the Balkans in the mid- and late-1990s, fighting in Chechnya in this 
same period, the continuing instability and crises in the Central Asian states, and 
the perception of competition for influence in the Caspian Sea basin with Russia 
and Iran have aIl made Ankara acutely aware of the potential negative impact aIl 
these issue-areas could have on Turkey. 
Given that Turkey perceived its security interests lay in stronger ties with 
the West and that it has remained a full member of most Western security and 
political institutions, it follows that Turkey might weIl use its relationship with 
Europe to enhance its security. Becoming a member of the EU would entitle 
Turkey to a host of economic, political, and military benefits that would 
strengthen it and make it better able to deal with the myriad concerns and threats 
surrounding it. 
There are two mam problems with such an analysis. First, it is too 
simplistic to argue that strategie considerations are the sole concern of Turkish 
policy makers, even staunch Kemalists. In fact, although it was the Kemalists who 
in the early republican period first oriented Turkish foreign policy toward the 
West, it was as the culmination of the emulation of Western civilization. 
Membership in Western institutional structures was seen as the foreign policy 
complement to domestic policies; moreover, it was the dream of the founder of 
modem Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, for Turkey to be a full member of 
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European civilization, not security structures (see Kinross 1964; Mango 2001); 
Kemalist actors throughout the Turkish state and society were committed to this. 
Beyond this, while it is true that relations with the United States were conditioned 
almost solely on strategie factors, this was not true of the relationship with Europe 
(see Müftüler-Bac 1997, Chapter 3). 
Second, more specifically in the context of this case study, Necmettin 
Erbakan simply did not think in security terms; his guiding. framework was 
Islamism, which although it might entail continued relations with Europe, pointed 
to a focus elsewhere-namely, the Islamic world. His repeated statements 
regarding the need to strengthen Turkey' s relations with the Islamic world testify 
to his concentration, and his ties to radical Islamic organizations and Islamic 
states considered pariahs by much of the international community underlines this. 
Although he allowed his foreign minister to manage the "European portfolio," he 
made no effort to actively pursue EU membership. 
Structural Realist-type explanations thus cannot explain either pnme 
minister's policies. In one attempt to utilize this type of understanding, Meltem 
Müftüler-Bac (1997) argues that Turkey's efforts to join the EU can be 
understood through this perspective, but even she unwittingly undermines this 
argument, since she notes that one of the motives for Turkish efforts to joïn the 
EU was "as the culmination of the Turkish orientation to the West" (54; emphasis 
added).7 Focusing on external imperatives presents too simplified a picture of 
7 She also undermines this argument in a later work, in which she argues that structural factors 
made Turkey less relevant to Europe, because the end of the Cold War removed Turkey's strategic 
relevance, highlighted its poor human rights record, and raised the importance of Central and 
Eastern European countries over Turkey (1999,245). 
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~ .. reality, since it does not distinguish between Europe and the United States (which 
was more important for security purposes than Europe), does not account for the 
ideational importance of Europe to Turkey, and ignores the highly relevant 
domestic and personal factors. Where one Islamist prime minister tried to avoid 
membership as a policy issue, the other actively committed himself to it but for 
strictly domestic political reasons. Structural Realist accounts are thus unhelpful 
for an understanding of foreign policy change. 
Constructivism 
Constructivist accounts of international politics focus on non-material, 
particularly social, elements-for example, actors' interpretations, social 
relationships, and ideational factors (ideas, norms, culture, identity) (see Checkel 
1998). Ideational factors in many cases, if not all, trump sheer material forces, 
because material forces on their own cannot determine state behavior. In 
Alexander Wendt's words, "people act toward objects, inc1uding other actors, on 
the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently 
toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and 
friends are not" (Wendt 1992,396-397; see also Checkel1998, 326; Wendt 1999, 
24). It is not the objective capabilities that enemies have that make them enemies, 
but rather the nature of the relationship. Offensive weapons are not threatening of 
themselves; they are only threatening when astate possessing them is perceived 
as hostile (Wendt 1992, 397; see also Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 
34). 
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Like Structural Realism, Constructivism has largely been a macro-
systemic analysis that has difficulty explaining specific foreign policies. Two 
examples of such an attempt inc1ude Jennifer Milliken's analysis of the Korean 
War (2001) and Karin Fierke's study of changes in East-West relations toward 
and after the end of the Cold War (1998). Yet both are inadequate, since they 
remain systemic analyses and thus suffer from the same indeterminacy as 
Structural Realism does. Despite their arguments to the contrary, they continue in 
the structural-Constructivist vein by explaining foreign policy change by 
reference to inter-state social interactions (macro processes). They faU into the 
same trap of indeterminacy as Structural Realism, by assuming away the role of 
specifie leaders and not delving into explanations of why leaders make the 
decisions they do. 
Milliken, for example, specifies her focus: "State behaviour is unlike an 
individual's behaviour in that state behaviour is made up of the activities of a 
variety of different persons and groups which represent astate" (2001, 21); and 
points out that her analysis "says absolutely nothing at aU about Kim Il Sung or 
Harry Truman and what motivated these and other individual state rulers" (2001, 
28). Instead, her locus is the interactions that unfold over time between states. For 
her part, Fierke also ignores the role of individuals by focusing instead on 
"grammars," which are large bounded arenas of interaction that constrain and 
guide behavior (Fierke 1998, 46). In neither case, despite the authors' c1aims that 
they are examining foreign policy, do foreign policy decisions stern from 
individual decision-making, but rather pressures from inter-state social 
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relationships. Individuals are thus shaped over time like clay by social and 
cultural contexts, with personal characteristics being irrelevant. Similar to 
Structural Realism, Constructivism's over-emphasis on overarching norms and 
frameworks has largely sidelined the role and impact of particular "agents" who 
specifically make decisions (see Checkel 1998,325). It is thus too imprecise. 
Constructivism and the Oslo Accords 
Few studies of Israeli foreign policy utilize a Constructivist framework. 
One exception is Barnett's (1996a) analysis of Israel's relationship with the 
United States. The relationship, Barnett argues, is conditioned on a shared 
identity-liberal democracy and Western orientation (ibid., 403). When Israeli 
identity began to change in the late 1980s, the foundation for the relationship 
cracked and led to problems (changes) in the relationship (ibid., 438). In the 
specific case of Oslo, Flamhaft has argued (1996, 94-95) that the global changes 
in the form of the end of the Cold War forced Israel to reconsider its own policies, 
and, in line with changing international normative structures, to choose peace 
with the PLO as a necessary alternative to hostility. 
The problem with such an approach is the same identified above regarding 
Structural Realism: it is too indeterminate. Rabin certainly recognized that 
changing international circumstances conditioned changing social relations 
between states, and allowed Israel to move toward a more cooperative foreign 
policy (see Inbar 1999, 134-139), which eventually led to Oslo. But Shamir faced 
the same changed circumstances, yet drew the opposite conclusion from Rabin: he 
felt that Israel could not let its guard down. He insisted, for example, in a March 
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1991 interview that Israel's regional position had not improved despite the 
obvious positive changes in the global arena (i.e., the end of the Cold War, and 
the establishment of diplomatie relations with India, China, and Russia) 
(Jerusalem Post 29 March 1991, 7; see Chapter 5 for more). In other words, the 
two prime ministers held very different ideas about the social structures of the 
regional and global systems, and so had very different ideas about the contours of 
Israeli foreign policy. This was most obvious in policy toward talks with the PLO 
and a Palestinian state: Shamir was adamantly opposed to both, while Rabin was 
willing to chance them and-in the end-engaged in policies that included these 
very objectives. Constructivism cannot account for this variation in foreign policy 
because Israel's social relations with other states did not change from Shamir's 
tenure to Rabin's. 
Constructivism and Lobbying for EU Membership 
Constructivist accounts of Turkish foreign policymaking are even less 
common than with Israel; instead, analysts focus on strategie imperatives 
(security) or domestic politics (Kemalism). However, we can imagine that such an 
argument would go something like this: Turkey' s relations with Europe are 
conditioned by social forms. When relations between the two were sour (based on 
the promulgation in 1993 of the Copenhagen Criteria and the European view that 
the recently enacted Customs Union between the two was more of a "mechanism 
to improve cooperation" and not related to full membership [Eralp 2000, 180]), 
Erbakan as prime minister sought to reorient Turkey away from Europe and 
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toward the Islamic world. By the time relations had improved,8 Erdogan had come 
to power and therefore worked under a very different (and more positive) set of 
social structures, which conditioned his efforts to seek full membership in the EU. 
This argument is not effective for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that 
economic factors in large part drove Turkey' s desire for c10ser relations with 
Europe in the 1990s, factors which were completely separate from social 
interpretation. Beginning just before the coup in September 1980 Turkey began its 
shi ft from an import-substitution policy to an export-oriented strategy: trade as a 
percentage of Gross National Product increased from 15.7% in 1980 to 23.4% in 
1990 and 40.8% in 2000 (Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade 2005). At the same 
time, Europe was becoming Turkey' s most important trading partner: by 1990 the 
EU accounted for 56.5% of Turkish exports and 45.8% of Turkish imports (ibid.). 
Individual European countries (especially Germany, Britain, France, and Italy) 
similarly occupied the top positions in trade. 
Second, more specifically, Erdogan has engaged in his foreign policies 
primarily for domestic political reasons-to reduce the influence of the military in 
policymaking and to ensure legal and political guarantees that Islam would not be 
repressed in the public sphere. His priority is domestic reforms, and the EU is 
8 The improvement in relations was based on several factors: First, both Brussels and Ankara 
realized that excluding Turkey would damage the relationship and that such neglect could not be 
sustained much longer. Second, the 1998 change in Germany's government from the Christian 
Democrat coalition to a Social-Democrat-Green coalition led to a more open and inclusive attitude 
regarding EU expansion and Turkey. Third, a severe earthquake that struck Turkey in August 
1999 led to a sympathetic response on the part of Greece, including a decision not to veto 
Turkey's candidacy. Fourth, the EU decided at the December 1999 Helsinki summit to accept 
Turkey as an official candidate. Fifth, the EU at its Nice Summit in December 2000 approved an 
Accession Partnership with Turkey setting out a road map for membership. And sixth, non-
Islamist governments passed a series of domestic reforms between October 2001 and February 
2002 to bring Turkish political and legal structures in !ine with European standards. 
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seen as an instrument in this regard (see Chapter 7). His efforts have not, 
therefore, been conditioned on the changed nature of the Turkish-European 
relationship. A focus on macro social structures thus ignores the critical role of 
the individual beliefs of leaders, and the impact they have on foreign policy. 
Public Opinion 
A third plausible motivation in foreign policy making relies on the 
competition for power between politicians. Given that politicians seek public 
support to remain in office, one might intuitively think that leaders engage in 
policies that are popular, in order to retain public goodwill and support. There is a 
substantial literature on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy making 
that cannot be reviewed here.9 Using specific examples drawn largely from 
American politics, this literature has pointed out the relevance of public opinion 
on leaders' policy calculations. There are, however, several theoretical and 
empirical defects to such an account of foreign policy making. 
Risse-Kappen (1991, 480-484) sums up these weaknesses as being far too 
simplistic: in many cases, decision-making elites and masses show similar 
support for the same foreign policy goals, while many foreign policies are chosen 
without any public consensus at all. Such an approach also ignores the fact that 
9 For sorne examp1es, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode (1990); Berger (1998); Foyle (1999); O. 
Holsti (2004); and Ostrom and Job (1986) (and the citations therein). For an understanding ofthis 
type ofpolitical behavior as economically rational, see Downs (1957) and Siverson (1998). Note 
that there is much more consensus on the link between public opinion and domestic public policy. 
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sorne societal groups may impact the policymaking process at different times, 
through different means, and on different issues. lO 
More generally, the causallink between public opinion and foreign policy 
has been identified as murky (O. Hoisti 2004, 56-69, Chapter 7; O. Hoisti 1992; 
Page and Shapiro 1983; Rosenau 1961; Sobel 2001, 9). Congruence has been 
demonstrated, but causality has been more difficult to establish both theoretically 
and empirically. The evidence suggests that public opinion tends more to set the 
foreign policy parameters within which decision makers operate, rather than 
pointing to specifie policy options: it "has a gui ding or limiting influence on 
policy. Support permits or facilitates, while opposition limits or deters, 
policymakers' discretion" (Sobel 2001, 10). Even where it does matter, its role 
tends to be issue-specific, and, more importantly,highly subject to numerous 
other factors, inc1uding personality, domestic political conditions, and external 
events (see Foyle 1999; Powlick and Katz 1998; Risse-Kappen 1991; and Rosati 
1999, 384-389).11 Finally, evidence has suggested that public attitudes may be 
used instrumentally-not to formulate policies, but to help design ways of 
manipulating society into accepting preferred policy (Cruz 2000, 277-278; Jacobs 
and Shapiro 2000). 
Public opinion might be most consequential in electoral terms: politicians 
are brought into office in order to engage in specifie policies deemed appropriate 
by the populace (see, for example, Bunce 1981; Hoisti 1992, 452). But focusing 
10 This also raises problems of measurement. How questions are phrased in surveys that help 
determine public attitudes, ev en the order they are presented, may be highly relevant (see Holsti 
2004, 310-315). 
Il For an opposing argument, see Eichenberg and Sto11 (2003). 
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on elections ignores two critical elements: First, they cannot account for the fact 
that leaders do not always know the specifie policies they will engage in; elections 
are more about general, even vague, policy positions. Once in office, politicians 
can also undergo a learning process that society cannot anticipate-or even 
change their minds. Broadly speaking, elections may help to explain the timing of 
a policy shi ft, but not why a specific policy was chosen from among other 
alternatives. 
Second, focusing on elections does not take into account changes in 
domestic or international environments that occur after elections, and must be 
dealt with; therefore, voters have no way of anticipating what will happen and 
how their leaders will react beforehand. President George Bush was elected in the 
United States in 1987, but the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred in August 1990. 
While scholars might be able to argue in advance, based on investigation of 
leaders' personalities, how an individual might react, the general population 
would not. At the same time, events that occur after elections can unfold rapidly 
and in different ways, thus making it difficult for anyone to predict specific 
policy. To continue with the Iraq example, while Bush stopped the US-Ied 
coalition attack once Iraq was thrown out of Kuwait and intended to stop any 
intrusion into Iraq itself, the Shi 'ite and Kurdish rebellions and, especially, the 
violent reaction by the Iraqi military to put them down pushed the US to do what 
it had not wanted to in the first place: put considerable time and resources into 
Iraq, through enforcement of the no-fly zones over the north and south of the 
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country. The Bush Administration had been public1y c1ear about avoiding any 
investment ofthis kind, but events compelled it to act otherwise. 
Public Opinion and the Oslo Accords 
Although public opinion does not feature prominently III analyses of 
Israeli foreign policy, given the remarkable nature of this "revolution" in Israeli 
policy, it would be reasonable to assume that Rabin could not have signed the 
Oslo Accords ifhe was not sure that public opinion supported him (Auerbach and 
Greenbaum [2000] provide the strongest argument on this). Both Michael Bamett 
(2002) and Mira Sucharov (2005) argue, for example, that any Palestinian-Israeli 
peace treaty would have to fit with national identity/role conception. Sucharov in 
particular presents a strong argument regarding the importance of the public' s 
understanding of its own identity and its contribution to Rabin's willingness to 
engage in the Oslo Accords. Such accounts point to a dovishness in Israeli public 
opinion that both provided support for and helped nudge politicians toward a 
more conciliatory policy toward the PLO and the Palestinians. The leftward drift 
in the Labor party itself (see Inbar 1991) provides further proof of this. Indeed, 
Asher Arian, a prominent analyst of Israeli public opinion, has found that from 
the 1980s to the early 1990s there was a "creeping dovishness" that slowly moved 
public opinion toward conciliation with the Palestinians (1995, Chapter 4; Shamir 
and Arian 1990, 78; see also Goldberg, Barzilai, and Inbar 1991; Levinsohn and 
Katz 1993, 53-63). 
The problem with this analysis is twofold. First, Israeli decision-making in 
the foreign policy arena is highly personalized and centralized, with little room 
39 
for any sustained consideration of public OpInIOn. This stems from several 
sources: One, the growing centralization of the Israeli decision-making. Israel's 
first prime ministers, especially David Ben-Gurion, enhanced personal control 
over foreign and security policy, and the development of the prime minister's 
office through subsequent prime ministers further entrenched this process legally, 
politically, and normatively (see Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002). The heavy 
institutionalization of political parties in Israel has also meant that politics is 
played out primarily within and through the party (see Arian 1998, 73; Eisenstadt 
1985; Horowitz and Lissak 1978; Shimshoni 1982; Yishai 1991), with little room 
for voters to have an impact on electoral candidates.12 
Two, in their study on the increasing centralization of power among prime 
ministers, Arian, Nachmias, and Amir found that there is no evidence Israeli 
prime ministers felt the need to bring in public opinion for a policy they 
considered important (2002, 154). In fact, Arian (1995) found that politicians 
considered public opinion relatively malleable, and available for manipulation to 
support their policies. Support among Jewish Israelis for the peace process, for 
example, increased significantly after the Oslo Accords were signed (see Arian 
1993, 3, 8), an indication that public opinion often reacts to events rather than 
determines them. 
12 In addition, the proportional representation system, in which parties present a list of candidates 
to the entire country as a single constituency, provides no opportunity for voters to influence 
individual candidates; parties control who becomes a candidate, and parties are responsive to 
broad segments of the population. Altemate1y, if a core group ob tains control of the central 
committee mechanisrns that decide on parties' lists, they can make these lists reflect their own 
ideological and policy preferences, regardless of how much it fits with broader public opinion. 
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Three, the Israeli public has tended to accept the decisions of government 
in foreign and security matters, particularly in the context of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In their 1988 analysis, Arian, Talmud, and Hermann found that "there is 
tremendous deference in Israel to the leadership precisely because security 
problems are so difficult and intractable. Public opinion' appears to be more 
reactive than active, more led than leading" (82; see also S. Cohen 1995, 9). In 
this same vein, Makovsky points to public opinion polIs during the 1991 Gulf 
War. Before the war, polIs showed a majority favored retaliation if Iraq fired 
SCUDs at Israel; but once the government invoked its restraint policy, 80% 
supporting the govemment's position on non-involvement (1996, 78). 
A public opinion explanation of the Oslo Accords might be strongest 
when considering the 1992 elections, when voters replaced a Shamir govemment 
with a Rabin government. Since the public made an obvious choice between 
different parties, we might assume that they were aware that sorne degree of 
policy difference (i.e., change) would be the result. In 1992 voters chose the 
Labor Party, which since the 1980s had come to represent a much more left-
leaning position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and, especialIy, policy toward the 
WBG (Inbar 1991). Combined with the "creeping dovishness" among the 
population, it would be reasonable to assume, then, as sorne observers have (King 
1994, 97; Ross 2004, 85; Slater 1996, 501-502) that Israelis brought Rabin to the 
prime ministry because they wanted a change in policy toward the Palestinians. 
There are three problems with this assumption. First, the voters did not 
bring Rabin in because he had promised to talk directly to the PLO and negotiate 
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the beginnings of an independent Palestinian state. As Makovsky notes, "not once 
during the election did Rabin mention swapping land for peace, even though the 
Labor platform called explicitly for territorial compromise" and that he "avoided 
making the election a referendum on the idea of trading land for peace" (1996, 85, 
86).13 Makovsky continues that "he did not confuse the Israeli public's 
willingness to probe the seriousness of potential Arab peace interlocutors with a 
desire to make sweeping a priori territorial concessions" (1996, 86).14 At the 
same time, Labor was careful not to offer distinct alternative positions on many of 
the foreign (and domestic) policy positions advocated by Likud, focusing instead 
on valence issues (those on which there is widespread agreement) (see Mendilow 
1995).15 In lnbar's words, "Labor won the elections precisely because it refrained 
from advocating a dovish platform" (1995, 40).16 
Second, relatedly, the vote for Labor was in many cases a vote against 
Likud. This meant that the electorate was not looking for Labor and Rabin's 
specifie policies, but an alternative from Likud and Shamir's policies: that voters 
switched for a variety of domestic "system management" or socioeconomic 
reasons (Arian and Shamir 1995; Aronoff 1995, 1993; Mendilow 1995; Reich, 
Wurmser, and Dropkin 1995; Shachar and Shamir 1995). Arian and Shamir write 
13 Rabin did daim he was willing to get rid of Gaza, seeing it as an economic, moral, political, and 
military drain (Makovsky 1996, 86). He also specifically stated that there was "no chance" he 
would abandon the West Bank during his first term (Elazar and Sandler 1995, 12). 
14 Prominent Labor doves who did weIl in the party primaries and supported such policies, such 
Haim Ramon, A vraham Burg, and Yael Dayan were not given significant roles in the campaign. 
15 For example, according to Mendilow (2003, 139) controversial foreign and security issues that 
took up 37% of all of Labor's broadcast time during the 1988 election made up only 5% of 
Labor's messages in 1992. 
16 This is in contrast to the 1988 election, in which Peres, as leader, conducted a campaign that 
emphasized the differences on foreign policy issues between Labor and Likud. The effort led to a 
decline in perceptions of Labor's ability to look out for Israel's interests. See Inbar (1992); 
Steinberg (1992, 173-186); and Torgovnik (1992, 74-77). 
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specifically that Labor's focus on socioeconomic priorities "could appeal not only 
to Likud voters with more conciliatory attitudes toward the territories, but also to 
hard-line voters who were not willing to give up the territories but felt that their 
direct concems of employment and opportunity were being neglected because of 
the Likud govemment's order of priorities" (1995, 40).17 This was underlined by 
the feeling that the 1990-1992 govemment, led by Likud but relying on the 
extremist far-right parties and the religious parties, reduced the Likud's image as 
a centrist party. 
Finally, concentration on elections cannot account for the specifie policies 
a leader engages in, since elections are more about broad, sometimes vague, 
positions. This conclusion is enhanced when a leaming process takes place, or is 
continuing. Rabin simply did not know in 1992 what policy he would choose: he 
not only rejected several attempts to bring the govemment into contact with the 
PLO, but his altemate hard-hne stance on security issues18 and dovish 
pronouncements indicate that he was unsure himself what direction he wanted to 
move in. Rabin only came to trust the secret channel when he leamed that the 
Washington talks would not move forward without PLO permission, and when 
Beilin, Peres, Savir, and, especially, Singer (whom he most trusted) reported 
positively on the Oslo talks. 
17 In the last several weeks before the election, a poll found that of potential Likud defectors, 
21.6% pointed to unemployment as their determining factor, 18.9% to socioeconomic conditions, 
16.2% to government corruption and inefficiency, and 13.5% to appeal of Rabin as leader. Gnly 
1.7% mentioned the settlement issue at all (Mendilow 1995, 221). 
18 Such as the deportation of 415 Ramas activists in December 1992 into the wintry no-man's land 
in Lebanon, the sealing off of the WBG in spring 1993, and the bombardment of Lebanon in July 
1993. 
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Public opinion does matter. It was important for Rabin, since it both 
contributed to his electoral victory and provided a responsive public attitude for 
his policies. As Auerbach and Greenbaum (2000) point out, Rabin used private 
polling data to gauge popular attitudes in order to formulate his policy messages. 
But it seems public opinion was used less to shape policy than how to present it. 
According to the authors, Rabin gauged his image as a security hawk by the polls; 
but he did this to gain credibility so that he could engage with the Palestinians. At 
the same time, public opinion had not moved substantially in the direction that 
Rabin eventually did with Oslo. Support for a Palestinian state among the Jewish 
public never reached higher than 40% (see the figure in Arian, Nachmias, and 
Amir 2002, 123). Because public opinion never reached a majority, it is hard to 
argue that Rabin used it to do something beyond what the public was willing to 
accept. More importantly, though, because the same explanation cannot account 
for Shamir's lack of change, public opinion is not a deep enough analysis, and so 
only tells part of the story. 
Public Opinion and Lobbying for EU Membership 
As in Israel, public opinion in Turkey is generally considered to play a 
minor role in foreign policy making. However, it has been noted that popular 
opinion, combined with intensive media attention, can impact on foreign policy 
issues with high emotive value and symbolism, particularly on Cyprus and 
relations with Greece (e.g., Makovsky and Sayan 2000a, 7). Moreover, 
consistently large numbers of Turks support EU membership: a poll conducted in 
1995 revealed that two-thirds of Turks supported strong ties with Europe (White 
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1997, 30), while a May/June 2002 survey conducted by the respected research 
institute TESEV found that a similar number (64%) still supported EU 
membership (TESEV 2002, 38). Based on this, it would be reasonable to assume 
that Erdogan believed he was constrained by public opinion toward Europe, and 
had to engage in active efforts at membership. 
But the study of the link between public opinion and foreign policy in 
Turkey is very under-developed. There has been little academic study on this 
topic (see Çarkoglu 2003, 172; Makovsky and Sayan 2000a, 6). Theoretical and 
empirical lacunae thus prevent an adequate understanding of the role of popular 
demands on foreign policy making and make any empirical conclusions difficult 
to sustain. 
Beyond this, there are two main problems with using public opinion to 
explain Turkish foreign policy toward the EU. First, the Turkish population seems 
to hold little interest in foreign affairs in general-meaning that while Turks may 
hold positive views of the EU, this does not translate into active lobbying efforts 
on membership. A mid-1997 survey found that 57% of Turks were "not 
interested" in foreign policy, and only 23% "interested" (cited in Makovsky and 
Sayan 2000a, 6). While the media has given foreign affairs much coverage, and 
foreign affairs columnists among the major newspapers can have significant 
influence on various issues, this has not percolated down through society in 
general. Andrew Mango, a long-time and keen observer of Turkey, writes that 
these issues interest "most people in Turkey only to the extent that events abroad 
affect their livelihood .... But for most ordinary people it is il subject of platonic 
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interest, something to discuss idly in front of the family TV set" (2004, 115).19 It 
might be argued that membership in the EU would impact on the economic 
capacities of Turks and Turkey, given the free flow of goods, services, and people 
within a huge geographic area, but this is debatable. The reality of the Customs 
Union and the increasing lowering of trade barriers under the WTO's free trade 
regime already provide many of these benefits, and the strong and persistent 
political and economic nationalism that permeates much of Turkish society might 
well offset this. 
Second, also as in Israel, foreign policy making in Turkey is an elite affair, 
particularly of the state elite.20 This stems from the tradition of the strong state in 
Turkey (see Heper 1985). As Robins put it, "[t]he state tradition in Turkey is that 
the people exist to serve the state rather than the state existing to serve the people" 
(2003, 89). This long-entrenched practice of ignoring public opinion began in the 
Atatürk period, when the Kemalists engaged in a series of domestic reforms 
designed to separate society from one of its historical guiding precepts, Islam. 
Many of these reforms were not widely, or easily, accepted, particularly in rural 
areas, but this was irrelevant to those who wanted to impose a new political and 
social system on the country. Numerous other examples exist to support this 
argument: Operation Provide Corn/art, the enforcement of the no-fly zone over 
northem Iraq, was never popular but its mandate was always renewed by 
19 As an example, he cites the low turnout to a rally in Istanbul in 1994 to protest the treatment of 
Bosnian Muslirns, despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of Turks are descended from 
refugees from Bosnia (2004, 115). 
20 Robins identifies the main actors in foreign policy making as the president, the prime minister, 
the foreign minister, the army, and the foreign ministry bureaucracy (itself a mini-elite within the 
state apparatus) (2003, 68-79). 
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successive and varied govemments. And when in June 1999 a Turkish court 
sentenced Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the militant separatist Kurdistan 
Workers Party (Partiya Karkerana Kurdistan-PKK) to death, the govemment 
decided, in deference to relations with the EU, not to carry out the sentence 
despite the wild popularity the sentence gamered among the public. 
Policy making in Turkey is also an affair of the political elite (Çarkoglu 
2003). Until the advent of multi-party democracy in 1946, the Republican 
People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), the only legal party, ran the 
govemment. From 1950 to the military coup in 1960 it was the Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti-DP). In both cases, the party supplied ministers and other top 
officiaIs to the govemment and bureaucracy. The coming to power of the DP, 
especially, emphasized this trend: it sought to replace CHP-affiliated officiaIs 
with its own loyalists, and in what has been called the "colonization" of the 
bureaucracy (Ozbudun 2000, 36; see also Heper and Sayan 2002). This practice 
was followed by successive parties-inc1uding the Islamists, though they were 
much less successful. The breaking down of politics into a series of parties 
concemed with their own interests, personal conflicts between leaders, and efforts 
to implant their partisans into the state (Sayan 2002) has meant that policy 
making has been relegated to secondary concem and reflective of whatever party 
holds the relevant policymaking bureau at the time. 
The weakest argument within this framework is an electoral politics one. 
As with public opinion more generally, it has been pointed out that there are few 
aggregate studies of voting in Turkey, so that little is known about electoral 
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behavior (Esmer 2002). This complicates any theoretical analysis of the impact of 
elections on foreign policy making. In fact, where studies have pointed out the 
importance of the 2002 elections, it has been in domestic terms and not foreign 
policy orientation (see, for examples, Müftüler-Bac 2004; Ozel 2003). What is 
most obvious about the 1995 and the 2002 elections is that they did not give the 
Islamist governments a mandate to engage in either an Islamist agenda or an 
active effort to obtain EU membership. White (1997, 26) calculates that non-
Islamic parties received four-fifths of the vote in 1995. Vertigans (2003, 76) 
points out that the Islamist victory in 2002 really represented only 25% of the 
electorate, once spoiled ballots and those who voted for other parties are taken 
into account; much of the Islamist electoral support was about voting against 
other parties as it was about voting for the Islamists. These are not electoral 
mandates on which to base policy shifts, in any direction. At the same time, 
significant support for both parties was based on a variety of domestic 
motivations, inc1uding demands for provision of better socio-economic goods, 
which the Islamists had done at the municipallevel (see Heper 1997, 36; White 
2002), frustration and resentment toward the established parties and the promise 
of a fresher approach (Sayan 1996), and a general expressions of "dissatisfaction· 
with the existing order" (Narli 1999,41). 
Public opinion is relevant for any explanation of Turkish policy toward the 
EU, since engaging in active efforts to secure Turkish membership is made easier 
by the majority support provided by the population. But because it was a constant 
during both Erbakan's and Erdogan's tenures, while it might help explain in part 
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Erdogan's foreign policy, it cannot explain the foreign policy variation between 
the two. Most importantly, the two elections in Tutkey highlighted here do not 
explain foreign policy variation among the Islamist prime ministers. Both 
belonged to the same type of party, received similar levels of support from the 
population, yet engaged in very different-even contradictory-foreign policies. 
Poliheuristic Theory 
Poliheuristic theory was designed to incorporate the cognitive processes of 
individual leaders with a rational choice-style (expected utility) selection of 
strategies. According to the theory, when making decisions leaders pass through 
two phases. The first is a noncompensatory phase in which leaders eliminate all 
the possible policy options that might harm them in domestic political terms21 
through the use of heuristics (mental shortcuts) that tell them which policies are 
acceptable. In the second stage individuals utilize an expected utility framework 
to rationally choose from the remaining options the one that maximizes benefits 
and minimizes risks/harm (Mintz 2004; Mintz and Geva 1997). 
There are two theoretical flaws that undermine poliheuristic theory's 
usefulness for a study of foreign policy variation. First, although it is an important 
contribution to our understanding of foreign policy decision-making, because it 
tries to combine cognitive processes with expected utility theory, in the end it de-
emphasizes the former while over-emphasizing the latter to the point where 
cognitive processes play no role in decision-making. Because poliheuristic theory 
21 This can inc1ude any of the following: 10ss in popular support; threat to survival; a drop in 
public support for a particular policy; potential electoral defeat; inter- or intra-party opposition and 
competition; collapse of a government; and so on (see Mintz 2004, 9). 
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assumes that the cognitive shortcut used in the first stage of decision-making is 
political survival, there is little if any difference between this and an expected 
utility approach that argues that politicians' highest goals are to stay in power and 
act accordingly (see Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; 
Downs 1957; Siverson 1998). 
It becomes, then, essentially an exercise in rational choice. And while 
rational choice is useful for the study of international relations (particularly in 
terms of prediction), this usefulness depends on the question being asked. 
Because it assumes that the structure of incentives is the same for aH leaders, 
poliheuristic theory ends up ignoring individuals' cognitive and emotional 
decision-making processes (see Stein and Welch 1997). It cannot explain why 
different individuals act differently under the same circumstances. It cannot 
pro vide an effective explanation of what are at bottom decisions based on 
individualleaders' specific cognitive and affective structures. Poliheuristic theory 
cannot explain foreign policy variation since it does not investigate the different 
motivations that drive different leaders, assuming instead that they are aU 
motivated by the same incentive structures (in this case, domestic political 
survival) (on this critique, see McDermott 2004, 14).22 
Second, poliheuristic theory over-emphasizes domestic political concerns 
as driving the elimination of alternatives in the first phase of decision-making 
22 Similarly, proponents of poliheuristic the ory also acknowledge that on any given dimension 
(especially the political one) in the first phase of decision-rnaking, there is a cutoff point be10w 
which an alternative is considered problematic enough that it is eliminated as an option. The only 
way to know that cutoff, though, is to know the individual decision-rnaker, which requires in-
depth study of her personality characteristics. Poliheuristic theory does not engage in this type of 
exploration, and so misses a critical elernent in the decision-making process. 
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(e.g., DeRouen and Sprecher 2004, 57; Goertz 2004, 15). In Mintz' words, 
"[p ]olitical leaders almost by definition take into account political factors and 
consequences while making decisions. They measure success and failure, costs 
and benefits, gains and losses, and risks and rewards in political units" (Mintz 
2003, 3). These are the "essence of decision," since an decisions stem from 
domestic political considerations (Mintz 2004, 7). This has, as one scholar put it, 
seemed to act "very close to an absolute constraint on policy making" (Stem 
2004, 110). 
There is little doubt, of course, that politicians would pre fer to be in than 
out of power. But that this is such an overriding motivation that it conditions how 
leaders choose among their alternatives is not necessarily so. Such an over-
emphasis ignores the complexity of individuals and their thinking processes, and 
how these impact on which alternatives are chosen and which are rejected. Sorne 
leaders are less focused on their standing, particularly when they believe very 
strongly in a particular course of action or hold fast to a specific ideology. 
Poliheuristic theory claims to utilize the psychological characteristics of 
individuals as the defining feature of the first stage of decision making, but by 
focusing almost solely on domestic political considerations, it ignores them. 
Poliheuristic Theory and the Oslo Accords 
Poliheuristic theory fails to capture the dynamics behind both Shamir' s 
and Rabin's decision-making regarding the PLO and a Palestinian state in the 
WBG, because of its emphasis on identical incentive structures, concern for 
political survival. But both prime ministers engaged in policies that were 
51 
unpopular among significant portions of their domestic constituencies, in 
Shamir's case eventually causing him the ultimate political harm-the loss of an 
election and a removal from office. Shamir and Rabin both interpreted their 
environments differently, and both not only utilized incentive structures different 
from what poliheuristic theory predicts, but also dissimilar from each other. 
It seems that Rabin's decision-making is more amenable to a poliheuristic 
approach. He did, after aIl, use polling data to gauge the public' s willingness to 
engage in serious efforts at peace talks with the Palestinians (see Auberbach and 
Greenbaum 2000). The problem with such an explanation is that it ignores 
Rabin's lack of concern with domestic political considerations once he decided to 
go with Oslo, particularly in the aftermath of the agreement when terrorism 
against Israelis continued and the public began questioning the .wisdom of 
bringing the PLO into the WBG. In January 1995, for instance, after a series of 
particularly horrifie terrorist attacks, he insisted that "1 know that many of you are 
asking, have you brought us peace, or terror? The road to peace is not 
easy .... There is no other alternative. We will achieve peace, for this is the 
solution for the long term, and for terrorism, even if it is difficult for us now" 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995b). If Rabin were more amenable to domestic 
political considerations in 1992-1993, why would he not be in 1993-1995, 
particularly when the latter period saw a much greater degree of popular 
dissatisfaction with him? The focus on po1itical survival, as predicted by 
poliheuristic theory, does not apply to Rabin's decision-making. 
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The case of Shamir illustrates even more strongly the weakness of 
poliheuristic theory due to its focus on political concems as incentive for 
decision-making. Shamir acted before and during the 1992 election campaign 
(when one might expect leaders to be most concemed with domestic political 
considerations) in decidedly un-rational ways. He simply did not care about 
political consequences. First, from 1989 to 1992 he insisted that Israel would not 
allow any PLO member to join Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, he refused to 
commit Israel to anything beyond the administrative autonomy envisaged for 
Palestinians in the 1978 Camp David Accords, and he maintained that Israel 
would continue to settle the WBG. This he insisted on in the face of growing 
American pressure, to the point where he provoked a public clash with the Bush 
Administration (on the loan guarantees; see Rusonik 1992). Since good relations 
with the us were a staple of Israeli foreign policy since the 1970s, Shamir's 
actions aroused concem among the Israeli public and augmented their 
dissatisfaction with him (Arian and Shamir 1995, 49). 
Second, even more glaringly at odds with poliheuristic theory, Shamir 
insisted throughout the election campaign on stressing his ideas about settlements 
in the WBG and the importance of the Land ofIsrael, even in the face of evidence 
that such declarations were only hanning his and Likud's chance for re-election 
(see, for example, Arens 1995). The Russian immigrant community, for example, 
was a natural constituency for Likud, but its focus at this point was on its 
members' economic status. Yet instead of providing sympathy and solutions for 
them, Shamir called for them "to elevate the welfare of the country' s strategic 
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calculus [that is, settlements in the WBG] above any personal goals or difficuIties 
they were presently enduring" (Nisan 1995,48). Toward the end of the campaign, 
in recognition of this, Likud finally began to "bypass" a focus on Shamir in favor 
offocusing on attacking Rabin (see Halevi and Susser 1992). 
Poliheuristic thus cannot explain the variation in Israeli policy that was 
Oslo, because it cannot exp1ain t~e motivations behind Shamir's and Rabin's 
decisions. It assumes that leaders work under an incentive structure that stresses 
political surviva1, but both Rabin and Shamir ignored these incentives in favor of 
po1icies that they personally believed were most appropriate. It contributed to 
Shamir's e1ectoral 10ss, and significantly undermined support for Rabin by the 
time of his murder in 1995. It therefore cannot provide an exp1anation for the 
Israeli case study. 
Poliheuristic Theory and Lobbying for EU Membership 
A po1iheuristic approach might in fact be able to explain Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan's foreign policy on active lobbying for EU membership.23 As explained 
in Chapter 7, Erdogan learned from the experience of others that the Turkish 
military was prepared to block any foreign policies that it did not deem 
appropriate. There was, in other words, a high domestic political cost that 
conditioned Erdogan's decision-making and made him reluctant to antagonize the 
relevant actors. He therefore chose from among a remaining set of alternatives a 
policy that would not anger the military, and thus keep him safe in his position. 
23 Poliheuristic the ory has not yet been applied to Turkey. Mintz (2004, 8-9) refers to Turkey in a 
few paragraphs but without any sustained or in-depth analysis. His conclusion there is also open to 
debate. 
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The effort to join the EU was seen by Erdogan as part of a broader strategy to 
relieve the Islamist movement of constrictive military pressure. 
But though it might shed light on Erdogan's decision-making, 
poliheuristic theory does not do so for Erbakan. It cannot explain Erbakan's overt 
efforts to engage in a policy unpopular with these "veto players" (the term is 
Mintz's [2004, 9]), antagonizing them to the point where it became obvious even 
to Erbakan that his political position was in danger. In the end, he provoked the 
1997 "soft coup," in which the military not only pressured him out of office, but 
engaged in a sustained campaign for sorne years against the Islamist movement in 
general. The argument that Erbakan may have been more concemed with his 
Islamist base than with the military does not hold; already by 1996 Erbakan had a 
reputation as someone who overrode the concems of his supporters, even joining 
coalition govemments twice (1974 and 1996) that included parties the Islàmists 
were diarnetrically opposed to, despite the objections of his party colleagues 
(Atacan 2005, 190-191; Ozbudun 2000, 92; Ozdalga 2002, 137-138). In short, 
Erbakan sirnply did not care all that much about any type of domestic opposition 
and so the incentive structures posited by poliheuristic theory cannot explain his 
foreign policy. 
Poliheuristic theory is thus not insightful as an explanation of foreign 
policy variation. It cannot account for the actions ofboth Islamist prime rninisters, 
and thus cannot help us better understand foreign policy variation. 
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Prospect Theory 
Like poliheuristic theory, prospect theory is a decision-making model that 
incorporates individual cognitive processes to explain why people engage in risk-
seeking or risk-avoiding behavior. First, prospect theory notes that individuals 
have a particular reference point around which they base their decisions. People 
are more sensitive to losses than to gains from this reference point. That is, they 
overvalue losses compared to comparable gains-"losses hurt more than gains 
gratify" (Levy 1998, 97). Second, people engage in a two-stage decision-making 
process: In the first stage, individuals "edit" their alternatives by identifying their 
reference point, the available options around that reference point, and the value of 
each option. In the second stage, individuals evaluate their options based on the 
value they ascribe to them and weight them with probabilities to settle on their 
eventual choice. At bottom, individuals are so loss averse that they are willing to 
take considerable risk to avoid the loss, despite the fact that an even greater loss 
may well result (see Kahneman and Tversky 2000, Chapters 1,2, and 7).24 
There are, however, two theoretical weaknesses inherent in prospect 
theory that undermine its capacity to explain foreign policy variation. First, 
despite its numerous and robust findings from both experimental evidence and 
International Relations, prospect theory has not been able to explain the process 
of how individuals frame decisions (Boettcher 2004, 332; Fischer and Johnson 
1986, 58; McDermott 2004, 304-305). The conditions under which and how 
actors identify reference points ("framing") has not been specified; in large 
24 These are reprinted articles from the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. AU of the main studies that 
formed the core of prospect theory's early research program and laid out the basic model are found 
in this edited volume. 
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measure this is because different individuals will identify different reference 
points. Levy (2000, 200) emphasizes this by illustrating the methodological 
problem of inferring an individual's reference point by looking at behavior, rather 
than identifying an actor's reference point independent of behavior. This creates 
problems of tautology. A more in-depth examination of individuals and their 
personal characteristics and the impact these have on their behavior apart from the 
specific decision under study would provide a better explanation. This requires 
more comprehensive investigation of an individual's personality than prospect 
theorists have been willing to engage in. In this vein, prospect theorists often lose 
the individual in their analysis, by focusing on collective (i.e., state) behavior 
(see, for example, Berejikian 2004; Taliaferro 2004). 
This leads to the second main criticism: an over-emphasis on context at 
the expense ofindividuals (see in particular Kowert and Hermann 1997). Because 
prospect theory emphasizes losses and gains around a given reference point, the 
emphasis in the model is on the domain in which an individual operates-rather 
than on the individual himself (McDermott 2004, 290, 294-297, 300-301). But in 
order to understand why individuals choose a particular reference point, we must 
understand the individual himself and his preferences, beliefs, and motivations, 
which shape his foreign policy decisions. Prospect theory is thus indeterminate as 
an explanation for foreign policy change, and therefore its use in such an analysis 
can lead to inaccurate conclusions and predictions. 
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Prospect Theory and the Oslo Accords 
Prospect theory is more effective at exp1aining foreign po1icy decision-
making than poliheuristic theory, because the process of framing incorporates the 
notion that individua1s differ on what they consider important and on what they 
base their decisions on. This can account for differences across individua1s and 
might, at first b1ush, seem appropriate for exp1aining foreign po1icy variation. 
Certain1y, in the Israe1i case study Shamir's frame was very different from 
Rabin's (the Land of Israel versus the security of Israel; see Chapter 5). And, in 
fact, Shamir's actions demonstrated a pronounced fear of 10ss, particularly of the 
Land, its settlements, and a maj or piece of identity of the J ewish people. 
However, Rabin's foreign po1icy can only be explained by the opposite of 
what prospect theory predicts. That is, Rabin took a major risk for a gain rather 
than a loss-a chance to improve Israeli security by negotiating directly with the 
PLO and laying the groundwork for a Palestinian state, both of which he himself 
considered to be "losses," in the sense that he never trusted the PLO or accepted 
that it could be a full partner in peace. He took this risk by making Israel lose 
what it already held-1and and control over it. And he strengthened the PLO at a 
time when it was at its weakest point and on the verge of irrelevance. In this 
sense, he took a major risk by tolerating a major loss-not to keep what might be 
lost, but to actually "lose" something by purposefully giving it up. 
To exp1ain foreign policy variation, a theory must be able to account for 
why two different foreign policy decisions were made. Prospect theory can 
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explain, in the Israeli example, only one decision. As such, it is not particularly 
useful for an understanding of variation in foreign'policy. 
Prospect Theory and Lobbying for EU Membership 
It is difficult to identify what loss Prime Minister Erdogan was seeking to 
avoid when he engaged in active lobbying efforts to join the EU. This example 
highlights the fact that not all foreign policy decisions are about risk, the core 
premise on which prospect theory is based.25 In addition, it is hard to argue that 
Prime Minister Erbakan was seeking to avoid a 10ss when he pursued closer ties 
with the Islamic world at the expense of Europe. He simply believed that this 
direction was the appropriate one for Turkey, and one that wou Id in fact 
strengthen it by retuming it to its glorious past through a retum to Islam (what 
might be classified as a search for a gain). 
There is no doubt that Erbakan was well aware of the "risk" (in prospect 
theory terms) he ran if angered the anti-Islamist military; at one of his first press 
conferences, he stressed that Turkey was a secular state based on the principles of 
Atatürk (Turkish Daily News 30 June 1996). While this might seem to open the 
door to prospect theory as an explanation for this case study, the fact that six 
months later Erbakan began pursuing a foreign (and domestic) policy opposite to 
his dec1aration in June (and thus completely ignoring the risks involved in stirring 
the military to action against him), it was because he perceived he could make a 
gain (an improved position for Islam in society) rather than trying to avoid a loss, 
When the military did move against him in February 1997, he actively resisted 
25 This is underlined by the fact that the term "risk" is often used in the titles of various studies 
utilizing prospect the ory to explain state behavior. See, for examples, Berejikian (2004); 
McDermott (1998); Taliaferro (2004); and Weyland (1996). 
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them by refusing to sign a document they presented him demanding a curtailment 
of Islamist activities, and then-when he did eventually sign it-avoided applying 
the directive in practice. 
Erbakan's actions over time aroused the military's suspicion, then anger; 
at any point had Erbakan stopped his provocations, it is likely the military would 
have left him in power. But instead, he continued to seek what he considered to be 
gains. He ignored the fact that there was a risk in continuing his foreign (and 
domestic) policies, ev en though in the end he did through his actions ensure he 
suffered a major loss (i.e., being thrown out of office). The critical element here is 
that Erbakan was not interested in or focused on avoiding any loss. His actions 
may have engendered such a reaction, but he himself was focused only on the 
gains for Islamism. Because prospect theory assumes that individuals do 
concentrate on avoiding losses, it cannot apply to cases where leaders ignored 
such considerations and focused only on gains. 
In short, it is sometimes difficult to identify whether an individual is 
working for a gain or to avoid a loss, if she is working under conditions of risk at 
aIl; indeed, the identification of either may be more useful as ideal-types rather 
than specific objectives. Sorne individuals (such as Shamir and Erbakan) pursue 
objectives based only on their ideological preferences, even in the face of obvious 
constraints and potentially large losses such as electoral defeat or direct 
intervention by other political actors. Prospect theory can shed light on particular 
foreign policy decisions, but because of this discrepancy it cannot do for foreign 
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policy variation where the different leaders held different objective vis-à-vis gains 
and losses. 
An of the ab ove approaches are indeterminate, inaccurate, or able to 
explain only one part of the foreign policy variation under study. The macro-
structural processes detailed by Structural Realism, Constructivism, and public 
opinion are certainly relevant; external and domestic events impact on decision-
making by emphasizes certain events and developments over others, and by 
providing constraints on or opportunities for decisions. But while they may help 
explain general timing or contours of a foreign policy, they cannot explain the 
particular foreign policy decisions under study, particularly when different leaders 
make different policies in similar environments. Poliheuristic theory and prospect 
theory are better explanations, because of their focus on the specific process of 
decision-making. But they, too, fan short since they can at most explain only one 
leader's policies but not the other's in the two dyads highlighted in the case 
studies. An five thus fail to help us understand the causes of foreign policy 
variation. 
A more insightful model would examme the individu al cognitive and 
affective structures that condition each individual leader's decision-making. It 
would examine the development of these personal characteristics so as to provide 
an in-depth understanding of why certain leaders engage in certain policies. And, 
by emphasizing the role of individuals, would provide a more effective 
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explanation for foreign policy change. Such a model is presented in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
A Model of Foreign Policy Variation 
Introduction 
How can we explain foreign policy variation? This chapter seeks to answer this 
question by constructing a model of foreign policy decision-making that 
emphasizes the role of the individual leader. It does so by c1assifying leaders as 
ideological or adaptable. This definition builds on earlier understandings of the 
role of individuals in policymaking, but it strengthens them by changing the 
elements of the definition and inc1uding the role of affect and emotion. 
In addition, we must also identify the conditions under which individuals 
matter. We do this by assessing the decision-making structures in which the 
leader operates. Centralized decision-making institutions provide greater 
autonomy for individuals to make policy; under these conditions, leaders' own 
belief structures can impact on policy. In de-centralized institutions, leaders' own 
ideas about policy matter less, since regardless of where their ideas come from 
they are blocked from translating them into policy by other institutional actors. 
We must also identify the ideational structures that prevail in a given society-
polit Y at the time of the foreign policy decision under study. This is necessary in 
order to better measure the capacity of a leader to enact new policy, and to 
determine whether and how much of a variation has taken place in foreign policy. 
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To this end, the chapter begins with a discussion of the role of individuals 
in foreign policy decision-making. Although widely accepted as a critical variable 
in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and, to a lesser extent, in International Relations 
(IR), there is still insufficient understanding of how individuals matter-that is, 
how specifically they impact on foreign policymaking. 
The next section deals with the role of affect in foreign policy decision-
making. This segment requires much more discussion, because affect is a little 
used concept in both FP A and IR. The first subpart seeks to provide a workable 
definition of emotion, a problematic endeavor in even the psychology literature. 
The following part focuses on the affect heuristic-a device similar to the 
cognitive heuristics mentioned previously but connected to emotional rather than 
cognitive processes. The third part discusses the (limited) use of affect in FP A and 
IR, and makes the argument that, in fact, this is a useful concept for understanding 
foreign policy and international politics. The next two sections form the core of 
the theoretical model developed in this chapter-the classification of individuals 
as ideological or adaptable. The conditions under which individuals matter in the 
actual process of making foreign policy are discussed in the following section, on 
the impact of institutions on policymaking. The final segment notes the important 
role ideas play in measuring whether and how much foreign policy variation 
actually takes place. 
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The Role of Individuals in Foreign Poliey Decision-Making 
It has already been established that individuals matter in foreign policy 
decision-making. How they matter, and the conditions under which they matter, 
must still be explored. This section does so by focusing on the cognitive and 
emotional processes that individuals undergo in their decision-making processes, 
which impact on their ultimate decisions. The identification of these processes 
helps us categorize individuals as ideological or adaptable. 
The mental simplification ofreality is the critical way in which individuals 
understand their environments. The process of simplification is the first line of 
defense against the amount and complexity of information assaulting all our 
senses, which would otherwise overwhelm most humans. Although the 
psychology, decision research, and neural science literatures have established that 
hum ans share basic models of simplification and decision-making, the evidence 
also suggests that decision-making-as a process of information processing-is 
still quite an individual affair. The basic elements of this process are shared across 
individuals, but the specific ways in which we incorporate information and then 
make decisions varies "as a function of the characteristics of individuals (traits) 
and their CUITent cognitive and affective circumstances (state)" (Szalma and 
Hancock 2005, 177). Even in the same general circumstances, individuals make 
different decisions: different individuals focus on different aspects of their 
environments; spend more or less time on specific issues than others; interact with 
others in different ways; recall different past experiences; hold different 
institutional positions; and so on. No individual feels and thinks the same way. 
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Studying an individual as an individual is a beginning step, but does not 
help us understand why individuals differ in their foreign policy decisions. We 
must compare leaders, then; studying one leader is useful for thick description but 
not so useful for theory development. By comparing leaders, we can better 
understand which cognitive or affective factors are more relevant, and how they 
impact on political outcomes. 
Belief Structures, Heuristics, and the Simplification of Reality 
Given the inherent ambiguity and informational complexity in the world, 
the mental simplification of reality is the critical way in which individuals 
understand their environments. Our capacity for rationality is "bounded" (Simon 
1985), and therefore we must make simplified assumptions about our 
environments in order to make it easier for us to understand our circumstances 
and make decisional responses to them. In the study of politics, these 
simplifications therefore "underlie all political behavior," since all individuals 
must engage in sorne sort of thinking process· in order to arrive at a decision for 
action (Young and Schafer 1998, 64). 
This simplification process is accompli shed through our be1ief structures, 
or schemas. Schemas define our situations for us, by interpreting, storing, and 
evaluating incoming information. They do so by helping us define and understand 
our contemporary situations in light of our past experiences and knowledge (Fazio 
1986; Fiske and Taylor 1991, 99; Lau 1986; Vertzberger 1990). In this sense, they 
incorporate our beliefs, values, attitudes, and past experiences, and synthesize 
them into representational structures that we can rely on for interpretation of our 
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contemporary environments. Without these kinds of simplifications to define our 
expectations and frame our responses, we would have difficulty functioning since 
we would have to cope with what would otherwise be new situations all the time. 1 
But even our schemas can be too complex for direct use, and it has been 
found that humans rely on mental heuristics as shortcuts to and simple 
representations of our schemas. Heuristics structure this information so that we 
can make decisions in a quicker, more orderly manner (Gilovich, Griffin, and 
Kahneman 2002; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Vertzberger 1990). Like 
schemas more generally, heuristics pro vide a priori assumptions and expectations 
about one's contemporary environment (Fiske and Taylor 1991, Chapter 9; 
Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974).2 
There is a large literature demonstrating how schemas (also referred to as 
cognitive maps) help foreign policymakers simplify their environments and guide 
their decisions (for sorne examples see Axelrod 1976; George 1979; M. Hermann 
2003, 1993; Jervis 1976; Khong 1992; Lebow and Stein 1993; Vertzberger 1990; 
for a good overview of the various literatures, see Young and Schafer 1998). 
Although this literature effectively utilizes the concept of judgmental heuristics as 
a form of schema, it has been much less interested in incorporating affect in the 
foreign policy decision-making process. It therefore misses a critical element in 
the decision-making process of state leaders, and prevents us from reaching a 
1 There are other psychologie al models that are not schema-based, but there is wide consensus 
among researchers on the appropriateness of studying schemas. 
2 The experiments that established the existence of heuristics were designed to explain errors and 
biases in human decision-making-that is, why people made bad decisions. The problems with 
such an approach in decision-making are highlighted in Chapter 1. 
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more insightful understanding of foreign policy change. The next section 
addresses this gap by incorporating affect into the theoretical model. 
The Role of Affect in Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
Emotion has had a rough ride in the study of decision-making. It was, for a 
long time, considered irrelevant in decision-making, which has been dominated 
by a focus on cognitive processes since the cognitive revolution in the 1960s. At 
best, it was considered to be relevant on1y because it caused people to become 
irrational and make poor decisions. Cognition was considered a rational, 
analytical process, while emotion was seen as unstructured, instinctive, reactive, 
and overly passionate, which in tum crowded out measured, cost-benefit analysis. 
The difference between the two was, it was c1aimed, c1early found in the logical 
or illogical decisions that people made, depending on whether cognition 
(rationality) or emotion (irrationality) structured the decision-making process.3 
In light of this, psychologists and sorne political psychologists have, in 
recent years, begun to expand their understanding of heuristics. There is 
widespread agreement now that humans use not only cognitive heuristics, but also 
"affective" heuristics that utilize emotion, rather than cognitive processes, to take 
shortcuts to one's schemas (Finucane, Peters, and Slovic 2003; Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, and Welch 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002; 
3 Emotions are sometimes considered to be similar to rational mental processes, in that they 
provide us with an emotional cost-benefit analysis (see Elster 1999, 301-306 for more discussion). 
They are non-rational mental states that do impact on our decisions, but they are not irrational. Or 
rather, they might appear rational to the decision-maker ("retaining a specifie policy is important 
to me because 1 believe passionately in it, therefore 1 will not budge from that policy regardless of 
the costs") but not to others or even in terms of the overall, long-term position for the state. 
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Snidennan, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Sorne have even argued that when 
engaged, affect and emotion often have a "dominating" influence over behavior, 
shunting aside cognitive processes (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and We1ch 2001). 
But this growing recognition has not spread very far in foreign policy analysis or, 
especially, International Relations. 
Two areas where emotion has been used-particularly during the 1980s 
and early 1990s-is in the literature on suboptimal group decision-making, and in 
parts of the literature on deterrence, crisis, and bargaining (aU of which are 
related) (see Janis and Mann 1977; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; Lebow 1996, 
Chapter 13; Lebow and Stein 1993). This has been a useful first step, but there 
have been two problems. First, in many cases the use of emotion (often referred to 
as motivated bias) is considered as part of the cognitive process, rather than as a 
separate variable with its own distinct impact (e.g., Lebow 2005). Stemming from 
this is the second snag: much of this literature does not examine the direct impact 
of emotion on policy, but rather how it works more indirectly through cognitive 
structures, particularly by biasing individuals against making "good" decisions.4 
For ex ample, many authors argued that emotion (motivation) impacted on foreign 
policy decision-making by pushing leaders to maintain or choose policies that fit 
with their self-images or needs (see, for example, the discussions in Jervis 1985a, 
24-27; Lebow 1981, 107-111). 
4 This criticism raises a third problem, as highlighted in Chapter 1 and above: namely, that the 
literature focuses on how both emotional and cognitive biases (and their interaction) lead to po or 
or wrong decisions. This undermines the study of affect and policymaking since it prejudices 
methodology, case studies, and conclusions. 
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Beyond this, these are lone examples of the incorporation of affect into 
foreign policymaking. The discussion below delves deeper into the role of 
emotion in hum an thinking and ties it into a process of foreign policy decision-
making, thus helping to fill the large theoretical gap in FP A and IR. 5 
The Affect Heuristic 
Today we know from brain research, physiological studies, and 
experimental evidence that affect and emotion play a critical role in the decision-
making process (though there continues to be disagreement over whether or not 
they do so independently from or in conjunction with cognitive processes). They 
do so by acting as judgmental shortcuts, similar to cognitive heuristics. Instead of 
cognitive processes, though, an affect heuristic shapes decisions by highlighting 
the intuitive or emotional meaning that objects, events, or people have for the 
decision-maker. Instead of appraising objects, events, or people by cognitive 
analysis, we simply feel what these objects, events, or people mean to us and 
respond accordingly.6 This heuristic "tags" an stimuli with an affective label that 
5 There continues to be disagreements over what affect and emotion actually are and what 
components are included in each (for an overview see Elster 1999). There is also disagreement 
over where emotion stems from-whether from neural-biological (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996), 
psychological (Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone 2001), or social contexts (Parkinson, Fischer, and 
Manstead 2005). Finally, there are differences over whether emotion and cognition work hand-in-
hand (Epstein 1994), whether one precedes and drives the other (Ellis 2005; Loewenstein, Weber, 
Hsee, and Welch 2001), or whether they are completely independent of each other (see the debate 
between Lazarus 1984, and Zajonc 1984). In this study affect refers to a broad, overall mental 
framework an individual undergoes for long periods of time, possibly their entire lives (broadly 
divided into general positive or negative feelings), while emotions are feelings of much shorter 
duration, often much more intense and sharp. Sorne psych010gists have argued that there is no 
such thing as an objective emotional state, calling it an "ontologicalillusion" and c1airning that 
ernotion is really only "sorne physiological state which is the basis of sorne felt perturbation" 
(Harré 1986,4). 
6 Sorne psychologists do argue that cognition plays this same role as well-that it can also be just 
as direct, automatic, and immediate as an emotional reaction, and in this way precede ernotion (see 
Lazarus 1984). See Ellis (2005) for an opposite argument. The difference appears to lie in how 
ernotion is defined (Cornelius 1996, 130). There is sorne evidence to suggest that the availability 
heuristic may be partly due to affect, in addition to cognition, in that ease of recall might be 
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bestows meaning on a piece of infonnation (Hancock, Szalma, and Oron-Gilad 
2005, 165-166; Lodge and Taber 2005; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and Mac Gregor 
2002). As the image or stimuli is brought before an individual's attention, the 
affective heuristic is engaged and the individual produces a decision based on 
how the heuristic tells her she feels (e.g, 1 don't like bungalows therefore 1 will 
not buy that one-story house). Zajonc argued that the difference between affect 
and cognition is that affect provides an early or immediate reaction that conditions 
how we think of things. In his words, "[ w Je do not just see 'a house': we see 'a 
handsome house,' 'an ugly house,' or 'apretentious house'" (1980, 154; emphasis 
in original). Because it is automatic and immediate (emotions are "powerful 
impulses that do not pennit the mediation of thought" [Simon 1985, 301]), an 
affect heuristic is considered by sorne to be a more efficient heuristic, in that 
reliance on affect makes for a faster, easier, and more efficient method of 
decision-making (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002, 398). This is 
considered helpful, since humans cannot, as noted above, process the range of 
incoming infonnation that we face every day.7 
We know that affect impacts on decision-making because neural science 
has proved that emotions stem from within us and that the brain uses emotion as 
underlined by the fact that the image being recalled retains an affective appeal or repulsion (see 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002, 414). The ide a is that events that hold emotional 
significance for an individual will be easier to recall; and the easier it is to recall an event, the 
more likely a decision about a contemporary event will be made in light of the past event. This 
would support Epstein' s (1994) and others' contention that a dual process of both cognition and 
affect work to influence decision-making, and that they cannot easily be separated. 
7 ln this context, research has found that less politically sophisticated (that is, knowledgeable) 
people rely more heavily on affect heuristics )-or at least uses emotion more frequently and easily 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002). For instance, an unsophisticated voter might 
think, 1 like liberals, therefore 1 will not vote for conservative candidates, while a sophisticated 
voter might examine a candidate's stance on various issues before deciding how to cast her ballot. 
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part of the decision-making process at least in sorne areas. Deep within our brains 
is a part that se1f-organizes our responses to the environments in which we act-
not in the sense of reacting to our environments, but in acting on them (Ellis 
2005). Rumans respond to a stimulus first by having an emotional reaction to it. 
In fact, this is the only way we can become conscious of it. Only then can we 
respond to it cognitively, that is, by making a decision about how to react. This 
pro cess is regulated by the various parts of the brain, particularly in the frontal 
and parietal lobes, which begin the process of making us aware of-at the 
beginning stages-vague sensorimotor images that inform us about what is going 
on in our environments. Damascio' s research has found, in this sense, that 
patients with brain lesions did not experience certain feelings (which stem from 
emotions) such as fear and anxiety, and thus engaged in decisions that were 
obviously counter-productive (Damascio 1994; see also LeDoux 1996). 
A wealth of experimental research by psychologists has aiso proven that 
emotion matters when making decisions. Importantly, this research differs from 
earlier exploration of emotion, which highlighted the negative impact affect could 
have. Much contemporary research focuses on the effect emotion has in general, 
without judging its consequences. 8 Such studies have focused on the 
attractiveness (affective appeal) of particular options over others (MeHers, 
Schwartz, and Ritov 1999; Svenson 2003); and the desire to expend more 
resources for objects or act differently toward individuals that are liked or toward 
which there is a more positive feeling (Alhakami and Slovic 1994; Hsee and 
Kunreuther 2000; LaFrance and Recht 1995; Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein 
8 For a good overview, see Finucane, Peters, and Slovic (2003). 
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1998). Affect and emotion thus work because of their immediate effect: there is 
an unconscious, rapid, automatic interpretation of an event that produces an 
emotion, and the nature of this pre-emotional process is so automatic and sudden 
that it prec1udes any type of cognitive process we might caU rational-or even 
cognitive in the political psychological sense of the word (Epstein 1994). 
Affect in FP A and IR 
How can we connect the existence of an affective heuristic to foreign 
policy decision-making? It should be much easier than it is. Crawford (2000) 
points out that emotion has always been subconsciously present in IR, and indeed 
has been an implicit or explicit element in the writings of most of the great 
political thinkers and philosophers of the human condition throughout the ages-
inc1uding Aristotle, MachiaveUi, Hobbes, Hume, Darwin, and many others.9 And 
yet, as Crawford continues, it has largely been ignored as an important factor in 
foreign policy decision-making and world politics. This study aims to rectify this 
unbalanced state. 
In part this imbalance stems from the mystifying nature of emotions, 
which do not lend themselves easily to probing (at least until recent decades); in 
part this has been due to the difficulty in quantifying and measuring emotions; 
and in part it is because of an implicit and explicit preference in the study of 
politics for what is considered reasoned, rational behavior in the pursuit of "good" 
political decisions and which emotions are perceived to disrupt. The perception of 
9 For overviews of the incorporation of emotion in political science more generally, see Clarke, 
Hoggett, and Thompson (2006a) and Marcus (2000). Most ofthese studies focus on politics as the 
outcome of popular attitudes, opinions, votes, and social movements; few focus on the impact of 
emotions on decisions at the elite level or on specifie domestic or foreign policies. 
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IR researchers of the inherent difficulty in measuring emotions in policymakers is 
similar to the view held by psychologists up to fifteen or twenty years ago. But as 
discussed above, a body of evidence in psychology, neural science, and decision 
research has been accumulating over the past several years that not only 
demonstrates the impact of affect and emotion on decision-making, but also 
effectivelymeasures this impact. 10 
If an object or event has an affective impact on a decision-maker, it means 
that the object or event holds intense, emotional, deep meaning for that individual. 
It matters for her in a way that other foreign policy issues do not. And the more 
something has meaning for us (whether consciously or unconsciously), the more 
emotion we generate regarding that something. Emotions are states of being, but 
they are not simply states of being that are suspended in an environmental 
vacuum-the y are about things: "One is not simply angry ... rather one is angry at 
someone, about something" (Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault, and Benton 1992, 
33; see also Schwarz and Clore 1988 11).12 In foreign policy, then, we must focus 
on what an individual thinks about a particular object, event, or c1ass of objects or 
events. 
Attractiveness of a particular foreign policy over any other foreign policy 
is thus based at least sometimes and for sorne individuals on the affective value 
one attaches to an object, event, or person. Policymakers judge incoming 
10 We might also determine the impact of affect by utilizing more conventional IR methods: by 
closely examining a leader's upbringing, views, experiences, attitudes, belief structures, actions, 
and public and private statements. From this we can draw a picture of how that individual feels 
about a particular foreign polie y issue. 
Il The authors also point out that when asked ta judge what we think about something or sameone, 
humans often answer in terms ofhow wefeel about that thing or person. 
12 This understanding is considered to help distinguish between emotion and mood. 
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information according to how their heuristics structure that information. The 
representativeness and availability heuristic, for example, might prompt decision-
makers to make choices based on their interpretation of present events in light of 
past events, but this interpretation is heavily loaded with affective appeal-that is, 
on the meaning the information holds for the individual. As Fiske and Taylor 
(1991, 427) put it, "schemas based on prior experiences can carry immediate 
affective tags. When a new instance fits the schema [or is made to fit], not only 
does prior knowledge apply, but so also may prior affect." Simply put, "emotion 
serves to make information more personally relevant" (Szalma and Hancock 
2005, 184). In the foreign policy arena, this means that policymakers who feel 
strongly/emotionally about a foreign policy objective are not willing to give it up 
or change policy away from attaining it, even in the face of difficult 
circumstances and contradictory incoming information. The underlying central 
role that territory plays in many ethnic conflicts especially is a major example of 
this, particularly at the mass level. 
This affective appeal, like cognitive heuristics in general, stems from 
one's past expenences, belief structures, and the way in which previously 
incorporated information has been evaluated and stored. We cannot escape from 
our past experiences, unless we can expunge memory from our minds, and the 
emotional values we have unconsciously attached to our past experiences always 
impact on our present interpretations, even unwittingly (Jones 2005).13 It is not 
13 This conclusion relies heavily on the connection of memory to decision-making, which is 
beyond the scope of this study. On the importance of memory to decision-making, not least 
because it better frames one's understanding of a problem by relying on previously absorbed 
information, see Dougherty, Gronlund, and Gettys (2003). 
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just that individuals remember past events and understand contemporary events in 
the light of similar past events, but it is also that the contemporary events elicit an 
emotional response. Understanding the present in light of the past is more than a 
cognitive process, it is an emotional response since we react on the basis of how 
we feel about something. 14 This highlights the individual nature of decision-
making; different individuals, based on their own individual experiences and 
pasts, value different things (see, for example, Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade 
1999; Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein 1998). This further underlines the 
importance of in-depth study of decision-makers, in order to understand the 
foreign policymaking process. 
The Interaction between Cognition and Emotion: 
Ideological versus Adaptable Individuals 
To date cognitive models have dominated the application ofpsychology to 
International Relations. Lebow and Stein (1993) made an early plea for a 
combination of cognition and emotion in an IR framework, but few have taken up 
the caU, despite the evidence from psychology that both cognition and affect 
matter in decision-making (see, e.g., Clarke, Hoggett, and Thompson 2006b, 7-
The theoretical model presented here is based on the assumption that 
cognition and affect work hand-in-hand in the study of foreign policy variation. 
For sorne individuals, affect is the predominant heuristic while for others a 
14 This is the implicit, yet underlying, point ofhistorical analogizing (e.g., Khong 1992). 
15 Hsee (1996), for example, found that under certain conditions a more rational-cognitive type of 
decision-making takes place, while under other conditions an affect-Iaden image can influence a 
decision. 
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cognitive framework, relatively free from affective influences, prevails. 16 These 
cognitive and affective conditions help us determine whether an individual is 
ideological or adaptable, which in tums helps us explain why foreign policy 
variation occurS. 17 
The political psychology literature has already established the 
classification of leaders into two main categories: "principled" versus "pragmatic" 
(the vocabulary is Margaret Hermann's; see M. Hermann 1993; see also M. 
Hermann 1984, 54-55, 61, 64; Hermann and Hermann 1989, 365-366; 
International Studies Review 2001; and Stoessinger 1985). My use of the terms 
ideological and adaptable builds on this taxonomy, but 1 argue that these are more 
effective terms in that they better represent the personalities of leaders and their 
foreign policy decision-making predilections. Most importantly, my 
categorization is better able to capture the affective nature of decision-making 
than Hermann's, which focuses only on cognitive processes. As discussed above, 
this is not a fair reflection of the reality of decision-making. 
The literature broadly supports the definition of principled and pragmatic 
leaders in the following terms: 
The more goal-driven leaders-the crusaders, the ideologues, those 
who are directive, task-oriented, or transformational in focus-
interpret the environment through a lens that is structured by their 
beliefs, attitudes, motives, and passions. They live by the maxim 
16 1 say "relatively free" because, aside from sociopathic criminals or medical patients who have 
had the relevant parts of their brains removed, no pers on can ever truly be free of emotional 
appeal. But the theoretical underpinnings remain relevant-that affect matters more for sorne 
individuals than it does for others. 
17 These categories are, of course, theoretical ideal-types. In reality leaders can be placed along a 
continuum between these two poles. The empirical examples in the following chapters use these 
terms for convenience and shorthand, while recognizing that few if any individuals really exist at 
either extreme. M. Hermann (2003) uses a computer program to provide a statistical continuum of 
this and other personality traits. 
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"unto thine own selfb[ e] true," their sense of selfbeing detennined 
by the congruence between who they are and what they do .... they 
act on the basis of a set of personal standards .... Because they tend 
to selectively perceive infonnation from their environment, such 
leaders have difficulty changing their attitudes and beliefs ... 
Leaders who are more responsive to the CUITent situation-
the pragmatists, the opportunists, and those who are consultative, 
relations-oriented, or transactional-tend ... to see life as a theater 
where there are many roles to be played. Indeed, people are 
essentially perfonners whose main function is choosing the 
"correct" identity for the situation at hand .... They seek to tailor 
their behavior to fit the demands of the situation inwhich they find 
themselves, and, before making a decision, ascertain where others 
stand with regard to an issue and estimate how various groups and 
institutions are likely to act. ... In essence, the self-image of these 
leaders is defined by the expectations and interests of others. To 
become acceptable, ideas, attitudes, beliefs, motives, and passions 
must receive external validation from relevant others (Hennann, 
Preston, Korany, and Shaw 2001, 86_87;18 see also Kaarbo and 
Hennann 1998, 249). 
There are several problems with these definitions. First, it is not true that 
the less principled a leader is, the less likely it is that a state's foreign policy will 
be detennined by the individual's own desires or goals. This implies that 
pragmatic leaders are "weak" personalities, in that they do not assert themselves 
and instead rely on eues from others around them to detennine policy. But a 
pragmatic-adaptable leader can have as strong a personality as an ideological 
leader, in the sense of holding to personal objectives even in the face of 
contrasting advice and demands from those around her. During the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, for example, President Kennedy-who would likely be c1assified as a 
pragmatic leader-exerted a forceful personality when he resisted efforts by hard-
liners in the administration to take a more active military response to the 
18 This article is used as the representation of these categories, because it utilizes and synthesizes 
the long-standing and varied literatures on this topic, distilling them into the archetypical 
definitions and traits of the two types of leaders. 
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placement of missiles in Cuba, leading to great frustration and even contempt by 
sorne, such as Curtis LeMay (Allison 1971). 
Second, it is not only principled leaders who respond to foreign policy 
problems on the basis of their ideas, beliefs, and attitudes. Adaptable leaders are 
less likely to relyon simple heuristics to process complex infonnation, but they 
can also be considered principled in the definition as cited above. Egypt' s 
President Nasser was an ideologue: his staunch be!ief in asserting Egypt's 
regional dominance-which inc1uded a removal of Westem influence from the 
Middle East as well as a commitment to Arab nationalism-remained his 
overriding goal for his entire presidency. Yet he often shifted tactics to achieve 
that goal, resporiding to circumstances in ways he was not previously prepared to 
do. As Safran argues (1969, 78-81), Nasser's idea of pan-Arab unit y did not 
inc1ude direct merger with other Arab countries until he was prompted into one 
with Syria in 1958 and came to view this as a tactic for achieving Egyptian 
dominance. 
Third, it is a mistake to argue that only ideologues are goal-oriented and 
filter out infonnation that does not correspond to their personal goals. This is an 
over-simplification, as it assumes that one type of leader has vastly different 
degrees of goals than another. AIl leaders have goals. We must then ask, how are 
these goals fonnulated, what are they based on, and how do leaders go about 
trying to achieve them? 1 agree with the general contours of the definition of 
"principled," but surely there is much more to such leaders. Current Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Olmert has never been c1assified as an ideologue; indeed, he was 
79 
often derided for being too much of a "pragmatist" (as defined above). Yet since 
Ariel Sharon fell into a coma and Olmert' selection to the prime ministry in 
March 2006, he has publicly and privately committed his government to the 
single task of "convergence" (his plan for withdrawing Israeli troops and settlers 
from much of the West Bank). His "ideological" commitment to this goal has, in 
fact, now been derided as a mistake and likely to worsen Israel's security 
situation. This pursuit of a goal by an adaptable leader fits more with the 
definition of a principled leader rather than a pragmatic leader. 
Finally, in both the definitions provided above and the literature that 
dichotomizes leaders in this way affect and emotion are largely absent from 
consideration. Affect and emotion are hinted at, as when ideologues are 
considered to make policy at least partly on the basis of their "passions" 
(Hermann et al. 2001, 87, 89). Moreover, referring to such leaders as crusaders 
and ideologues implies an affective basis for their decisions-leaders who feel 
that strongly about an issue usually do so because of the powerful emotional 
appeal the issue has for them. But neither principled nor pragmatic leaders, 
according to the definition, rely on affective heuristics in their decision-making 
process; they utilize only cognitive heuristics. This literature therefore leaves a 
large gap in the study of foreign policymaking-a gap that has been steadily 
closing in the psychology and decision research. My study is an attempt to bring 
IR more in-line with developments in these other fields by re-defining ideological 
and adaptable individuals-inc1uding their predilections toward emotion or 
cognition-in the following manner. 
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Ideological individuals, as suggested above, rely on their (often dogmatic) 
princip les and ideas about the world around them. Incoming information is stored 
in belief structures that are rigid in what they filter out and what they retain. These 
schemas either ignore information that does not fit with preconceived notions 
about issues, events, and other actors or bend them to fit. 19 Ideological individuals 
are less sensitive to contextual situations and incoming information, are less likely 
to change their ideas, and therefore are more likely to utilize their ideological 
beliefs as the basis for their foreign policy decisions. State behavior will be 
conditioned by the leader's ideological considerations. 
Social psychological research has found that there is a difference in how 
"experts" (those with more involvement in and knowledge of a subject) and 
"novices" (those with only a rudimentary involvement and knowledge) process 
incoming information. The former do so in a more complex manner, while the 
latter in a more simplistic manner (e.g., Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983). 
ln the description of these conditions, "complex" and "simplistic" could 
be substituted with "cognition" and "affect. 1 posit that this dichotomy also 
applies to ideological-adaptable individuals. Ideological individuals are more 
likely to utilize affect heuristics in their decision-making processes. That is, they 
will reach back into their schemas not by cognitive processes that utilize a 
rational-analytical approach, but rather on the basis of the meaning a particular 
foreign policy issue holds for them; that is, how they feel about that issue, not 
what they think about it. The simplistic nature of an affect heuristic lies in its 
19 On the use of beliefs, values, and stereotypes to process information see Vertzberger (1990, 
113-127). 
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capacity to recall information more quickly and directly, due to the stronger 
affective appeal or repulsion that information holds for the decision-maker 
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002, 414). Like analogies in general, 
emotion matters more in determining decisions the more one has connections to 
similar or analogous situations (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch 2001, 
271). ldeological individuals who rely on an affect heuristic will likely have a 
connection of sorne kind to an event or object, or c1ass of events or objects. 
Ideological leaders are therefore more likely to be "emotional" about foreign 
policy issues, and are thus more likely to be influenced by their affective 
understandings and beliefs about situations than adaptable individuals. This 
emotional attachment makes the ideological leader that much less likely to 
incorporate contradictory information or change foreign policy course; that is the 
power of affective connections. 
In contrast, adaptable leaders are not tied to rigid schemas or use affect 
heuristics to simplify their decision-making. They have greater capacity for 
flexibility. They will tailor their policies to fit the demands of the situation (and 
not, as outlined above, what others think of the situation). They do so by 
incorporating incoming information without filtering out pieces that may not fit 
with their already-deve1oped belief structures-which are subject to change. 
Because they do not rely on specifie unbending ideological ideas about other 
actors, events, and issues, they are more willing to change policy. Adaptable 
individuals will adopt new ideas even if they do not fit with existing 
understandings of their environments, and moreover can learn or be convinced of 
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the benefit of these ideas. Their thinking can change according to changed 
circumstances. 
We can code this dichotomy into the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: ldeologicalleaders are more likely to base their decision-making on 
affective appeal; adaptable leaders are more likely to base their 
decision-making on cognitive appraisal. 
Adaptable Decision-Makers and The Capacity to Leam 
Where ideological individuals are prone to be emotional in their decision-
making, and thus acting more rigidly in their foreign policy decision-making, 
adaptable leaders are given to leaming. These are in many ways opposites: being 
emotional (in the sense of the dichotomy discussed here) prevents an individual 
from being flexible enough to leam; and being adaptable exc1udes affect as a 
constraint on decision-making. Adaptable leaders' cognitive flexibility prec1udes 
them from overly relying on affect to determine policy and allows them judge 
their situations on the merits or problems of the situational conditions, and not on 
what these conditions or the situation itself means to them (in an emotional 
sense). They can leam when policy is not working, when environmental 
conditions are constraining a particular policy, or when changed circumstances 
necessitate a shift in policy. 
Leaming is a fundamental element of human behavior: it is how we adapt 
to our environments (Lindsay and Norman 1977, 499).20 It is in this sense, as both 
neural science and psychology have pointed out, a goal-oriented activity (Kandel, 
Schwartz, and J essell 1995; N ewell 1990, 317), beginning in humans as early as 
20 For critiques of leaming as an explanatory approach, see Evangelista (1991, 266-275) and 
Tetlock (1991). 
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six months of age. In other words, individuals leam better ways to attain their 
aspirations. They do this by acquiring new information (Kandel, Schwartz, and 
Jessell 1995, 651). But new information in itself does not lead to leaming; it 
merely means more information is absorbed in our memory banks. The newly 
acquired information matters only when we realize that our existing policies are 
not working, that is, not meeting our objectives (see especially Sitkin 199221 ). In 
this way we leam that new policies are necessary to help us reach our goals,z2 
However, sorne individuals-that is, ideological persons-do not wish to 
leam or adapt (consciously or unconsciously). This is because their policies 
already fit with their existing schemas; the rigidity of these schemas preclude 
them from leaming when the new information (and any subsequent new policy) 
contradicts their deeply-held beliefs-or if they do incorporate the incoming 
information, they do so by fitting them with their schemas or subsuming them 
under more preferred knowledge. This is amplified when an issue holds deep 
affective appeal. Extrapolating from this, state leaders do not believe they need to 
change their state's foreign policies because the contemporary ones already work 
fine in terms of meeting the policy objectives these leaders have set out. 
21 The international political economy focuses on learning from external shocks (usually sudden 
changes in the global economy, such as the 1980s debt crisis or rising unemployment in the 1970s 
related to the decade's oil crises) (see Gourevitch 1978; Hall 1989; Keohane and Milner 1996). 
The ideationalliterature foeuses on poliey failure (see Legro 2000, 426; MeNamara 1998). Some 
also refer to uncertainty in the international environment as prompting a learning of new ideas 
(Blyth 2002,35-37; Jacobsen 1995, 293). 
22 Note that this is not the same as the type of learning associated with historical analogies, which 
Khong calls decision-making using history (Khong 1992, 6, fu.17). Learned ideas may not be 
based on historical analysis but rather contemporaneous analysis or simply creative thinking. 
Moreover, this defmition of learning is problematic when applied to contemporaneous ongoing 
experiences. On learning from history, see Jervis (1976, Chapter 6); Khong (1992); May (1973); 
Neustadt and May (1986); and Reiter (1996). 
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Adaptable individuals are more likely to leam from past experience or 
new information than ideological individuals, who are more likely to judge 
present experiences as the same or similar to past experiences or to ignore 
information that dissents from their extant conclusions, which in tum are shaped 
by their belief structures. Quite simply, ideologicalleaders, because they are more 
likely to rely on emotion to guide their decisions about specific issues, are less 
likely to leam when it cornes to that issue. The object of activity holds such a 
powerful affective resonance with them, that they cannot make altemate 
decisions. 
These predilections are captured in the second proposition: 
Hypothesis 2: Adaptable leaders are more likely to leam from past experiences or 
policy failure and therefore we can expect them to change policy; 
ideological leaders are less likely to leam from past experiences or 
policy failure and therefore we can expect them not to change policy. 
Having identified the differences between ideological and adaptable 
individuals, we must now consider how to determine which category a leader falls 
into. Admittedly, this can be difficult-as Mark Snyder (1987) has noted, people 
have both a public and private persona, and when it cornes to public figures it is 
more complicated to get at the underlying motivations and decision-making 
processes behind a public policy decision. However, the rather large literature on 
political psychology-which focuses on leaders' beliefs, attitudes, personality 
characteristics, and so on-has regularly used the methods outlined in Chapter 1 
(analysis of speeches, statements, interviews with colleagues and advisors, and 
probing of secondary sources) to do so, and it has become a common method to 
study the formative experiences and personality development, over time, of 
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individual leaders in order to explain their political decisions (e.g., George and 
George 1956; Greenstein 1994; Mango 2001; and Volkan, Itzkowitz, and Dod 
1997). 
In order to c1assify an individual into one of the two categories, we must 
be able to identify the schemas and heuristics that motivate his behavior (see M. 
Hermann 1993, 82). Doing so in regard to the particular foreign policy decision 
under examination cannot be the basis for our characterization. This would ensure 
a tautology that undermines the falsifiability of the model. Instead, we must 
examine the individual' s actions and decisions on other issues, and before the 
behavior in question has taken place (e.g., in the case of yitzhak Rabin, before he 
contemplated the decision to pursue and sign the Oslo Accords).23 An in-depth 
study of the leader can accomplish this. The evidence for assessing type of leader 
is therefore separate from the decision itself. Again, this is a common method in 
analyses of leaders, and it avoids the problem of tautology inherent in assessing 
type according to behavior (for a recent use ofthis methodology, see Chiozza and 
Choi 2003). 
In this method, other behavior is used to gauge type. If an individuals acts 
ideologically on a range of other issues, we can expect that she will do so in 
regard to the specific foreign policy issue under study; if a leader is consistently 
adaptable on other foreign policy issues over time-that is, if he is flexible 
enough to change his own preferred policies or previously-held ideas to fit with 
the demands of existing circumstances-we can expect that he will be just as 
23 Including observation of behavior is also necessary in order to avoid measurement problems 
associated with studying a leader's public statements, speeches, memoirs, etc., which are often 
self-serving and not objective. 
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flexible on the foreign policy issues under consideration. It can be difficult, but in 
any study of the role of individuals in policymaking, there is no way to explain 
the impact of an individual' s characteristics on policy without an in-depth 
investigation ofher actions on a range of issues. 
Institutions: Domestic Structures as "Transmission Belts" 
Belief systems matter more when individuals face environmental 
uncertainty and when there are several policy options to choose from. However, 
there is much more to foreign policymaking than individual cognitive processes. 
Ole Hoisti noted long ago that although the cognitive processes of decision-
makers may be necessary to understand foreign policy decisions, they are not 
sufficient (1976, 36). We must therefore explain the conditions under which 
individuals matter, since while understanding the personalities of leaders may tell 
us how they will respond to policy problems, they do not tell us how likely it is 
that their preferred decisions will be enacted-i.e., about state behavior. 
Domestic structures have long been recognized as relevant in foreign 
policymaking, first becoming popular in the international political economy 
literature, particularly in terms of cornparing different states (Gourevitch 1986; 
Katzenstein 1978). Later, scholars used institutions to help us understand a variety 
of foreign policies, including econornic policy (McNarnara 1998; Odell 1982), 
European integration (Parsons 2003), and in general theoretical developrnent 
(Evangelista 1997; Kissinger, 1977; Risse-Kappen 1995, 1994, 1991). The 
cornrnon thread running through this literature is the recognition that dornestic 
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institutions are important because, as representative rules, regulations, and 
practices, they constitute "the critical 'transmission belt' by which the preferences 
and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy" 
(Moravcsik 1997, 518). The political structures of a polit Y are the corridors 
connecting ideas and foreign policy outcomes. 
Although institutions can be understood in formaI and informaI terms (see 
Ikenberry 1988), they are defined here as the formaI decision-making structures of 
a polity. This inc1udes the office(s) that individuals must hold in order to decide 
what policy a state will follow and to have enough authority to have that decision 
implemented. In terms of authoritative decision-making, the ultimate arbiter is the 
individual who wields the most power to decide-presidents, prime ministers, 
monarchs, or sorne other actor. Constitutionally, legally, and politically in 
democracies the head of govemment is the key decision-maker (though, as M. 
Hermann [1993, 80] points out, he may choose not to take advantage of this). 
InformaI structures can help transmit ideas toward the top policymaker, but in 
democracies with c1early spelled out roles and positions, it is the formaI authority 
to decide that allows individuals the capacity to make policy decisions. 
The conditions under which individuals matter is therefore understood 
through a third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals will matter more in foreign policy decision-making the 
more decision-making autonomy they have; individuais will matter 
less il?- foreign policy decision-making the Iess decision-making 
autonomy they have. 
That is, individuals who occupy decision-making offices relatively free from 
constraints (i.e., pressure from other actors to change their decisions in 
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accordance with these other actors' preferences) matter, and VIce versa. This 
conceptualization may seem self-evident, but when studying the role of 
individuals in foreign policymaking, we must specify the conditions under which 
they matter.24 Centralized decision-making institutions provide individuals with 
greater capacity (power) for putting their ideas into practice: the possibility of 
decision-makers influencing policy based on their own ideas (whether stemming 
from their ideology or incorporation of new information) is increased in highly 
centralized decision-making structures. In less centralization institutions, power is 
more diffused among other actors who could well impose their own ideas on the 
formaI decision-maker. 25 
How do we measure centralization? One could argue that examining 
constitutions and laws would tell us which office has how much power. But this 
would not be enough-often the practical application of decision-making differs 
from what is set out in documentary form. In the United States, for ex ample, the 
Senate was originally meant to play a major role in foreign policymaking, but in 
practice presidents have come to assume the central role. Even beyond this, 
American presidents have often been constrained by Congress in specific foreign 
policy situations. Centralization, then, can be measured by how much decision-
making power the primary leader-as identified in a polity's political 
24 The conceptual importance of institutions in this context is also highlighted by the work of the 
Hermanns and others, who focus on specifie types of decision-makers based on their institutional 
make-up and structures. (lndividuals are only one type of their decision-making unit taxonomy: 
see M. Hermann 1993; Hermann and Hagan 1998; and Hermann and Hermann 1989). 
25 The epistemic communities literature follows the same logic, though more implicitly, by its 
focus on the necessity of decision-making power (see International Organization 1992). Haas puts 
it specifically thus: "It is the political infiltration of an epistemic community into goveming 
institutions which lays the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community' s beliefs and 
ideas about the proper construction of social reality" (Haas 1992, 27). Peterson (1992) provides a 
good example ofhow a lack ofinstitutional power inhibits a change in policy. 
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regulations-has exercised on controversial issues. If a president or pnme 
minister can impose her prefefred policy options on issues over which other elites 
disagree, we can say that that individual has significant centralized decision-
making power. If, on the other hand, that type of decision-maker cannot, and is 
constrained by other elite actors, we would argue that decision-making authority 
is de-centralized.26 
We need to examme the historical development of decision-making 
institutions in order to see how they have become structured. In this sense, 1 draw 
on insights from historical institutionalism, which points to the importance and 
constraining or enabling nature of institutions based on their previous 
construction, though 1 do not discuss the path dependency of institutions that this 
literature focuses on.27 
Ideas as Measurements of Foreign PoHey Variation 
An effective way to measure whether and how much foreign policy 
variation has taken place is by comparing leaders' foreign policies to prevailing 
ideational structures. It has been argued that a country's identity shapes its foreign 
policy along specifie lines that fit with its cultural proc1ivities and the national 
conception of itself (for general discussions see Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and 
Kratochwil 1996). We would expect, then, that foreign policy variation is more 
prominent when it differs from long-standing general national belief structures 
26 Similar to the caveat added regarding ideological versus pragmatic individuals, centralization 
and de-centralization are ideal types. 
27 For good recent statements and examples, see Pierson (2004) and Pierson and Skocpol (2002). 
Good earlier discussions include March and Olsen (1989) and Powell and DiMaggio (1991). 
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and, especially, from previous foreign policies that are tied to these structures. In 
addition, studying ideas helps us identify the policy choices available to leaders, 
which allows for better operationalization of foreign policy change by specifying 
the options available to policymakers. Without knowing the options, we cannot 
explain whether or not a particular leader is likely to adopt one ofthe options. 
Ideas are typically referred to as sorne type of road map, providing a 
policy guide .toward specified objectives. Such understandings are too limite d, 
however. In most cases policy ideas are more than just tactical methods; they 
encompass an ultimate goal toward which these methods are oriented. Leaders' 
calculations also take into account how well their policy goals fit with national 
role conceptions and their own ideas of what their state requires. Canadian 
policymakers, for instance, tailor their policies toward a cooperative foreign 
policy relying on negotiation and coordination with other states, while American 
leaders construct policies to reflect their idea of the requirements of a global 
hegemonic power, which inc1udes more aggressive, even unilateral, actions. 
Ideas are defined here as "strategie models." These frameworks are ideas 
about the ultimate national security objectives of a state, the specifie policy 
contours (i.e., methods) required to achieve them, and how these policies fit with 
the national identity or value system of the state.28 They can be he Id by several 
28 1 recognize that this definition may confuse preferences, interests, and strategies. It is not my 
intention to confuse the distinction between them but to illustrate that policy ideas cannot be 
divorced from the ultimate preferred outcomes of an individuallstate (see Frieden [1999] for a 
good discussion on these issues). Empirically, it may be impossible to do so, since policymakers 
do not norrnally engage in behavior they consider at odds with their state's self-conceptions and 
value structures. 
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individuals at once, specifie elites, large groups within society, or even by most 
members of society. 
It is in the second and fourth form that ideas are most effectively used to 
measure foreign policy variation. When elites or society-at-large ho Ids specifie 
ideas about a foreign policy issue, it is more likely that the primary decision-
maker will conform to these preferences in broad terms (see the discussion on 
public opinion in Chapter 2). When a leader shifts the state's foreign policy away 
from these general conceptions, we can more easily measure foreign policy 
variation. Indeed, such shifts provide us with significant empirical puzzles. 
It is, in fact, in this way that foreign policy variation matters more for IR, 
rather than just for FPA. When leaders change their state's policies on critical 
foreign policy issues, they are for the most part re-directing state behavior in 
unexpected ways. These major-or drastic--changes thus shift the state's 
relationships with other actors, as well as the political, military, or economic 
structures of their immediate systems (or even of the larger regional or global 
systems).29 
Having described the model and its causal processes, the discussion can 
now utilize the model to explain the empirical puzzles laid out in Chapter 1. The 
next chapter will examine the development of Israeli political institutions and 
ideational structures regarding a Palestinian state and negotiation with the 
29 Ideationa1 sch01ars often argue that new policies are more like1y to be adopted if they fit with 
extant ideational and institutiona1 structures (G01dstein 1993; Sikkink 1991). As the discussion of 
public opinion in Chapter 2 points out, though, ideational structures pro vide only broad outlines 
within which substantia1 room for policy maneuver exists. They can, moreover, be manipu1ated by 
clever leaders. See Mendelson (1998) for an opposing view within the ideationalliterature. 
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Palestine Liberation Organization. This will set the background necessary for 
understanding how centralized Israeli decision-making institutions are, and how 
much of a policy change was Rabin's policy on these issues. 
93 
Chapter Four 
The Institutional and Ideational Setting 
in Israel 
Introduction 
The institutional and ideational structures of a polit Y are critical elements in the 
model presented in Chapter 3. Understanding the historical development of a 
country' s decision-making institutions is the most effective method for classifying 
these institutions as centralized or de-centralized. The power of such offices is 
spelled out in formaI legal and constitutional structures, but the practice of 
decision-making may differ greatly in reality. Understanding the development of 
a country' s ideational structures is also important in explaining foreign policy 
variation, since such structures often provide broad contours of a state's foreign 
policy. When policy shifts away from such general pressures, foreign policy 
variation is much more noticeable and indeed much more of a puzzle. l 
The discussion below is a historical analysis of Israel's institutions and 
ideas. Only by clearly outlining how decision-making power became centralized 
are we able to categorize Israel as a centralized polity. At the same time, by 
identifying what the dominant ideational structures within a state are, we can 
1 Pierson (2004) provides a detailed argument on the theoretical necessity of understanding 
historical development. 
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better recognize understand the context Israel's foreign policy, particularly its 
variation, as when it differs from long-standing national conceptions and previous 
policies that fit with these conceptions. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the development of Israeli 
decision-making institutions will be examined, in order to set the stage for our 
understanding of how centralized the Israeli political system has become. This 
inc1udes the process of labor dominance, external security threats, and the course 
of state building efforts. The next section will focus on the ideational structures of 
Israel. It will detail ideas held toward Palestinian Arabs before the establishment 
of Israel in 1948 and the seizure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. This 
will be followed by an analysis of Labor's and Likud's (the only two parties that 
have governed Israel until 1993) policy toward a Palestinian state and 
negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The conclusion 
drawn is that despite sorne policy distinctions between the two on issues such as 
settlements, both adamantly rejected negotiation with the PLO and a Palestinian 
state. In addition, the 1992 Labor govemment' s shift in foreign policy marks a 
dramatic change from Likud's foreign policy, particularly as the latter coincided 
with general popular conceptions of Israel and Israel' s place in the regional and 
global system. This makes the Oslo Accords both a significant variation in foreign 
policy and a puzzle. 
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Institutional Setting 
Israeli decision-making authority in foreign policy and security matters is 
centralized in the office of the prime minister. The Basic Law: The Government, 
which sets out the workings of Israeli governing structures, designates as the head 
of government a prime minister (Articles 4 and 5), but also requires that she be 
accountable and responsible to the Knesset (parliament) III all areas of 
administration (Basic Law: The Government 2001). Yet III practice this 
stipulation has not been borne out. Institutionally, Israeli prime ministers have 
concentrated decision-making power in their hands in the areas of foreign and 
security policy, often making decisions in secret (and only informing the Knesset 
afterward), not consulting even the entire cabinet, and justifying their actions on 
the exigencies oflsrael's security situation. This, they argue, requires fast, secret, 
and firm action, none ofwhich is conducive to consultation and debate with larger 
political groups. 
This centralization of power especially in foreign policymaking is the 
direct result of the historical construction and development of decision-making 
institutions during both the Yishuv (the Jewish community in pre-state Palestine) 
and early state periods. Three patterns contributed to this development: the 
dominance of the labor movement (Mapai/Labor) in the building of the Jewish 
community; the importance of security matters stemming from the threats posed 
by hostile neighboring Arab states; and the necessity of state-building after the 
establishment of the state in 1948, which meant the concentration of 
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administrative power in state institutions at the expense of political parties, which 
had previously run much of the affairs of the Yishuv. 
The Rise and Dominance of Labor Zionism 
Yishuv and then Israeli politics and institution building were dominated by 
the laborlsocialist movement, particularly in the form of Mapai2 and then the 
Labor Party.3 The identification of Mapai/Labor with the establishment and 
defense of the state and achievement of the Zionist dream intensified this pattern. 
The importance of Yishuv politics has been highlighted by every analyst of Israe1i 
political deve1opment; the institutions (formaI and informaI) that were created 
during this period (approximately the l880s to the establishment of Israel in 1948) 
essentially were adopted by Israel after it was dec1ared independent (see as 
examples Eisenstadt 1985; Horowitz and Lissak 1978; Sachar 1996; Shimshoni 
1982). 
The supremacy of the labor movement began near the beginning of Yishuv 
politics. The onset of sustained and organized J ewish immigration into Palestine 
(aliyot) in the 1880s brought to the area the socialist future leaders, particularly 
during the Second Aliyah and mainly from Russia (1904-1914) (Sachar 1996, 88). 
They came with revolutionary ideas about a strong, independent Jewish 
community with an underlying Jewish working and especially agricultural c1ass 
that would re-c1aim their biblical and historical heritage and re-establish a Jewish 
2 Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel-Workers Party of the Land of Israel. Formed in 1930, it was an 
arnalgam of several other labor and socialist parties. For an excellent discussion of the formation 
ofMapai, and its importance, see Aronoff(1993); Medding (1972); and Shapiro (1976). 
3 The Israel Labor Party first came into existence in 1968, as three parties merged into it. In 1969 
it became (for the second time) the Alignment (Ma 'arach) when Mapam, a party to the left of 
Labor, joined. It became Labor again when Mapam separated just before the 1992 elections. See 
Lochery (1997). 
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political entity in Zion (Sachar 1996; see also Halpern and Reinharz 1998, 
Chapter 7; Shapira 1992, Chapter 2). 
Labor's control began in the World Zionist Organization (WZO), which 
after 1897 provided most of the funding and organizational support for Zionist 
activity in Palestine. First, socialist Zionism forged an alliance with the WZO to 
further Zionist objective along socialist directions. Second, the labor movement 
gained a majority in the WZO itselfbeginning in the 1930s. More importantly, the 
workers of the Second Aliyah set up the first political institutions in the area, 
which gave them a head start in political and social organization, permitting them 
to dominate these institutions once other Zionist movements and parties joined 
them. The collectivist-nationalist ideals inherent in their value structures enhanced 
their domination, instilling in the Jews a sense of national commitment and 
willingness to work under the socialist leadership for ultimate Zionist goals 
(Shapiro 1976,2-3).4 
The establishment of Mapai in 1930 went a long way toward the 
institutionalization of labor supremacy in the Yishuv and then in Israel. 5 First, the 
welter of parties in the Yishuv, combined with the highly competitive democratic 
nature of its and Israel' s politics, meant that no single party ever received an 
absolute majority to govern on its own; it had to rely on coalition partners in 
either the National Assembly or, after 1948, in the Knesset in order to form a 
4 The workers also won the competition over how to achieve Zionist objectives: their arguments 
that an independent Jewish economy based on Jewish labor was the sine qua non of any successful 
Zionist enterprise earned them the institutional and financial support of the .WZO (Shapiro 1976, 
Chapter 8). 
5 Aronoff (1993, 32) argues that Mapai was specifically formed to enhance the control of the main 
socialist Zionist parties in the economic and political institutions of the Yishuv. 
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government. Because Mapai/Labor always obtained a plurality, it was in a 
position to trade concessions for support. In this way it was able to hold on to the 
top foreign policymaking portfolios (the prime ministry, defense ministry, and 
foreign ministry). At the same time, because Mapai/Labor occupied the center of 
the political spectrum, in order to form a govemment parties on either side would 
have to cooperate to take control from it. This was next to impossible given the 
often diametrically opposing views these parties had on various issues, thus 
ensuring Mapai/Labor's continued preeminence.6 
Second, the labor movement' s control of the levers of decision-making 
authority enabled it to entrench its ideology and agenda in Yishuv and Israeli 
political institutions. This was facilitated by a lack of qualified career civil 
servants and administrators. Since it was the party in control of govemment, 
Mapai naturally put its own people and supporters into these open positions 
(Medding 1972, 29-30), thus embedding its message and objectives directly into 
policymaking institutions and setting the policy agenda. 
Finally, in addition to controlling the Jewish community's resources, the 
labor movement also organized and ran its economic as sets (Shimshoni 1982, 22-
23). In 1920, even before the formation of Mapai, two of the parties that 
eventually folded into it set up the Histadrut (the General Federation of Hebrew 
Workers in Eretz Israel). A giant economic labor federation designed to meet the 
needs of the independent Jewish economy in Palestine, it came to provide for 
many of the services necessary for the effective working of the Jewish community 
6 The indispensability of Mapai to forming a govemment is captured in the observation that 
elections were not conducted to determine who would le ad the country, but rather who would 
become Mapai/Labor's coalition partners. 
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~ ... (such as economic activity, health care, education, and so on). It also became a 
primary patronage instrument, as it allocated a wide range of resources and 
services on the basis of labor priorities. 
The Centrality of Security 
In addition to the dominance of socialist Zionism, the centralization of 
Israeli decision-making was facilitated by the precarious security situation. 
Surrounded by Arab states and irregular forces public1y committed to its 
destruction, Israel for the first twenty-five to thirty years of its existence faced an 
existential threat that permitted prime ministers wide latitude to make foreign 
policy, tied as it was into national security and defense affairs. 
The life-and-death nature of these threats allowed prime ministers to argue 
that there was little time or space for prolonged debates on foreign and security 
policy; and that even if there were, the demands for secrecy would severely 
limited any such discussions (see Klieman 1988). In most cases, the prime 
minister, defense minister, foreign minister, and one to a few other key ministers 
or advisors made decisions on their own, presenting them to the Knesset and the 
public afterward as a fait accompli.7 The decision to obtain a nuc1ear weapons 
capability, for example, was made in total secret by David Ben-Gurion, the 
country's first prime minister, and only two or three others; Ben-Gurion purposely 
denied the existence of such a pro gram to his fellow citizens (see A. Cohen 1998). 
The concentration on security and foreign affairs also stemmed from the 
understanding that these issues were the most important for the development and 
7 Most Israeli leaders have eschewed an institutionalized staff, preferring to consult with personal 
advisors (within or without the government and party) on specific issues (see Arian, Nachmias, 
and Amir 2002, Chapter 6). Both Rabin and Shamir followed this trend. 
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safety of the state (see Arian 1998, 290; Garfinkle 1997, 108-115; HeUer 2000, 
13-17; Peri 1983). Israeli prime ministers have tended to neglect both internaI 
party affairs and domestic issues, leaving the latter to senior cabinet ministers 
(Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002, 49). 8 Israeli society generaUy agreed with this 
analysis, and therefore acquiesced in this process of decision-making (see Arian, 
Talmud, and Hermann 1988). It was easy, then, for Ben-Gurion to set the standard 
when he kept the Defense Ministry for himse1f during his tenure as Prime 
Minister (1948-1953, 1955-1963) (see Kurzman 1983; Levite 1989; Medding 
1990,210-220). Rabin also he Id the defense portfolio during his second tenure as 
prime minister, while other Israeli prime ministers held instead the Foreign 
Ministry. 
The Requirements of State-Building 
The third trend that led to the centralization of decision-making power in 
Israel was the shi ft from an informally institutionalized Jewish community to a 
state after the state's establishment in 1948. This meant that official, formaI 
frameworks had to be set up, and that the state had to consolidate aU 
administrative and decision-making authority in its own institutions. Only in this 
way could the fledging state survive and be successful. 
From the beginning the Zionists were intent on creating their own 
governing institutions in Palestine. Their creation was motivated by three main 
ideas: to provide the Jewish community with the ability to look after itself, 
particularly as it was felt the British were not doing this satisfactorily (see Segev 
8 This changed somewhat in the 1980s, as prime rninisters came to devote more attention to non-
security matters. 
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2000, for an opposmg argument); to prepare for at a minimum communal 
autonomy and at a maximum an independent state; and, stemming from the last 
point, the desire to separate themselves from the Arab community and to form 
their own national institutions (see Horowitz and Lissak 1978, Chapter 2). 
But the influx into Palestine of a myriad of different movements, groups, 
and parties-an based on different Zionist ideologies and visions-helped 
entrench the system of autonomous parties that acted as their own sub centers 
(Horowitz and Lissak 1978). These were comprehensive institutions, each with 
their own sports and youth clubs, school systems, and particular philosophical and 
ideological outlooks (see Horowitz and Lissak 1978: Chapter 4; Roberts, 1990; 
Sachar 1996, 147; Yishai 1991, Chapter 1). Political parties were oligarchic, led 
by their founding fathers and run by an efficient, bureaucratic party machinery 
that controlled an elements of life for their members-what Medding (1990, 8) 
refers to as the "partification" of society. The parties were not willing to give up 
their independence, fearing a loss of influence and thus ability to meet their 
particular visions of the Zionist dream; these divisions carried over into the state 
period. 
As the founding father and first prime minister of Israel, Ben-Gurion 
played a critical role in the early establishment of Israeli goveming institutions. 
He adhered to a policy of statism (mamlachtiut), which entailed the transfer of 
most activities that were previously the purview of the independent parties to the 
state (see Avi-hai 1974; Kurzman 1983). An decision-making functions and 
activities (in political, economic, military, cultural, and social are as ) had to be 
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concentrated in the state, and state interests took precedence over an others 
(Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983, Chapter 4; Medding 1990, Chapter 7; Yanai 
1989). Although the process was not successful in an areas (particularly in health 
care and economic activity, where the Histadrut managed to retain a good deal of 
independence, and in education, where the religious parties kept a separate 
schooling system for their own segment of the population), in foreign and security 
policy it was. 
Crucially, because Mapai/Labor was the dominant party in the system, 
neither it nor Ben-Gurion, who was also the leader of the party, ever intended that 
it should not retain the central position in the Israeli polit y, despite Ben-Gurion's 
genuine commitment to state consolidation and democratic debate. Mapai 
essentially saw its own interests as identical to those of the state; this was 
reflected in its domination of state institutions and the integration of Mapai 
members-with Mapai ideology-into the nascent bureaucracy. In Medding's 
words, Mapai "established and directed the new state structures, headed an 
cabinets, chose its coalition partners, manned the important ministries, set 
national priorities, determined the political agenda, and centralized and controlled 
policy-making and its implementation" (1990, 178). 
Executive power in the hands of the prime minister has been steadily, if 
slowly and even intermittently, increasing since 1948 (Arian, Nachmias, and 
Amir 2002). This was not how it was intended to be: The leaders of Mapai/Labor 
were genuinely concemed to construct a "normal" Westem-style parliamentary 
democracy. But because of their position in the Israeli polit y, their long-time 
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dominance in Yishuv politics, their expectation that they would continue to hold 
this standing after 1948, and Ben-Gurion's own personal efforts to concentrate 
power in his hands, the result was a centralization of power that was maintained 
and strengthened even after Labor was overtaken in office by Likud. As Arian, 
Nachmias, and Amir (2002, 48) put it, "[p]rime ministers have been the 
predominant figures in the Israeli government. While by design the prime 
minister, prior to the [1992 direct election] reform, has beenprimus inter pares, in 
practice an Israeli prime ministers have been primus.,,9 
In sum, the ongoing centralization of power in the hands of the labor 
movement continued with the establishment of the state. Strong prime ministers 
who concentrated power in their own office combined with the needs of building 
state institutions after 1948 to put decision-making power in their own hands. The 
security situation facilitated this, by sanctioning the perceived necessity of quick 
and secret decisions that would best protect the new state and allow for the most 
efficient process of decision-making. This historical sketch allows us to 
categorize Israel as a centralized state: the primary decision maker (the prime 
minister) holds the decision-making authority in foreign policy matters. 
Ideational Structures 
Sirnilarly, a historical analysis is necessary because it can help us 
determine the general patterns of ideas toward negotiating with the PLO and an 
9 The authors also note there is a normative-societal dimension to this as weB: Israeli prime 
rninisters that do not display decisive leadership roles are perceived as weak and ill-suited to lead 
Israel. The example of Levi Eshkol during the crisis leading up to the 1967 war is cited as a good 
example (Arian, Nachrnias, and Arnir 2002,48; also Arian, Talmud, and Hermann 1988, 16-17). 
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independent Palestinian state-both of which were generally opposed by most 
elites and much of the population in Israel, yet both of which were incorporated 
into . the decision to sign the 1993 Oslo Accords. The fact that such ideas were 
never part of official government policy or widely agreed to among the public 
makes Rabin's decision to sign the agreement a dramatic variation and puzzle in 
Israeli foreign policy. 
This section begins with a short discussion on how Palestinians were 
viewed by the Jews before the establishment ofIsrael in 1948. From 1948 to 1967 
the Palestinians did not figure much in Israeli policy: the West Bank was under 
Jordanian control while Gaza was retained by Egypt. 10 But after the 1967 Six Day 
War, when Israel seized the WBG, ideas about a Palestinian state and talking to 
the PLO became unavoidable. In this context, we will focus on the policies and 
ideas of the two main political parties, Labor and Likud, since these were the only 
parties to form and lead Israel' s governments up until the 1993 Oslo Accords. 11 
Ideas about the Palestinians during the Yishuv 
How the Zionists viewed the Arabs in Palestine before 1948 is critical for 
understanding how most Labor and Likud leaders thought of them from 1967 to 
1993. At bottom, they were seen as, first, competitors for employment, and 
second, as a threat to the establishment of an independent J ewish state in 
Palestine. With the ons et of the 1947-1949 War and its results, little if any thought 
10 Indeed, most analysts agree that from 1948-1967, the Palestinians were not important for Israel 
in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which instead focused on relations between Israel and 
the Arab states, particularly Egypt (see TessIer 1994, 336). For good studies of the history of 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Morris (2001) and TessIer (1994). 
JI Only in 2006 was this trend broken, when a completely new party, Kadima (made up of former 
Likud and Labor members) became the senior partner in the government coalition. 
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was given to a Palestinian state; and there was no need to consider dialogue with 
the PLO (formed only in 1964), since the PLO's stated policy was the "liberation" 
of Palestine from the Jews. By this they meant Israel, and this was not something 
the Israelis would obviously contemplate. 
The Zionists were aware of the Arabs in Palestine from the beginning of 
the movement's creation, but the existence of another communal group in the 
territory they intended to shape into a homeland played almost no part in public 
debates among the Zionists. 12 The oft-heard refrain, "a land without a people for a 
people without a land," was not intended to mean that the land was completely 
empty of people, but rather that in its undeveloped and neglected state, it was 
waiting for an industrious people willing to settle in harsh conditions to revive it. 
In fact, the prevailing view among the socialist Zionists, stemming from the 
influence of the Second Aliyah members and in keeping with their emphasis on 
working the land, was that the land belonged to those who expended the effort to 
develop and take care of it-which the Arabs were not doing to any great 
degree. 13 
In this context, the Arabs were mostly seen as contenders of labor. The 
ideological outlook of the Second Aliyah members was that the Jews could only 
become a nation and a state if they worked the land themselves. The Arabs were 
12 There were sorne Zionists who recognized that the Arabs already living in Palestine would pose 
problems for the Zionist enterprise, or whose rising nationalisrn would eventually clash with 
Jewish nationalism, and wrote or spoke about it. But they were to the greatest extent ignored or 
dismissed, subsurned under the larger questions with which Zionisrn was concemed; narnely, the 
we1fare of the Jewish community and developing authoritative and allocative institutions to look 
after it. See Dowty (2001). 
\3 Ben-Gurion, in particular, was very public and specifie about this viewpoint: see Kurzrnan 
(1983, 160) and Teveth (1985, Chapter 3). Although he recognized that where Arabs did work the 
land, they were entitled to it, he qualified this by noting that the Jewish need for a Jewish 
horneland was far greater. 
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seen as rivaIs for this, particularly as they were willing to work for less pay. In the 
1920s the Labor-Zionists had mixed success in imposing their ideas on First 
Aliyah farrners, who were the main employers 'of Arab labor. By the 1930s, the 
socialists began to take more aggressive action, leading strikes against J ewish 
farrners who employed Arab labor, and often strong-arrning the Arabs into 
quitting (Sachar 1996, 157). 
When the Zionists did think about the Arabs in non-competitive terrns, it 
was mostly in a patemalistic fashion-that Jewish work, technological and 
organizational advancements, and economic activity would benefit the Arabs to 
the point that the latter would we1come J ewish immigration and be willing to live 
within a Jewish national home. 14 There was thus no "Arab problem," since once 
the Arabs saw how much they benefited from J ewish efforts, they would be 
content (Penslar 1991; Sachar 1996, Chapter 8; Shapira 1992, 40_52).15 As 
Shapira put it, the Zionists quite simply lacked a real understanding of both the 
conditions within Palestine, and the budding nationalism of the Arabs (1992, 51). 
The Arabs in Palestine were thus not ignored so much as dismissed, 
particularly in their potential as a cohesive communal group with nationalist 
aspirations similar to those of the J ews. But by the late 1920s Zionist thinking 
began to shi ft, as a resuIt of violence between Arabs and J ews; the Arab Revoit 
(1936-1939) crystallized for many Zionists this emerging attitude (see Shapira 
1992, Chapters 5-6). The notion of separation of the two communities, already 
14 The right-wing groups believed that the Arabs would eventuaUy come to accept Israeli 
sovereignty not because of the benefits but because ofits inevitability (see Shavit 1988,266). 
15 This viewpoint also stemmed from the self-perception of the Zionists as universalists and 
humanists, concemed with human progress in general. They believed whole-heartedly that their 
actions in Palestine would benefit aU its inhabitants. 
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evident in the desire for two different economies based on Arab and Jewish labor, 
became more prominent and was now perceived as necessary, in both security and 
economic terms. This notion of territorial partition became the traditional view of 
Labor on Palestine/Israel, transforming itself into acceptance of the 1949 
armistice borders that divided the Land ofIsrael into a Jewish state and Arab-held 
terri tories. The end of traditional Labor partitionism did not corne until 1967, with 
the conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
1967, the Occupation of the Territories, and Ideas Toward a Palestinian State 
ln June 1967 Israel fought a war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, seizing 
from them the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan 
Heights respectively.16 The armistice lines of the 1947-49 War, which had been 
regarded by most of the socialist movement as the legal and factual borders of 
Israel (Avi-hai 1974, 128, 175, 187) became less relevant regarding the WBG. 
The war and its results raised questions about who would be the permanent 
goveming authority over them (Israel or one of the Arab states), what kind of 
political entity would emerge and what would its boundaries be, and crystallized 
the nationalist/territorial aspirations for the Palestinians, particularly in the form 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 17 
Perhaps most importantly for Israel, it raised questions about Israeli 
identity and its connection to Israeli borders and Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) 
16 The onset and conduct of the war is not germane to the discussion at hand. For insightful and 
full accounts, see Morris (2001, Chapter 7); Oren (2002); and Shlaim (2001, Chapter 6). For a 
discussion ofIsraeli decision-making, see Brecher (1975, Chapter 7). 
17 The PLO was created in 1964 in an effort to increase Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser's 
control over the Palestinian cause and Middle East politics. The Israeli capture of the West Bank 
and Gaza galvanized the PLO to an extent not possible before 1967. 
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itself (see Sprinzak 1991, especially Chapter 3). Subsumed within these issues 
was the proper status of the Palestinians within the WBG. Before 1967, only 
smaller groups on the right had continued to advocate a Greater Israel to inc1ude 
all of Mandatory Palestine, but the dominance of Labor and the centralization of 
power that allowed it to impose its ideological outlook on the rest of the country 
essentially prevented any policy movement toward expanding Israel' s borders. It 
was also considered unlikely that Israel could ever take these lands away from the 
Arab states holding them. 
But the capture of the West Bank provided aIl Israelis with a glimpse, as it 
were, into the historical and biblical heartland of the ancient Jewish kingdoms, 
typically referred to as Judea and Samaria. Equally, the capture of the eastern 
portion of Jerusalem put into Israeli hands for the first time in almost 2,000 years 
the Old City. Under Jordanian control since 1949, it held the holiest site in 
Judaism and the Jewish identity: the Western Wall, a slice of the wall surrounding 
the Roly Temple that was the center of the Jewish religion and identity until it 
was destroyed by the Romans in 70 C.E. The Jordanians had refused to let Jews 
worship at the site. 
The impact on the Israeli elites and masses alike cannot be exaggerated-
the country shifted rapidly from a mood of fear for its survival before the war, 
through a swift and overwhelming victory against its enemies, to the conque st of 
its historical homeland; the outpouring of emotion could not be ignored. Labor 
leaders were not immune to this feeling, and within three weeks the govemment 
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formally annexed all of Jerusalem, 18 while in December the government officially 
changed the name of the West Bank to "Jude a and Samaria" (though in Hebrew 
only). At the same time, nationalist sentiments more attuned to a larger Israeli 
state were aroused across the political spectrum, making ideas which had 
previously been limited to the right wing parties and abstract discussion suddenly 
concrete and possible. 1967 opened up for legitimate and even necessary debate 
the meaning and identity of Israel, the requirements of security, and which party 
could best represent the former and achieve the latter. 
Bach party he Id specifie ideas about these issues, and these "interpretive 
struggles" (the word is Sikkink's 1991, 22) were thus reflected into the political 
arena, where the contestation over the prime ministership also meant who would 
get to set or reflect the contours of Israeli identity. (See Bamett 2002, for a four-
category classification of these distinctions and their impact on foreign policy; 
also Peleg 1998.) However, in reference to the dependent variable, an independent 
Palestinian state, the basic position of both parties remained the same: outright 
rejection. For Labor, this potential would be worked around by tying the 
territories into sorne kind of confederation with Jordan; for the Likud, there could 
be no shared sovereignty with any other power. The rest of the section analyzes 
the parties' ideas about a Palestinian state. This will set the benchmark against 
which the policy change of 1993 occurred. 
18 Golda Meir, a key Mapai/Labor leader and later prime minister, mentions that although she was 
due to leave the country the day after the war, she could not leave before seeing the Western Wall; 
she received special permission from the government to do so (Meir 1975, 105). Rabin notes that 
he was "breathless" when he first reached the Wall (Rabin 1994, 87). When Moshe Dayan, 
Defense Minister, entered the Old City of Jerusalem just after its capture, he declared in typical 
drarnatic fashion: "We have returned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned never to be 
parted from it again" (cited in Sachar 1996, 673). 
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Labor and Territorial Compromise 
Labor was unable to ignore the emotional and psychological pull of the 
West Bank on the Israeli psyche. But because it had a tradition of acceptance of 
partition in exchange for an independent Jewish entity, and had always been 
guided primarily by strategic-security concems in settlement policy, it was from 
the beginning interested in ceding control of sorne territory to the Arab states 
provided it was assured of a peace agreement in retum. Despite factional 
differences within the party, aU of Labor agreed that Israel had to remain a J ewish 
state with a Jewish majority, and had to remain committed to democratic norms of 
govemance. Holding on to the territories with their large Arab populations 
undermined both. 19 
The West Bank and Gaza were thus viewed not as permanent additions to 
Israel, but as temporary advantages. This is further underlined by the lack of 
planning for administration of the territories before the 1967 war, and the decision 
"not to decide" about what to do with them after the war (see Gazit 1995; Nisan 
1978). In the context of contributing to Israel's security, they were seen as 
strategic assets in two ways: as bargaining chips to be used in any eventual 
negotiations with the Arabs states (Gazit 1995,294); and as a means of extending 
a buffer zone between Israel and any threats from the south and the east. 
Jerusalem was thus willing to retum part, but not an, of the territories (see, for 
example, Meir 1975, 371). The term "defensible borders," the new watchword in 
this context, came into use in the weeks immediately after the Six Day War 
19 According to Friedgut (1995, 72), the question of the impact of holding on the territories on 
Israel's democracy and Jewish character was first mentioned only a few weeks after the war, at a 
symposium at Hebrew University. 
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(Horowitz 1993, 49, fn. 12). On 19 June 1967, the Labor govemment officially 
decided it would sign a peace treaty with Egypt and Syria on the basis of the 
international (1949) border, with sorne security modifications, but the WBG was 
only vaguely referred to.20 
In keeping with both its traditional position and the security lens through 
which it viewed the West Bank and Gaza, Labor policy toward them was defined 
as territorial compromise. However, because in the immediate aftermath of the 
war Labor displayed indecision toward the territories, coupled with the ernotional 
tug of the land, and because there did not seern to be any willingness on the part 
of the Arab states to explore peace options, Labor recognized that the inhabitants 
needed to be taken care. But not wanting to take complete responsibility for them 
(and thus minimizing the costs of occupation), Israel sought to work something 
out with the Arab state it saw as rnost likely to cooperate with Israel, and which 
had ruled the area from 1948 to 1967: Jordan. 
The Jordanian Option 
According to Sandler and Frisch, three things guided Israeli thinking on 
the territories: (1) Israel could not, for historical, cultural, religious, and political 
reasons, replace Jordanian rule; (2) Israeli security interests were intirnately 
linked to the territory itself, as opposed to the people; and (3) Jordan was still an 
important actor in controlling the territories, with numerous ties to the inhabitants, 
and so sorne form of cooperation had to be worked out with it (1984, 58-59). 
These ideas formed the basis of what has become known as the "Jordanian 
20 The decision was later rescinded in the wake of the 1967 Khartoum Summit, where the Arab 
leaders declared their three noes: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel. 
112 
option" in Labor policy toward the territories. This entailed working with Jordan, 
usually through direct talks, over the status of the WBG, rather than with "local" 
Palestinians or the PLO. 
From the time of Ben-Gurion, Labor leaders had been meeting secretly 
with the kings of Jordan to work out a modus vivendi between Israel and the 
Hashemite Kingdom. Long considered one of the more moderate of the Arab 
states, Jordan was seen as a critical ingredient in a Middle Eastern framework that 
ensured Israel's security. Amman's ambition to retain the West Bank for itse1f 
and control over the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem provided a basis for 
cooperation, since Israel under Labor did not hold any pretensions toward 
conque st of the West Bank during the 1947-49 war (see Kurzman 1983, 275; 
Kurzman 1970,22-24; Sandler and Frisch 1984, 108). 
In addition to dealing solely with Jordan, territorial compromise for Labor 
also came to mean sorne form of Jordanian control, preferably joint management 
with Israel. There was no thought given to handing over the terri tories to complete 
Jordanian sovereignty: Jordan's participation in the 1967 war, against Israeli 
warnings, and the fact that Jordan agreed to have other Arab forces stationed on 
its territory, combined with the obvious inability of the country' s leadership to 
resist the pan-Arab necessity of standing together .against Israel, convinced most 
Israeli leaders that the West Bank could never be allowed to faU under the control 
of a potential enemy. This option was advocated by Labor leaders even up until 
the signing of Oslo.21 There was no consideration given to the possibility of an 
21 Even in May 1993, while the Oslo talks were ongoing, then-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was 
still talking about a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. See Peres (1993, Chapter 13). 
113 
independent Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza; it was simply assumed that 
Jordan had to be involved in sorne way. 
Two dominant ideas emerged among the Labor leaders after 1967, 
reflecting these ideas about the Jordanian option and heavily influencing future 
policy. The first was the Allon Plan, based on the notion of territorial 
compromIse; the second was the Dayan Plan, which was about functional 
compromise (Sandler 1993, 188). There were many similarities between them: 
both were designed primarily with Israel's security in mind, and both incorporated 
the notion that Israel must control the strategie points in the occupied terri tories. 
Finally, both also saw Jordan as the only partner with whom Israel could work on 
the West Bank (Sandler 1993, 188-189). 
The Allon Plan called for the establishment of a security zone along the 
Jordan River, in areas not densely populated by Arabs, and at sorne other points in 
the West Bank. In return for a peace treaty, Israel would give most of the West 
Bank and all of Gaza to Jordan (Allon 1976; M. Benvenisti 1984, 51-52). This 
was, in essence, a newer version of partition. It was adopted by the government in 
June 1968 as a settlement plan, though not as a formaI territorial plan (since the 
government was still plagued by uncertainty and indecision). In 1977 Labor did 
adopt it as part of its official policy platform (see Inbar [1991] for more 
discussion on this). 
Moshe Dayan was considered to be a more hawkish member of Labor, and 
his plan reflected in many ways sorne of the thinking of the Likud party (indeed, 
he served as foreign minister in the first Likud government in 1977). Rather than 
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any shared sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, he proposed a "functional" 
division instead, with Israel retaining overall security control and Jordan given 
administrative and civic control. With the dec1ine in Dayan's influence after the 
1973 War and his agreement to work in the first Likud government after 1977, the 
Dayan Plan ceased to be part of Labor policy; in fact, it bec orne associated with 
Likud's autonomy plan in the Camp David Accords (see below). 
In the context of the Allon Plan, Israel set about establishing a series of 
political libera1ization efforts combined with strengthening the economic links 
between the West Bank and Gaza. The main purpose was to make the territory 
relatively self-sustaining, so that Israel would not have to pay for the occupation 
(see Sandler and Frisch 1984, 48-58, 61-65; on the legal absorption of the 
territories, see E. Benvenisti 1990). While placing the areas under mi1itary 
government, Jerusalem also ensured that Jordan continued to play a crucial role in 
West Bank and Gaza life. But nowhere in any of the ideas presented by Labor 
leaders was mention made of an independent Palestinian state, or of negotiating 
with the PLO on the future of the territories. 
Likud and Greater Israel 
A combination oflsraeli policy contradictions, Jordan's own ambivalence 
about joint control with Israel, and most importantly the unexpected rise to power 
of the Likud party in 1977 effectively ended the Jordanian option, although it 
remained the guiding princip le for Labor until 1993. Where Labor was willing to 
entertain sorne form of territorial compromise, Likud was opposed to any 
agreement that wou Id remove Israeli sovereignty over what it saw as the biblical 
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and historical heritage of the Jews. The most that Likud leaders were willing to 
consider was sorne forrn of Menachem Begin's autonomy plan, presented in the 
1978 Camp David Accords. If for Labor the terri tories were a means to an end 
(enhancement of Israel' s security and bargaining chips for peace talks), for Likud 
the territories were an end in themselves (see Sandler and Frisch 1984, Chapter 
6). 
The Likud party was rooted in the Revisionist Zionist movement that 
began in the 1920s. The Revisionists opposed the labor movement's vision of 
Zionism, including its emphasis on agricultural labor and socialism, and its 
gradualist approach to the attainment of Zionist objectives. It stood for a build-up 
of Jewish military power and its use against both the Arabs and the British if 
either group opposed the establishment of a Jewish state. And it adamantly 
rejected any partition of the biblical Land of Israel (see Shavit 1988; Shindler 
1995, Chapter 1). 
Herut, the core element of Likud (which was an amalgam of several 
smaller parties), was essentially the heir of the Revisionists. As a political party, it 
was forrned by Menachem Begin and the other leaders of the Irgun Zvai Leumi 
(National Military Organization, commonly called the Irgun or by its Hebrew 
acronyrn, Etzef), an underground military organization that broke from the Labor-
controlled pre-state Jewish arrny because of its policy of restraint in the face of 
Arab attacks. It also held to a maximalist position on the boundaries of a Jewish 
state: Herut's emblem was a map of the Land ofIsrael on both sides of the Jordan 
River, though this was later modified to include only Israel, the West Bank, and 
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Gaza. It was also a nationalist, rather than a religious, emphasis. There was no 
room here for a Jordanian option or any independent Arab political entity-the 
West Bank was referred to by Herut as the "eastern part of the western Land of 
Israel" (Shindler 1995, 45). In Han Peleg's words, "[t]he cornerstone of Begin's 
foreign policy throughout his tenure as Israel's prime minister was his effort to 
maintain Israel's control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (1987, 95). 
Although the later transformation of Herut into the Likud helped exp and 
its support base and give it a policy cast beyond hard-line territorial demands, it 
was the Six Day War that made the Likud more germane for policy debates over 
the territories, in two ways. First, during the cri sis leading up to the war, both elite 
and popular pressure forced the Labor leaders to create a National Unit y 
Govemment, by bringing in Gahal (the party formed by a merger between Herut 
and the LiberaIs) and other parties for a united front in the face of a national 
emergency. HerutiGahal leader Begin became a Minister without Portfolio. This 
provided Begin and Herut with national legitimacy, portraying them as 
responsible political actors concerned notjust without their own partisan interests, 
but with the national interest as weIl. 
Second, the results of the 1967 war suddenly made Herut "more relevant 
to an Israel that had acquired the territories. The right to the terri tories, which 
became the issue of the day, was what Herut had preached during its many years 
in opposition" (Torgovnik 1986, 58). The nationalist framework that rejected 
territorial compromise and partition (seen as capitulation) that Herut had been 
preaching was now given concrete manifestation, and its ideological vision and 
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emotional attachment no longer seemed far-fetched or unrealistic. The fact that 
the territories were (a) captured by Labor; (b) he Id on to by Labor; and (c) first 
settled by Labor also increased legitimacy for Likud's vision of Greater Israel. If 
the traditionally legitimate and ruling party could acquiesce in these things, then 
surely Likud's ideas could not be an bad? 
Changes in Israeli society and politics also impacted on general ideational 
structures regarding a Palestinian state. The decline of Labor as the dominant 
political force was reflective of, and contributed to, the weakening of its image as 
the primary vehic1e for the Zionist enterprise. This mattered less so long as it was 
impossible to settle beyond the 1949 armistice lines, but the capture of the WBG 
provided a new arena in which the Zionist mission could take place. By this time, 
Labor's dec1ine was almost complete, and Likud's takeover was supplemented 
with the rise of another entity as representative of the historie Zionist mission of 
settling the land, at the expense of the Labor movement: Gush Emunim (Bloc of 
the Faithful).22 The Gush presented itself as continuing the Zionist enterprise as 
begun by Labor, eaming greater appeal than it might otherwise have obtained (see 
Aronoff 1989, Chapter 4; Sprinzak 1991, 43-51,114-117).23 This helped generate 
support for Likud's policy of settlement in and retenti on of the WBG. 
22 The Gush was formed in 1974. Made up of young religious-nationalists tied to the National 
Religious Party, the traditional coalition partner of Labor, it was formed in the wake of the trauma 
of the 1973 War. Labor's policy of holding the territories in stasis in the hopes of trading them for 
peace with the Arabs was widely considered to have failed. To fill the gap of despair, these youth 
sought to rejuvenate the historie Zionist mission; this was enhanced by the fact that the places 
open for settlement were the heart of the ancient Jewish kingdoms (Drezon-Tepler 1990, 170-171; 
Sandler and Frisch 1984, 118-132). 
23 Aronoff, for one, believes that the Gush would not have been as successful as it was had Labor 
been in the prime ofits politicallife (1989,87). 
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Autonomy 
The Likud rejected both the Jordanian option and partition. However, the 
Likud could not ignore the existence of hundreds of thousands of Arabs living on 
these lands, and so in lieu of a Jordanian option, the Likud began advocating 
autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, but not for the territory 
itself. In other words, the territories were to remain under Israeli control, but the 
inhabitants could exercise sorne forrn of self-government. Foreign policy thus 
shifted from a security-oriented motivation to an "ethnonational" inspiration 
(Sandler 1993). 
Begin presented his "home-rule" plan in December 1977, based in part on 
the Dayan Plan, as a mechanism for retaining control over the territories. Because 
for Begin and other Likud leaders (inc1uding yitzhak Shamir) the historical right 
of the Jews to the Land ofIsrael took precedence over everything (Shindler 1995, 
89-90; Sofer 1988, 124, 129-130), autonomy for the people was the most that 
could be offered. The plan called for an end to military government in the 
terri tories, and Palestinian elections to an Administrative Council, which would 
hold responsibility for education, religious affairs, finances, transportation, 
housing, health services, industry, justice, and local police forces. Palestinians 
would have a choice of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship; Israel would hold 
responsibility for public order and overall security, and land and water rights; and 
J ews would be allowed to buy land and settle wherever they wished (Shindler 
1995,90; Sofer 1988, 135). The autonomy plan became the basis for Likud policy 
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throughout the negotiations with Egypt on the Camp David Accords, and 
throughout the 1980s.24 
Likud's priorities are best reflected in its sett1ement policy. Because Likud 
policy was based not on security considerations, settlement policy came to reflect 
the nationalist demands of the right in Israel and Gush Emunim. From the 
beginning the Gush pushed for settlements in densely populated Arab are as , in 
sharp contrast to Labor's policy of keeping away from these districts. It was 
hoped that once the new settlements became established facts, the government 
would have no choice but to support and protect them, building up the 
infrastructure around them and incorporating them into the Israeli social, political, 
. d' k 25 economlc, an secunty networ s. 
Settlement activity under the Likud differed considerably from settlement 
patterns under Labor (see Sandler 1993,203-210) in three main ways. First, Labor 
settlements were concentrated in three areas: the Jerusalem area, the Etzion bloc 
(a concentration of J ewish settlements between J erusalem and Hebron, toward the 
south-west corner of the West Bank), and the Jordan Valley. Begin extended the 
settlements around and beyond all these areas. Second, where under Labor the 
original settlers came from youth movements or kibbutzim associated with Labor 
or the National Religious Party, and came to protect the borders of Israel, those 
who came under the Likud were motivated by nationalist-religious ideals, to 
24 In fact, Ezer Weizman, who was invo1ved in the discussions with the Americans and Egyptians 
1eading up to the Camp David Accords, be1ieves that Begin on1y agreed to retum the Sinai "to 
protect himse1f against any eventua1 concessions in the West Bank" (Weizman 1981, 151, 190-
191). 
2S The West Bank road system under Labor, for examp1e, was designed primari1y a10ng a north-
south axis, in keeping with its strategic ideas about the position of the West Bank in Israe1's 
overal1 security framework. Under Likud, it was laid out a10ng an east-west line, to connect the 
West Bank and Jewish settlements with Israel (M. Benvenisti 1984,23). 
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!~ entrench the J ewish right to settlement in their historie homeland. At the same 
time, the government, particularly under Ariel Sharon as Minister of Agriculture, 
began encouraging Israelis who wanted a better quality of life, cheaper housing, 
and space away from the heavy urban areas to move to the territories, through a 
series of financial and economic inducements. Third, Labor' s plans evolved from 
three considerations: security, the density of surrounding Arab populations, and 
economic viability and self-sufficiency. For Likud, the settlements had to be tied 
to Israel's economic structures, to facilitate control over the area (see also M. 
Benvenisti 1984; Eisenstadt 1985, 511-513; Sandler and Frisch 1984, 135-136). 
Likud policy thus reflected Likud ideas about Israeli sovereignty over the West 
Bank. 
We can see the different party policies on these issues through an 
examination of elections platforms throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see Yishai 
1986, 237-238). However, the basic underlying policy was the same for both 
parties: Labor advocated sorne form of territorial compromise while Likud 
insisted on overaU Israeli sovereignty, but neither party accepted the necessity or 
possibility of an independent Palestinian state. For aU their differences in policy 
on settlements and ultimate control over the terri tories, the idea of a third 
independent state in the area was a non-starter for both parties.26 The 1977 
elections that brought a very different party to power did not change Israeli policy 
on this point. Even after Palestinian nationalism became a prominent issue in 
26 Inbar (1991) analyzes the shift throughout the 1980s in Labor ideas about a Palestinian state 
(and negotiations with the PLO). Although there was a clear swing toward acceptance of such 
prospects, it was never officially endorsed by the party; more importantly, neither Peres nor Rabin, 
the two main leaders of the party, ever accepted either of the se options. 
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Arab-Israeli relations from the mid-1970s, the dictates of security or ideology 
prevented any movement on the part of Israel toward such a goal. 
Direct Talks with the PLO 
Less discussion is necessary regarding ideas about negotiating with the 
PLO. This is for three reasons: First, the Palestinians as an independent actor were 
simply ignored by both Labor and Likud. This disregard stemmed from three 
factors. One, it was a function of the lack of progress on the peace front: with no 
Arab state or other international actor either interested in focusing on the 
Palestinian issue or having the capacity to influence Israel on this matter, there 
was no reason for Israel to concern itself with the WBG.27 Two, lack of armed 
conflict between Israel and the Arabs2S removed a key element that normally 
helped push the Palestinian issue to the top of the Israeli-Arab agenda. Three, and 
stemming from the first two facets, Israelis simply had no motive to be concerned 
about the Palestinians and their conditions in the WBG. Palestinians had for long 
not been a factor in Middle East politics, ignored by both Israel and the Arab 
states when it suited them; they were simply unseen, and the territories were 
considered a "distant land" that few Israelis outside of the govemment agencies 
that dealt with them thought about, except perhaps as a place to obtain cheaper 
goods and services. 
Second, the PLO was regarded by both parties as a terrorist organization 
with no redeeming qualities. This left it outside the pale in terms of peace 
27 Although the 1978 Camp David Accords tried to bring the Palestinian issue to the center of 
Israeli-Arab negotiations, neither Begin nor Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat had aU that much 
interest in doing so, preferring to concentrate on ending their own bilateral state ofwar. 
28 The war in Lebarron was essentiaUy over by 1985, but even while it was ongoing it was 
confined to Lebanon itself and Israeli-PLO interactions. 
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negotiations. Third, it was not until the later 1980s that the PLO became an actor 
relevant in its own right, as it began to receive significant international support 
(particularly from the Americans) as the representative of the Palestinian people. 
The onset of serious efforts to establish a negotiating framework in this period 
raised questions about who would or could represent the Palestinians, thus also 
raising the profile of the PLO. In short, the PLO was a non-entity for Israeli 
govemment foreign policy considerations until the second half of the 1980s. 
Chapter 4 discusses these last two factors in greater detail. 
This chapter has summarized the institutional and ideational developments 
of Israel. The centralization of Israeli decision-making structures is based on a 
long process of concentration of power in the office of the key decision maker, 
the prime minister. This allows Israeli prime ministers more capacity to put their 
own preferences into practice. The ideas about the WBG he Id by both Labor and 
Likud, despite significant differences on settlement policy and issues of 
sovereignty, were the same: no Palestinian state in the WBG. Similarly, both 
parties rejected negotiation with the PLO as dangerous, unfeasible, and potentially 
opening the door to the first shared commitment, no independent Palestinian state. 
The two variables, however, do not tell the entire story of Israeli foreign 
policy variation in the form of the Oslo Accords. The dynamic element that is 
necessary to complete the picture can be found in the different individuals who 
held decision-making power; specifically, the different belief structures they held, 
the emotion generated by these structures, and how these impacted on their 
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foreign policy decisions. Where Yitzhak Shamir was ideological and given to 
making decisions based on the affective appeal of an object, Yitzhak Rabin was 
adaptable and less willing to rely on emotion as a determinant of policy. This 
pragmatism allowed Rabin to undergo a leaming process that culminated in the 
1993 Oslo Accords-a major variation in Israeli policy toward the PLO and an 
independent Palestinian state. 
124 
Chapter Five 
From Confrontation to Accommodation: 
The Oslo Accords and 
Foreign Policy Variation in Israel 
Introduction 
As the first step toward providing an effective exp1anation for the 1993 Oslo, we 
have identified the historically conditioned institutional structures of Israel that 
have given prime ministers autonomy in foreign policymaking. We have also 
noted the long-standing ideational structures of the country in order to help 
distinguish when a new policy decision is made. In this case, Oslo represents a 
new policy because it entailed direct negotiations with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and-at a minimum-recognition that an independent 
Pa1estinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) wou1d be the 1ike1y outcome 
of such a dialogue, both ofwhich were directly opposite to the policy of all Israeli 
governments (Labor and Likud) since 1967. 
Oslo is a good case study because it high1ights the differences between 
Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin, and therefore the impact that their persona1 
beliefs had on their foreign policies. Individuals are therefore the dynamic 
variable that provides the key to understanding this variation in foreign policy. It 
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is the difference between individual leaders that best explains how and why Oslo 
marks a departure from previous foreign policy. This chapter will focus on this 
differentiation, between Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Shamir (who opposed 
talking to the PLO and a Palestinian state) and Yitzhak Rabin (who pursued and 
signed Oslo by negotiating directly with the PLO and thus laid the groundwork 
for a Palestinian state). 1 
In order to demonstrate the significance of these differences and their 
impact on policy, the chapter will analyze the different belief structures of the two 
leaders. The first part will focus on the independent variables: that is, the personal 
characteristics and policies of the prime ministers that allow us to code them as 
ideological or adaptable. The discussion does this by examining the different 
cognitive and affective structures of Shamir and Rabin through their 
understanding of Zionism, and then examining their actions and responses to the 
intifada and their view ofIsrael' s position in the region in light of changed global 
conditions. By studying the experiences of these individuals and their policies 
toward issues other than the PLO and a Palestinian state, we are able to determine 
where to place Shamir and Rabin on the ideological-adaptable continuum and 
avoid problems of tautology and determining categorization based on the decision 
under study. Once we have coded these individuals, the second part examines 
these conclusions in light of the dependent variable, their policies toward direct 
1 It might be argued that any discussion of the Oslo process focus extensively on Yossi Beilin, the 
Deputy Foreign Minister who essentially created and guided the preparations for the secret talks 
for the first several months, and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who nurtured the process by 
bringing Beilin into the Ministry in the first place and working hard on the details of the 
negotiations. While it is true that Oslo would not have occurred without them, they are relevant in 
the context of the model being offered here in that they provided a menu of ideas for the main 
policymaker, Rabin, who had the authority to reject the process or shut it down at any time. This 
was, in fact, Beilin's fear for much of the process (see Beilin 1999, Part 2, passim). 
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talk with the PLO and aPalestinian state in the WBG. For Rabin, this section will 
also include a discussion of the leaming process he underwent, which pushed him 
to reconsider both his own and long-standing govemment policy about these 
matters. A short summary of the findings in this case study will be presented at 
the end. 
The Role of Individuals: yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin 
The key difference that can explain Oslo is the difference in belief 
structures between Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin, and the resulting cognitive 
and affective processes that drove their foreign policy decisions. This is illustrated 
through a discussion of Shamir and Rabin, their belief structures, their ideas 
toward both direct talks with the PLO and the possibility of an independent 
Palestinian state, and their consequent reactions to related environmental 
circumstances. 
The Independent Variable: Yitzhak Shamir 
Yitzhak Shamir is an ideological individual, and affect plays a 
determinative role in his decisions on foreign policy. This stems from a very basic 
source, which is the starting point for both individuals: their Zionism. Shamir's 
Zionism was heavily, if not solely, concentrated on the meaning of Eretz Israel 
(the Land of Israel) for the Jewish people in a strongly nationalist sense (Ahimeir 
2006; Ben-Aharon 2005; Pazner 2005). He believed it belonged to the Jews by 
both divine mandate and especially by historical legacy. Being bom outside of 
Palestine was a critical element in the development of his thinking on these 
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matters: Born in Rujenoy, a small town in Poland, Shamir's Zionist upbringing 
(by his father, the Jewish school he attended, and indeed most of the town's Jews 
[see Shamir 1994, Chapter 1]) was overlaid with idealistic (sorne might say 
romantic) visions of the land and what it meant for the J ews. It was not the 
desperate needs of the Jewish people, anti-Semitism, or the desire for norrnality 
among the nations (elements that drove many of the disparate groups within the 
Zionist movement) that inspired and motivated Shamir, but rather the Land of 
Israel in its historical incarnation. The Jews, he felt, belonged to the Land in its 
entirety (including the WBG), and the Land belonged to the Jews. Reflecting on 
the achievements of Zionism with the establishment of Israel, Shamir wrote: 
In 1948, a Jewish state carne into being which was a far cry from 
that of which I had dreamed: a Jewish state from which much of 
the Land of Israel was severed. I have done aIl I could, in various 
ways, in the intervening years to help rectify this distortion to 
which I can never be reconciled, and to prevent others like it 
(Shamir 1994, 26). 
Herzl Makov, Shamir's Chief of Staff in 1992, later said that "to him [Shamir], 
Eretz Israel was everything. And everything else was supposed to be subordinate 
[to] Eretz Israel" (Makov 2005; Arens [1995] also stresses this element in 
Shamir's policy thinking.) 
Shamir was thus naturally drawn to the right-wing Revisionist youth 
movement, Betar, by the time he carne to Palestine in 1935. Betar advocated 
maximalist territorial demands and immediate military action to establish a Jewish 
state in the Land of Israel, both ideas with which Shamir heartily agreed. As 
Revisionist leader Vladimir J abotinky appeared to become more moderate in his 
policies toward the British, Shamir was drawn to the more right-wing elements 
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within the Yishuv (Shindler 1995, 174). In 1939 he joined the paramilitary 
organization of the Revisionist, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military 
Organization-Etzel) because he believed it was most dedicated to establishing a 
J ewish state on the Land oflsrael, by force of arms if necessary (see Shamir 1994, 
18-20). 
Shamir eventually broke with, Etzel when it decided, in the early 1940s, to 
suspend its military campaign against the British in order not to undermine the 
Allied effort to defeat the Nazis. For Shamir and his ideological associates, 
Britain was the greater enemy, since it was directly preventing the establishment 
of the Jewish state. He joined the Stem Group, which was the most active right-
wing group in the Yishuv at the time. Nothing better illustrates Shamir's later 
beliefs about the WBG than the commitment he made to the 'Stem Group. The 
Group was led by A vraham Stem, who relied on the Bible rather than the 
Mandate or any other structure to determine what the boundaries of the J ewish 
state should be. This was reflected in the "Eighteen Princip les" that members of 
the Group had to pledge to uphold, inc1uding the injunction from Genesis 15:18: 
"To your seed, 1 have given this Land from the River of Egypt [presumably the 
Nile] to the great River, the River Euphrates" (Shindler 1995, 176).2 This belief 
remained a part of his thinking and subsequent foreign policy for his entire 
political career.3 
ln short, the Land of Israel held intense affective appeal for Shamir. As 
discussed below, this colored his thinking on various issues related to it and to 
2 For the full eighteen principles, see Shavit (1988, 154-155). 
3 Shamir later stopped thinking about Jordan as part of Eretz Israel, referring to it instead as astate 
for Palestinians (see below). 
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r--.. Israeli foreign policy, and in the end prevented him from making any changes to 
Israel's longstanding policy toward the PLO and a Palestinian state. The affective 
appeal of the WBG, as the Land ofIsrael, was simply too great; Shamir could not 
conceive that a Palestinian state in this areas should be an option, or that the PLO 
should be engaged with toward such an end. His rigidity on these and related 
issues is illustrated below. He was not capable of incorporating contrasting 
information into his decision-making process. Instead, he viewed everything 
through the emotional prism that is based on his upbringing and persona! ideas 
about Zionism and Israel. 
Shamir' s Reaction to the Intifada 
With hindsight, many Israelis and analysts have corne to accept that the 
intifada (the Palestinian uprising that began on 8 December 1987 and lasted until 
1993) sprang from the poor living conditions in the territories.4 But Shamir 
continued to believe it was not about socio-economic conditions or even the 
desire for national self-determination, but rather a war over Israel' s right to exist 
(Shamir 1994, 182). As the rioting and stone-throwing (and sometimes Molotov 
cocktails) spread and persisted throughout the WBG, Shamir remained 
unconvinced that the intifada represented a new phase in Palestinian action and 
Palestinian-Israeli relations. The policy corollary was to do nothing to encourage 
the belief that the uprising would lead to any change in the political status quo. 
Harry Hurwitz, a close speechwriter for Shamir, reported that Shamir did not 
believe Israel should make any concessions under fire-not to mention the fact 
that Shamir simply did not conceive of the necessity of any political concessions 
4 For a good discussion, see Schiffand Ya'ari (1990). 
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(Hurwitz 2005). Rather than convincing Shamir that new ideas and policies were 
necessary to deal with changed circumstances, the intifada only validated his 
extant beliefs that any Palestinian-run entity with any real power in the WBG 
would be a threat to Israel, not to mention remove any chance Israel would have 
at retaining its historical heritage. 
Shamir's Response to Israel's Position in the Regional Balance of Power 
The intifada represented for Shamir only one more attempt in a long list of 
efforts by an unremittingly hostile world to attack the Jews. Stemming from his 
experience in the Holocaust,5 Shamir simply could not incorporate new 
information into his thinking processes and policies on the WBG, even when 
global and regional changes occurred that improved the regional balance of power 
in Israel's favor. The emotional appeal of these areas was too great. In fact, he 
simply ignored these changes, continuing to see other states as "inherently hostile, 
unsympathetic, and, in many cases, anti-Semitic" (Steinberg 1995, 175) and 
unable or unwilling to alter their perceptions. In an interview in March 1991, 
Shamir insisted that despite these positive changes, Israel still faced dangers from 
a hostile regional environment (Jerusalem Post 29 March 1991, 7). None ofthese 
external changes mattered to Shamir; he did not distinguish between the various 
threats to Israel, and areas where different policies might be called for. Overall, he 
perceived that Israel was still under siege by a world that was at best indifferent, 
at worst hostile. 
5 Shamir suffered a terrible ordeal in the Holocaust: Rujenoy's Jews were almost aIl killed by the 
Nazis; his mother and sister died in the Holocaust, while a second sister, her husband, and their 
children were betrayed by a fellow Pole who had promised to help them but in the end killed them 
himself. FinaIly, his father was also betrayed by former non-Jewish friends from the village, and 
also murdered (Shamir 1994, 5). 
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The Dependent Variable: 
Shamir's Policy toward the PLO and a Palestinian State 
Shamir is clearly an ideological individual. His belief structures are tied to 
an affective attachment to the Land of Israel, which has conditioned his 
understanding of Israeli foreign policy objectives. Even when circumstances 
changed (the end of the Cold War and the intifada) Shamir could not ignore his 
emotional attachment to the Land, and therefore he was unable to change his 
foreign poli ci es in light of a changing environment. Having demonstrated the 
importance of affect in his decision-making, we can see how it applied to the two 
issues of Oslo. Shamir's attitudes toward the PLO and a Palestinian state further 
underline his attachment to the land and his unwillingness to consider any 
changes in his foreign policy even as circumstances themselves changed. Since 
Shamir never did engage in any policy similar to Oslo, the closest comparison we 
can contemplate is his response to the American efforts that entailed at least sorne 
minimal form of the very things that Oslo stood for. 
Ideas Regarding a Palestinian State 
Building on his conception of Zionism and his policies on the issues cited 
above, we can better understand Shamir' s position on a potential Palestinian state 
in the WBG. Simply put, and based on the intense affective appeal the WBG had 
for him, Shamir believed that the sovereignty of the Jewish people over the WBG 
was mandated by God and by history. There was therefore no room for a 
Palestinian state on any of these lands. When Prime Minister Begin signed the 
Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1978, Shamir reports that he was 
"thunderstruck" when he heard about the agreement, believing that it undermined 
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"the abiding Jewish claim to the Land of Israel" and set a "disastrous precedent" 
of Israel's willingness to withdraw from its historie lands (Shamir 1994, 104). 
Indeed, when Moshe Arens, a close associate of Shamir within Likud, suggested 
that Israel give up Gaza-a place with far less historical and emotional 
significance for Jews and far more strategie and moral problems than the West 
Bank, given the large numbers of Palestinians living there-Shamir rejected the 
idea out ofhand (Arens 1995). Shamir told Yossi Ahimeir, a close advisor, that so 
long as he was prime minister there wou1d be no territorial concessions that 
resulted in a 10ss ofIsraeli sovereignty over the WBG (Ahimeir 2006). 
Instead, he maintained that the Pa1estinians a1ready had their own state in 
Jordan, which did not encroach upon the Jewish state. In an address to B'nai Brith 
International Leadership on 15 August 1981, he said that "[t]he Palestinians have 
a homeland in Jordan .... There is no justification for a second Palestinian Arab 
state, except as a base against Israel's existence" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1981a). He referred to sueh an entity as "an Arafatist state," thus delegitimizing 
the idea that sueh astate would reflect national aspiration of a distinct people 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1981b). In a speech to the UN General Assembly at 
the beginning of October 1981, he again repeated his belief that 
[t]he Palestinian Arabs do have a state on a major part of the 
territory of Palestine. In Jordan there exists a Palestinian Arab state 
in everything but name. It is a Palestinian Arab state by virtue of 
its geography, demography, history, culture, religion and 
language .... There is thus no need to speak further of Palestinian 
self-determination; their homeland is already in existence 
(Ministry of Foreign Affair 1981c). 
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And in presenting the outline of his government's guiding princip les in 1988 (in 
which Likud was the senior partner to Lab or) , Shamir asserted that "Israel will 
oppose the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza district and 
in the area between Israel and Jordan" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1988; 
emphasis added). Finally, he peppered his opening speech to the Madrid peace 
conference on 31 October 1991 with references to Israel's rightful claim to the 
Land of Israel, thus implicitly denying the possibility of Palestinian claims (see 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1991). 
As part of his belief that the WBG belonged to the Jews, Shamir also felt 
that J ews had the right-even the duty-to settle anywhere in the WBG they 
desired. In his speech presenting his government to the Knesset when he became 
prime minister after Begin's resignation, he noted that "Paths must be opened and 
cleared for J ewish settlement throughout the Land of Israel.. .. This sacred work 
must not stop; it cannot stop; it is the heart of our existence and life" (cited in 
Shamir 1994, 146). The Basic Guidelines of his 1990 government (which 
incl~ded aIl of the far-right parties) stated explicitly that "The etemal right of the 
Jewish people to Eretz Yisrael is not subject to question" (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 1990). 
Shamir insisted on the right of the J ews to settle in the WBG even in the 
face of concerted American pressure,6 and even while he knew this would 
6 From 1989 to the ons et of the Madrid peace process in October 1991, the United States pushed 
hard to bring Israel and the Arabs states and the Palestinians together to negotiate an end to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Recently-elected President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James 
Baker believed that changes in the international environment made conditions ripe for Arab-Israeli 
peace, and they were determined to effect it (see Baker 1995,412,414-415,422; Quandt 2001, 
303-306). At first peace efforts were concentrated on putting together a Palestinian delegation to 
design with Israel a framework for elections in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians would 
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undercut the purpose of any peace negotiation (see for example Jerusalem Post 5 
June 1990, 1). President Bush eventually sent a letter to Shamir in June 1990, 
explicitly threatening to publicly oppose Israel if it did not stop settlement 
expansion (Jerusalem Post 29 June 1990, 1). 
Shamir's absolute conviction in the right of the Jews to the Land oflsrael 
also, in this context, allowed him to believe that the Palestinians themselves 
would eventually come to acknowledge and accept this reality. This strengthened 
his own belief that there was no need to grant concessions to the Palestinians that 
would lead to astate. According to Eytan Bentsur, Deputy Director-General of the 
Foreign Ministry under Shamir and Rabin, Shamir reiterated to the Americans 
throughout 1989 and 1990 his firm belief that J ewish settlements in WBG would 
not prevent an agreement with the Palestinians (Bentsur 2001,23), implying that 
the Palestinians would accept whatever was offered to them. Y ossi Ahimeir, 
Herzl Makov, and Avi Pazner (one of his chief foreign policy advisors) have aIl 
said that Shamir believed that if Israel held to its position, the Palestinians would 
eventually come to accept autonomy as inevitable and even good for them, 
particularly as they had not experienced anything like the autonomous decision-
making they would have under Shamir's designs before (Ahimeir 2006; Makov 
2005; Pazner 2005). 
use the elections to select another delegation that would then negotiate with Israel on a final 
settlement of the conflict. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf War interrupted these 
efforts, but they intensified soon after, with a different focus: an international conference that 
would bring Israel and aU the Arabs (induding the Palestinians) together to dialogue about 
bilateral and regional issues. 
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Attitude toward the PLO 
Shamir also maintained a firm policy against negotiation with the PLO. He 
viewed it as a terrorist "murderous organization" (Shamir 1994, 258) bent on the 
destruction of IsraeL He wrote that "the only peace the PLO could produce in 
terms ofIsrael was the peace of cemetery" (1994, 198). At the same time, because 
the PLO was the representative of Palestinian refugees, he argued it was 
committed to undermining the Jewish character of Israel because of its demand 
for the "right of retum"; the outcome for the J ewish state wou1d be the same as if 
military force had been against IsraeL (Several former advisors stress this latter 
factor: Arens 1995, passim; Ben-Aharon 2005; Makov 2005; and Pazner 2005.) 
This approach to the PLO had c1ear policy implications: When presenting 
his govemment to the Knesset in 1988, Shamir stated that flatly "Israel will not 
negotiate with the PLO" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1988). The guidelines for 
the 1990 govemment inc1uded the stipulation that "Israel will not negotiate with 
the PLO, directly or indirectly" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990). Finally, when 
asked in a February 1990 interview (during the period of American attempts to 
bring Israel and the Palestinians together in a negotiating session) if there was 
anything the PLO could do to make itself acceptable to Shamir, he responded that 
"[t]he only thing it should do is dismantle itself' (Jerusalem Post 23 February 
1990,5). 
In addition, Shamir rebuffed American pressure, in the context of their 
efforts to establish a negotiating framework for Palestinian autonomy in the WBG 
at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. This focus on autonomy was relatively 
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unproblematic even for Likud, which had committed to autonomy in the 1978 
Camp David Accords with Egypt and consistently upheld them during election 
campaigns in the 1980s as the proper framework for negotiation with the 
Palestinians. Shamir himself often used the Accords during the period under 
examination to demand that the Americans stop pushing Israel beyond what was 
envisaged in them. 
The key stumbling block, though, was in both the composition of either of 
the delegations, and which Palestinians would be allowed to vote in elections, and 
for whom. Likud's position (and the official government position, given Likud's 
seniority in it) was that it was opposed to any member of the delegation coming 
from "outside" the territories (essentially a euphemism for the PLO) or those 
living in East Jerusalem, since this would undermine Israel's claim to Jerusalem 
as the "etemal, undivided capital" of the Jewish state. Under pressure from 
Washington, Shamir finally presented the Americans with an Israeli plan 
incorporating these elements in April 1989 (with considerable input from Rabin), 
which later became the official Israeli blueprint for peace when the govemment as 
a whole accepted it on 14 May (Arens 1995; Bentsur 2001,28).7 
But Shamir almost immediately undermined the initiative. On 26 June he 
told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the proposaI was a 
public relations show, and then bowing to pressure from the more hawkish 
elements in the Likud, he soon after announced that the Likud would never give 
the territories up to foreign sovereignty, and that elections would only take place 
7 The broad principles of the initiative were direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states; 
no dialogue with the PLO; and no independent Palestinian state could be the final outcome. For 
the full document, see Knesset (1989). 
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once the intifada was ended (Aronoff 1993, 210).8 He resisted any attempt to 
allow the PLO sorne form of involvement, even in the face of heavy American 
pressure and signs of PLO moderation, arguing that the association of the PLO 
with peace efforts was hindering any progress (see Jerusalem Post 3 June 1990, 
1) and that there was no difference between moderates and extremists within the 
group (see Jerusalem Post 5 June 1990, 1). And he insisted that the government 
would only work with Palestinians who accepted the autonomy framework 
beforehand (Jerusalem Post 13 June 1990, 1); this of course meant the automatic 
exclusion of the PLO, which stood for Palestinian self-determination. 
The Washington talks that followed the opening convention at Madrid 
were the culmination of American efforts. They entailed both bilateral discussions 
between Israel and each Arab state (including a joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation) and multilateral talks involving all participants on a range of regional 
issues. Shamir' s strategy during these talks appears to have been to simply drag 
the process out (at least with regard to the Palestinians) in the hopes that nothing 
concrete would ever be achieved and Israel would not have to talk to the PLO or 
consider the possibility of a Palestinian state (see Bentsur 2001, 79, 121). 
According to Arens, Shamir had never really been interested in any peace 
initiatives, and he stuck to "unrealistic doctrines" that made any such attempts 
doomed from the start (Arens 1995,60, 126). One writer referred to Shamir's plan 
as a "smokescreen" designed to leave the status quo in place (Shindler 1995, 250). 
Shamir himself is said to have confirmed that his strategy was to drag the process 
8 Shamir was also under heavy internaI pressures from would-be contenders for leadership in his 
party, which may also explain in part his readiness to take a hard-line stance. 
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out so that nothing substantial would result (see New York Times 26 June 1992, 
1). (Though he later said he was misquoted, Shamir's intention might be gleaned 
from statements made earlier, such as in an interview with the Jerusalem Post in 
which he asserted that "negotiations for resolving territorial conflicts between 
various countries take years" [Jerusalem Post 13 June 1990].9) 
Based on Shamir' s responses, the Americans themselves became 
convinced that Shamir was purposefully intransigent and was only out to stymie 
their peace efforts (see Baker 1995, 493-496; Ross 2004, 68-72, 77-78, 82-85). 
Dennis Ross, a key negotiator for the US, specifically notes that the Americans 
considered the fall of the National Unit y Government in March 1990 as a good 
thing: "There were no tears in Washington over its demise. Shamir's opposition to 
the dialogue confirmed what Bush and Baker believed-namely, that he had been 
stringing us along" (64; see also Quandt 2001,299). (The Americans later felt the 
same way about the Likud defeat in the 1992 elections to Rabin [see Quandt 
2001,312-313].) 
For his own part, Shamir was convinced that the American efforts would 
undermine both Israeli security and Hs daims to the WBG (see Arens 1995, 
Chapters 3-9; Bentsur 2001, Chapters 1-3). In fact, he came to believe that the 
Americans were purposefully undermining his and the government's efforts to 
resist these outcomes. He wrote: "1 felt 1 could no longer fend off or deny the 
9 Those who have worked with Shamir maintain that he did not say this in the way it was written 
up in the newspapers. Though these advisors have emphasized different aspects of the intention 
and meaning behind Shamir's words, they are unanimous in their agreement that the words were 
taken out of context-that Shamir was sincere about engaging in negotiations, though on his tenus 
(Ben-Aharon 2005; Makov 2005; Pazner 2005). Dan Meridor, a close advisor to Shamir, believes 
that Shamir simplydid not think anything would come out of the Madrid talks (Meridor 2005). 
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realization that what President Bush wanted-and what Secretary Baker was 
determined to secure for him-was no less than Israel' s total withdrawal from 
Judea, Samaria [the West Bank] and the Gaza district and, if possible, the handing 
over ofthese territories to the Arabs" (1994, 105). 
We can see from the preceding discussion that Shamir was an ideological 
individual, as classified in Chapter 3. His basic understanding of Zionism, his 
ideas about the WBG, and his feelings toward the PLO aIl pushed him, in various 
manifestations, to reject any possibility of a Pa1estinian state in the WBG and the 
PLO as a viable partner for negotiation. Both his words and his actions support 
this conclusion. In the context of this discussion, this meant that he formulated 
Israeli foreign policy according to his own ideological belief structures, which 
themselves were formulated through his affective understanding of the place of 
the WBG in Israeli identity and history. By 1993, however, he was no longer 
prime minister, and so could not translate his ideas into po1icy and block 
movement on these issues. Under the new prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, Israel 
pursued a foreign policy that was a significant variation from its previous policy. 
The discussion now turns to Rabin, in order to complete the explanation based on 
individual decision makers. 
The Independent Variable: Yitzhak Rabin 
In contrast to Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin can be classified as adaptable. 
Although he held strong views on Oslo-related issues, he was not emotionaIly 
attached to any of them. To begin with, Rabin's Zionism was rooted in a 
completely different basis. Where Shamir was born outside of Palestine, Rabin 
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was a sabra (a Jew who is born in Israel). Where aU Israeli leaders who have been 
born outside of Israel normally spend the first chapter or two on their Zionist 
upbringing, Rabin's memoirs (1994) skip this pattern: there was no reason for it, 
since living and growing up in Palestine was the most complete Zionist 
experience one could have. Instead of seeing the Land of Israel through pictures 
gleaned from the Bible or stories from family and friends, he experienced it 
firsthand. Rabin was engaged throughout his life in a realistic struggle to reclaim 
Eretz Israel for the J ews, through practical agricultural and military efforts. His 
parents instilled in him the socialist-Zionist values of manual labor as the 
beginning of individual and national redemption (Slater 1977, 14-15, 22-23, 35), 
he passed through a school system that emphasized the same values (including the 
Kadouri Agricultural school, which combined military activities with schooling), 
and he became involved with the Palmach (the left-wing paramilitary group that 
made up the elite strike force of the Jewish military organization, the Haganah). 
Rabin' s Zionism, then, was of a practical nature: though the Land of Israel 
mattered to him, he was less interested in its affective appeal and more concerned 
with how to better the lives of the Jews who lived in Israel. He saw the position of 
the Jews in Palestine and the problems they faced from many directions in trying 
to establish themselves in the Land of Israel. His focus became the security of the 
J ewish community and the eventual J ewish state. In the end, he gave up a civilian 
career (he wanted to be a hydraulic engineer) to remain in the military because he 
felt "the needs of the Jewish people led me on the path that had me spend much of 
my life dealing with the security of Israel" (Rabin 1994, II; emphasis added). The 
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prominence of security is abundantly clear throughout Rabin's memoirs and his 
public statements: he notes several times that "security takes preference even over 
peace" (Rabin 1994, VIII). His presentation of the government in July 1992, for 
example, asserted his priorities in this way: "The central goals of the Government 
are: national security and personal security; peace; the prevention of war" 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992b). Rabin and Shamir thus had radically 
different ultimate objectives: Shamir wanted to hold on to as much of Eretz Israel 
as possible, while Rabin wanted to ensure the security of the Jews as much as 
possible. 
Rabin's Reaction to the Intifada 
Like many other Israeli leaders, Rabin did not appreciate that the onset of 
rioting in December 1987 marked a new stage in Israeli-Palestinian relations (see 
Slater 1996, 401-415). Two days after the intifada began, he flew, as defense 
minister, to Washington and did not retum until21 December. Like other leaders, 
Rabin did not think that it was a local response to intolerable social, economic, 
and political conditions imposed by an increasingly ambivalent and neglectful 
Israeli occupation. On his retum to Israel, Rabin told a press conference, before he 
received any briefing on what was happening, that he was sure Iran and Syria 
were behind the rioting (Schiff and Ya' ari 1990, 25). 
However, even when he did come to realize what was different about this 
round of demonstrations, rioting, and violence, Rabin never viewed the uprising 
in life-or-death terms for Israel the way Shamir did. First, he simply did not see 
the Palestinians as a strategie threat to Israel; his focus was shifting instead to Iran 
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(Inbar 1999, 139-140). Second, in this context, he was keenly aware that military 
efforts would not resolve what was essentially a political issue, namely, the 
necessity of satisfying Palestinian nationalist needs in sorne form (see Slater 1996, 
418-422). Despite the calls by many Likud leaders for a harsher military response 
to the uprising, Rabin engaged in a series of changes designed to mitigate both the 
impact of the suppression on Palestinian lives and the negative media attention the 
whole affair was bringing to Israel (see Schiff and Ya'ari 1990). He also became 
convinced that the Palestinians would have to be engaged as independent partners 
in dialogue, and he began to soften his opposition to PLO involvement somewhat, 
asserting in an interview with American media in spring 1988 that he was 
prepared to talk to PLO officiaIs on the condition that they renounced the 
Palestine National Covenant, accepted United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, and ended all acts of terror (Slater 1996, 419). 
According to Dan Pattir, a close advisor and friend, Rabin was aware that his 
contacts with West Bank Palestinians included behind-the-scenes guidance by the 
PLO, and he did not actively oppose "outside" Palestinians being in a peace 
delegation, even though he was well aware that this would leave open the back 
door for PLO influence (Pattir 2006). 
Rabin's Response to Israel's Position in the Regional Balance of Power 
Rabin did share with all Israeli leaders an inherent mistrust of the outside 
world when it came to relying on the Gentile world for support (Inbar 1999, 8-
12), but he did not share the unmitigated suspicion ofthat world that Shamir had. 
At least part of this can be traced once again to the different circumstances of 
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Rabin' s and Shamir' s births. While the Holocaust was a personal experience for 
Shamir, it was not for Rabin; for Shamir, then, the personal experience of the 
Holocaust did lead to, as psychologists have posited (see Chapter 3), intense 
emotional impact on future policies regarding related issues. Where the Holocaust 
shaped an image of the Jews from Europe as powerless in the face of their own 
destruction, Rabin had no such experience: his entire life, and that of his parents, 
was based on the notion "of the J ew empowered by his own efforts on his own 
behalf' (Friedgut 1995, 78). 
At the same time, because he was not subject to an overall worldview that 
categorized an anti-Semitic Gentile world against the Jews/Israel, Rabin was able 
to perceive layers of threat (e.g., differences between Iran and the Palestinians) 
and accept the necessity of different policies tailored to specifie dangers. The 
same international changes that had no impact on Shamir' s view of the outside 
world-the end of the Cold War, the undisputed hegemony of the United States, 
the defeat of Iraq-convinced Rabin that Israel's strategie position was 
considerably improved (see Inbar 1999, 134-139; see Chapter 6 for a fuller 
discussion). He was confident that these changes heralded an Israel that had 
grown stronger and could engage in reasonable concessions to the Arabs in order 
to strengthen its security. In his address presenting his govemment to the Knesset 
in July 1992, he noted, in obvious contrast to Shamir's thinking, that 
[n]o longer are we necessarily 'a people that dwells alone,' and no 
longer is it true that 'the whole world is against us.' We must 
overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for 
almost half a century. We must join the international movement 
toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation that is spreading over 
the entire globe these days .... the winds of peace have lately been 
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blowing from Moscow to Washington, from Berlin to Beijing 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992a).10 
The Dependent Variable: 
Rabin's Policy toward the PLO and a Palestinian State 
The above discussion brings us to the conclusion that Rabin was an 
adaptable individual: his focus on security for Israel and for Israelis indicates 
flexibility; lack of emotional attachment to a particular issue in Israeli identity 
meant that he would not be prey to rigid ideological belief structures that 
constrained his policy options. We can apply this categorization now to the 
dependent variable, the issues contained in Oslo: direct talks with the PLO and the 
possibility of a Palestinian state. 
Ideas Regarding a Palestinian State 
Because his concem was security and not the Land itself, Rabin was able 
to conceive of several different avenues toward obtaining his goal. Because he 
was not emotionally tied to an abstract conception such as the "Land" or to the 
physical contours of the WBG, he could view the land as a strategie resource, and 
he could concede at least parts of the WBG to the Palestinians provided this did 
not undermine the security of Israelis or of the state. This is not to say that he 
advocated a Palestinian state in aIl of the WBG; indeed, even at the end of his life 
he was at least publicly ambivalent about how much land he was willing to give 
up. In fact, in his early political career Rabin was close to Shamir's position on an 
independent Palestinian state. 
During his first tenure as prime minister (1974-1977) Rabin explicitly 
opposed an independent Palestinian state (Rabin 1994, 216, 230, 232), calling this 
10 He added though that the dangers of war in the region remained. 
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an "extremist" position offered by the PLO (ibid., 260). He saw such an entity as 
a clear security threat to Israel, because it would be run by the PLO, which sought 
Israel's destruction, and would be used as the first stage in a process designed to 
achieve a single state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. This 
would effectively mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state (ibid., 262). When 
asked directly, in a September 1974 interview with the now-defunct Davar 
newspaper, whether he objected to a Palestinian state, Rabin replied that it "would 
be the biggest mistake Israel cou1d make" (though he qua1ified it by adding "at 
this time") (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1974b). His presentation of the 
govemment's principles to the Knesset in June 1974 noted, as Shamir did later, 
that either the Palestinians already had a state in Jordan or that any Palestinian 
entity would be confederated with Jordan: "Israel rejects the establishment of a 
further separate Arab State west of the Jordan" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1974a). In this he much preferred the long-standing position advocated by Labor 
since 1967, the Jordanian option-that is, negotiating directly with Jordan on a 
political settlement of the WBG that entailed sorne form of shared control 
between the two states. 
This opposition to an independent Palestinian state remained with him 
through his tenure as defense minister during the National Unit y Govemments of 
the 1980s, his capture of the Labor leadership, and in the early months of his 
second tenure as prime minister after June 1992. At the Labor Party convention in 
November 1991, Rabin categorically stated that Israel wou1d not retum to the pre-
June 5 borders, and there would not be a Palestinian state (Jerusalem Post 21 
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November 1991, 1). During a televised debate with Shamir, on 16 June 1992, 
Rabin specifically said there would be no Palestinian state and no retum to the 
1967 borders (cited in Lochery 1997, 214). In the first months of his prime 
ministry in 1992 and 1993, he did not once advocate anything like the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. 
We cannot of course know what Rabin would have done had he been 
prime minister at the time of American efforts to construct a negotiating dialogue 
between Israel and the Arabs, in the late 1980s and up to 1992. Il But we can 
derive sorne conclusions from Rabin's stated positions. Underlying his stance was 
his advocacy of the long-standing Labor policy based on territorial compromise 
(see Chapter 3). He was willing to consider options that would lead to concessions 
on land, and for this reason he was not opposed to engaging the Palestinians in a 
serious political dialogue (even if it entailed indirect involvement of the PLO) 
(Avner 2006; Pattir 2006). In contrast to Shamir's and Likud's position that 
American efforts were threatening to Israel, Rabin and Labor believed they were 
reasonable and that Shamir and Likud were actively trying to. prevent any 
progress at aIl on the peace front. 
Attitude toward the PLO 
Rabin's attitude toward the PLO in his early years in politics was, again, 
similar to Shamir' s. He consistently repeated that the PLO was a terrorist 
organization that Israel could not negotiate with. In January 1976, he stated in an 
Il Although he was not head of Labor at the time (he was not elected to this post until February 
1992) Rabin remained one of the top two leaders in the party, holding second place after Shimon 
Peres. Because he also later became prime minis ter, and pursued the Oslo channel, Rabin's ideas 
during this period do matter. 
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interview that '" [w Je cannot sit down and negotiate with a terrorist organization 
whose fundamental political position is in direct opposition to the very existence 
of Israel''' (cited in Slater 1977, 238). According to Dan Pattir, a close colleague 
of Rabin during his first prime ministership, Rabin never trusted Yasser Arafat, 
which prevented him from considering any negotiations between Israel and the 
PLO (Pattir 2006). He believed that PLO leader Yasser Arafat was no more than a 
common murderer: "'1 hate what he stands for, when 1 see the atrocities that he 
and his organization carry out. He represents to me aH that is evil, and a concept, 
a philosophy which is contradictory to the very existence of this country'" (cited 
in Slater 1996,281). 
It is informative to look more c10sely at Rabin's position on talking to the 
PLO during the later 1980s and early 1990s, since this was a period of broad 
international acceptance of the PLO, the United States was pushing to leave the 
door open for sorne informaI PLO influence in any negotiating framework with 
the Palestinians, and efforts to bring Palestinians and Israel together seemed to 
abound. But as with his ideas about a Palestinian state, Rabin's position on 
negotiating with the PLO remained similar throughout his political career and he 
resisted doing so as long as he could. 
In May 1990, Rabin criticized those in the Labor party for spreading the 
impression that peace was impossible without a dialogue with the PLO (cited in 
Aronoff 1993, 224). At the Labor party conference on 19-21 November 1991, a 
debate was resolved when the party officiaHy "abandoned its longstanding 
objection to negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization," but Rabin 
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did not support the resolution, maintaining that the PLO was a terrorist 
organization dedicated to Israel's destruction (ibid.). Shimon Peres notes that he 
twice (in August 1992 and in January 1993) raised the issue of direct talks with 
the PLO, but both times Rabin rejected the idea (Peres 1995,280). On at least two 
other occasions in 1992 Rabin indicated his desire to avoid the same: in October 
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), a senior PLO leader, suggested to Rabin, through 
the Egyptians, that secret talks begin between Israel and the PLO; and at the end 
of December 1992, in a Cabinet meeting, the issue was raised of including the 
PLO in the Madrid peace talks. Both times Rabin rejected the proposaIs (Aronoff 
1995, 132). And in March, 1993, he deflected American pressure to negotiate 
with the PLO, even though he was fully aware of the Oslo channel at the time. 12 
However, Rabin still felt that it would be difficult if not impossible to shut 
the PLO out completely of the negotiating framework the United States was 
working hard to build, and so to stand against any agreement or final resolution 
on this ground was simply a formula for avoidance. He acted toward this end on 
several occasions, sometimes behind the National Unit y Government's back. 
During the 1989 discussions on Palestinian elections, he argued that Palestinians 
from outside the terri tories should be allowed to participate in the delegation to 
12 Despite these public positions, it is sometimes assumed that Rabin had fully intended to talk to 
PLO when he came to power in 1992. Aside from these public statements, there is good reason for 
supposing the opposite. First, Yossi Beilin points out that Rabin was in no rush to repeal the law 
prohibiting contact with the PLO, and in fact initially opposed doing so (Beilin 1999, 59). Second, 
Rabin always intended any agreement reached at Oslo to remain secret, with the document either 
signed by Rabin and a representative of the WBG Palestinians (the usual nominee was Faisal 
Husseini (see ibid., 57 and Part 2, passim) or brought to the official delegations in Washington. 
Third, even before Oslo, in March 1990 when the National Unit y Government was on the verge of 
breaking up, Rabin opposed those Laborites who wanted to leave the government because of 
Likud's peace policies, which included continued exclusion of the PLO. And fourth, when the 
subject of recognition of the PLO came up in the context of the Oslo process, Rabin resisted doing 
so; he tried to negotiate the agreement without official recognition, and only agreed when it 
became obvious that the DOP could not be signed until Israel recognized the PLO. 
149 
meet with Israel to discuss e1ections. Egypt sent an advance summary of a 
blueprint for negotiation to Rabin through the Americans two weeks before it was 
officially submitted to the Israeli government. The plan entailed indirect PLO 
involvement, as it allowed the PLO to authorize the Palestinian delegation that 
was to dialogue with Israel (Bentsur 2001, 24). It was sent to Rabin because he 
was publicly known to accept that indirect PLO participation was unavoidable. 
Although Rabin' s position on direct talks with the PLO and an 
independent Palestinian state were similar to Shamir' s, the pragmatism that 
marked his policymaking-free from the intense emotional attachments that 
guided Shamir's policymaking-allowed him to react very differently to the three 
key external developments of the time, the intifada, the changing regional power 
structures, and American peace efforts. Simply put, Rabin was much more 
flexible about the final outcomes of all three developments, he did not consider 
that Israel was explicitly threatened by any ofthem, and he responded in a manner 
that raised questions about how committed he actually was to the positions 
outlined above. 
Rabin's Learning Process 
Although he originally opposed both direct talks with the PLO and an 
independent Palestinian state, by 1993 Rabin had come to accept the necessity of 
the former and the strong possibility of the latter; his responses to the 
developments listed above indicate his path toward this recognition. These 
realizations culminated in his pursuit of the Oslo channel and the signing of the 
mutual recognition letters with the PLO and then the DOP. How can we explain 
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Rabin's shift from opposition to endorsement of these positions? It is by tracing 
the leaming process Rabin went through. A series of developments occurred that 
convinced Rabin that his opposition to the PLO and a Palestinian state were not 
helping-and may have been undermining-Israel' s security. These 
developments-the in tifa da , the failure of the Washington talks, and the early 
successes at Oslo-proved to Rabin that the PLO was a necessary partner in 
dialogue and that a Palestinian state, provided it was created with enough 
safeguards for Israel, would not threaten the J ewish state. 
A leaming process leading to a change in policy is possible only in an 
adaptable individual, not an ideologicalleader. While Shamir can be c1assified as 
the latter, Rabin falls into the former category. A common thread running through 
various observers' comments about Rabin is his pragmatism, his flexibility: Uri 
Savir, the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, consistently describes Rabin 
as a pragmatist throughout his memoir of the peace process between 1993 and 
1996 (Savir 1998). Eitan Haber, Rabin's c10sest aide and an opponent of the 
timeframe for resolution established through Oslo, emphasizes that Israeli security 
was the overriding concem for Rabin, which in the end allowed him to consider 
the Oslo option (Haber 2005). In her analysis of Rabin' s personality, Yehudit 
Auerbach notes that his "realism bordering on pessimism" was a hallmark of his 
behavior: "His belief in the dut y and ability of a statesman to exploit every 
opportunity to promo te the affairs of his country and not sit idly by has guided 
him through every political post" (1995, 301); she continues that "[h]e is not 
locked into positions which do not stand the test of reality but is willing to 
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reexamine them, dec1are them invalid, and adopt new positions" (1995, 307). In 
other words, Rabin was willing to try even radical solutions that went against 
decades of government policy, and his own preferences, if he thought it would 
ensure security for the country. 
While Shamir was incapable of viewing the intifada as anything but a 
challenge to Israel's right to exist, Rabin came to see it as proof that a political 
solution of sorne kind that would satisfy the Palestinians-and not just the 
Israelis-was necessary. Two developments flowed from the uprising that 
contributed to this leaming process. First, although the PLO was caught as much 
by surprise by the rioting as Israel was, it soon came to exert sorne control over 
the demonstrations. During his (initially secret) meetings with WBG Palestinians 
beginning in May 1988 Rabin was repeatedly told that local leaders could not 
engage in any political negotiations with following PLO directives (Haber 2005). 
The refusaI of WBG Palestinians to sign on to any kind of agreement without 
PLO involvement indicated that PLO influence was likely too entrenched to 
ignore. Indeed, as early as the mid-1980s, when Labor (and Rabin) was part of a 
National Unit y Govemment with Shamir and Likud, Rabin entertained the 
possibility that the PLO would have to be part of any dialogue: Shlomo Gazit, the 
head of Military Intelligence during Rabin' s first tenure, headed a small 
delegation that met with PLO officiaIs; Rabin was fully informed of the meeting 
and the purposes behind it, and did not oppose it (Gazit 2006). 
Second, the uprising caused King Hussein of Jordan to renounce, on 31 
July 1988, the monarchy's long-held c1aim to the West Bank, and tum 
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responsibility over to the PLO. This removed the Jordanian option as a viable 
policy for Labor and reinforced for Rabin that even a "local" option (i.e., WBG 
Palestinians) might not be practicable. Rabin came to realize during the course of 
the uprising that it was going to have serious political implications, and he 
became more willing to consider policies that would me et at least sorne of the 
Palestinians' political demands (HelIer 2000, 29; Horovitz 1996, 111-112; Inbar 
1999, 105).13 
The advent of the Madrid process and subsequent failures at the 
Washington talks underlined for Rabin the ever-present influence of the PLO, and 
the feeling that nothing would ever get done without its involvement. AlI the 
Israeli leaders, inc1uding Shamir, were well aware that PLO officiaIs in Tunis 
were gui ding the Palestinian position, and that Palestinian negotiators were 
reporting back to the PLO and asking for directions (Bentsur 2001, 158; Peres 
1993, 4-5; Shamir 1994, 228-229, 241). As Haber succinctly put it, "[Rabin] 
heard during the Madrid convention [that the Palestinian delegation] called 
Tunisia to get orders every two minutes. So he said if they are doing it, why do 
we have to negotiate with them, let's negotiate with the PLO" (Haber 2005). 
Rabin himself admitted that "[ d]uring the course of the negotiations with the 
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation in Washington, it became truthfully c1ear over 
13 It is also possible that Rabin's role in the suppression of the uprising played a crucial function in 
changing his understanding of how to resolve the issue. Rabin is generally considered the person 
who was most in charge of the response to the intifada, in his capacity and Minister of Defense 
and head of the Territories Forum, which inc1uded the relevant agencies and decided poHcy 
toward the WBG. None ofthose involved in the Forum "had the least doubt that the man who was 
making the decisions and directing this war ... was Rabin himself' (Schiff and Ya'ari 1990, 138-
139). Thus, the decisions on how to respond and the fallout from them could be laid directly on 
him. 
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time that the one and only address for decisions was PLO headquarters in Tunis" 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993b). 
This disillusionment with the Washington talks finally prompted Rabin to 
think seriously that the PLO would have to be engaged more directly. Rabin had 
pledged, during a Labor Central Committee meeting on 1 March 1992, to reach an 
agreement on autonomy with the Palestinians within six to nine months of taking 
office. It was only after prominent West Bank Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini 
joined the official Washington talks, and they still went nowhere, that he began to 
worry his pledge could not be met through official channels. It was not desire but 
necessity that drove Rabin to engage directly with the PLO-a necessity that 
Shamir never perceived. As he stated in his explanation to the Knesset for signing 
the DOP, on 21 September 1993, 
This [the PLO] is an organization ofterror and destruction that has 
known no mercy; an organization that dispatched the murderers of 
children against us-in Avivim, in Ma'alot; those who shot guests 
at the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv, those who attacked innocent ( ... ) 
bus [passengers] on the coastal road; [those responsible] for 
hundreds of terrorist, murder and injurious activities. 
But, we have chosen another way, that which gives a chance, 
which gives hope. We have decided to recognize the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people for negotiations, within the 
framework of the peace talks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993b). 
In a later interview with IDF Radio in October 1993, at a time of growing 
concem over the activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad (two fundamentalist 
terrorist groups opposed to both the Oslo Accords and the PLO's decision to sign 
it), when asked if he expected the PLO to at least condemn terrorist attacks on 
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Israelis, Rabin replied that "at this phase, l do not expect them to demonstrate 
such heroism. We know with whom we are dealing." But he also noted that the 
difference between the PLO and Hamas is that the former was, with.the DOP, no 
longer opposed to Israel's existence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993a). 
Nowhere was the clash between necessity and preference illustrated better 
than Rabin's personal struggle to de al directly with Yasser Arafat, leader of the 
PLO. His aversion was made public in September 1993, when he hesitated before 
shaking Arafat's hand after the signing ceremony at the White House, and 
refrained from showing any joy in the contact (in contrast to Arafat, who 
energetically pumped Rabin's hand).14 Savir said: "Rabin, the pragmatist, saw the 
agreement as a national imperative and regarded the Palestinians as partners in 
peace but still felt toward them, and especially toward their leader, revulsion that 
he had great difficulty concealing" (1998, 78). Rabin himself wrote of the 
handshake that: "1 knew that the hand outstretched to me ... was the same hand 
that he Id the knife, that held the gun, the hand that gave the order to shoot, to kill. 
Of aIl the hands in the world, it was not the hand that l wanted or dreamed of 
touching" (Rabin 1994, II-III). 
Rabin also came to realize that no Israeli offer could ever be acceptable to 
the Palestinians if they always included the stipulation that aU of the WBG would 
remain under Israeli sovereignty. This belief was reflected in the Basic Guidelines 
for the government Rabin set out in 1992: Point 2.5 stated that "[t]he Government 
14 Further evidence of Rabin's profound psychological barrier was his refusaI to conduct an 
interview Barbara Walters had requested: she wanted to meet with him and Arafat at the same 
time, similar to the interview she had conducted with Sadat and Begin in 1977. But Rabin simply 
could not bring himselfto sit down with the PLO leader. See Horovitz (1996, 147). 
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will advance the peace process in the region with representatives of Arab states 
and the Palestinians, without any pre conditions" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1992a). While this should not be taken as implicit support for an independent 
Palestinian state, the fact that this outcome was not rejected outright indicates at a 
minimum a willingness to have the subject brought up in discussions. The 
Guidelines went on to assert in Point 2.8 that "[i]n the negotiations with the 
Palestinians, the Government will propose-as an interim arrangement-a 
pro gram for the implementation of self-administration for the Palestinians in 
Judea, Samaria and Gaza" (ibid.). The emphasis on an interim solution again 
implies that the final status might well be something very different. 
The final development that convinced Rabin that the PLO was the only 
real partner for dialogue and that a Palestinian state would have to be considered a 
viable outcome was the process of Oslo itself. The inclusion of Joel Singer, an 
intemationallawyer who had worked with Rabin in the Defense Ministry, into the 
negotiations was critical in this respect: he was seen as the representative of 
Rabin, and it was his advice that Oslo was a serious channel that convinced Rabin 
to continue with and invest more time and energy in it. 15 Moreover, Singer's 
argument that the DOP could not be signed without first mutual recognition 
between Israel and the PLO essentially enabled Rabin to take this final step, 
formaI acknowledgment of an organization he had always referred to as 
murderous and terrorist. At the same time, the provisions laid out in the drafts and 
final agreement that came out of Oslo convinced Rabin that a Palestinian state, 
15 Singer points out that once Rabin decided to go with Oslo, he essentially took firm control of 
the process: "every comma, every word" in the draft agreements was scrutinized by Rabin (Singer 
2005). 
156 
provided it was established with due care for Israel's needs, would not be as much 
of a threat after aIl. 16 
The idea that a Palestinian state-however small or bounded-would be 
the outcome of Oslo was a greater turn-around in Israeli policy than even 
recognition of the PLO. The establishment of a Palestinian state went against the 
firm policy of every government since the WBG was captured in 1967. Only a 
leader not emotionally committed to the Land of Israel could engage in such a 
process. Rabin was pragmatic enough to consider the possibility and willing to let 
it happen. Although he never spoke about the actual creation of a Palestinian 
state, either public1y or privately, all the evidence indicates that he was well aware 
that this would be the outcome of Oslo. Oslo negotiators Yair Hirschfeld, Ron 
Pundak, Uri Savir, and Joel Singer have all said everyone involved in the Oslo 
channel was well aware that the ultimate outcome, beyond Oslo as an interim 
agreement, would have to be an independent Palestinian state (Hirschfeld 2005; 
Pundak 2005; Savir 2006; Singer 2005).17 Eitan Haber adds that despite the fact 
that he refused to use the words "Palestinian state," Rabin knew this would be the 
final outcome (Haber 2005). Joel Singer says that during the preparation for one 
ofRabin's speeches to the Knesset, when one speechwriterproposed to Rabin that 
he inc1ude the sentence "there will never be a Palestinian state," Rabin refused; he 
16 This was also likely due to Rabin's belief that not all of the WBG would become a Palestinian 
state, for security reasons. In an address to the country on 23 January 1995, he reiterated that peace 
"must le ad to separation, though not according to the borders prior to 1967: Jemsalem will remain 
united forever. The security border of the State of Israel will be situated on the Jordan River" 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995b). And in presenting to the Knesset, in October 1995, a third 
agreement worked out with the Palestinians, he specified that "[t]he borders of the State of Israel, 
during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We 
will not return to the 4 June 1967lines" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995a). 
17 Though Hirschfeld is much more skeptical that Rabin was certain they were moving in this 
direction. 
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would not say there would be a Palestinian state, but he would also not say there 
would not be one (Singer 2005). 
The specifics entailed in Oslo add further evidence. Peres states that he 
and Rabin agreed that Article 1 of the Oslo Accords could include the proviso that 
negotiations on the final settlement would lead to implementation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (Peres 1995, 290), which 
called for Israel withdrawal from sorne of the terri tories occupied in the 1967 war. 
The extensive provisions for self-government and physical jurisdictions provided 
for in the DOP (and in the later agreements signed by the Rabin government) set 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a path that could not lead anywhere el se but a 
Palestinian state (HelIer 2000, 25). Moreover, the PLO saw itself as the vehicle 
for Palestinian self-government, in both legal and practical terrns: Article 26 of its 
Charter explicitly states that as the primary representative of the nationalist 
struggle, the PLO is responsible for the Palestinian people's self-deterrnination in 
Palestine. Other articles reiterate the theme of Palestinian self-government,18 and 
given that the PLO saw itself (and was recognized by many others, including 
Rabin at the end of the Oslo process) as the legitimate representation of this, 
Rabin could not have avoided the inference that the PLO would be satisfied with 
anything less. 
Yehuda A vner, a close advisor to Rabin during his first terrn as prime 
minister and a long-time friend, reports that he had the feeling that Rabin's "heart 
was never really in it" [the Oslo process] because of how he feH about the PLO 
18 The Palestinian National Charter, available at: http://www.pna.gov.ps/ 
Government/ gOY /plo _ Charter. asp. 
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(Avner 2006). But the fact that Rabin did go through with the Oslo process, even 
in the face of growing public discontent with it, highlights his classification as 
adaptable. He continued to stick by a foreign policy because he believed it would 
in the end be better for Israel, even though he personaUy could never reconcile 
himself to it. An ideological leader with emotional attachments could never 
contemplate such a policy shift. In addition, the fact that Rabin ,went with such a 
controversial and dramatic policy shift without consulting any of even his closest 
aides indicates that the prevailing definition of pragmatism (see Chapter 4) is 
misleading. 
In sum, Rabin had come to leam two things: First, that the PLO was the 
only partner Israel had for negotiation if it wanted to come to some sort of interim 
or final settlement of the conflict. Neither Jordan nor the WBG Palestinians had 
the authority or legitimacy to negotiate with Israel, and although the thought of 
talking to an organization he considered terrorist was loathsome to Rabin, he did 
it nonetheless because he believed it was necessary to come to a solution. Second, 
Rabin came to accept that a Palestinian state in at least part of the WBG was 
necessary, in order to entice the Palestinians into negotiation. The Palestinians 
(and their representative, the PLO) simply did not want anything less, and Rabin 
saw that continuing to reject this stalemated aU attempts at negotiation. Moreover, 
because he did not see such an entity as a threat to Israel and, perhaps more 
importantly, because he was not wedded to the ide a of retaining Eretz Israel for 
the Jews, he could consider the establishment of a Palestinian state on land even 
he believed had been the Jews' by both God and history. 
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Summary 
The analysis above illustrates that it was the crucial difference between 
Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin that explains the variation in Israeli foreign 
policy represented by Oslo. The idea of Oslo (direct negotiation with the PLO and 
a basis for an independent Palestinian state) was presented to Rabin at a time 
when he was struggling to find a way to meet his promises to achieve an 
agreement with the Pa1estinians. It also came at a time when Rabin had come to 
the conclusion that working through non-PLO Palestinians or other Arab states 
was simply not a viable option anymore. As such, it provided a specific strategic 
model for Rabin. This is not to say that Rabin had a change of heart, or that he 
came to believe that Arafat and the PLO were genuine1y sincere in their 
commitments to give up the option of violence. But sincerity is not a condition for 
a leaming process. What matters is that Rabin saw that embracing these positions 
was necessary for the security of Israel. 
The fact that he went with Oslo, despite the risks to both his personal 
credibility and political position (see Auerbach and Greenbaum 2000, 38, 40), 
indicates the importance he attached to any su ch efforts. Yitzhak Shamir, even 
had the Oslo option been presented to him, wou1d have rejected it outright. If he 
refused to bow to American pressure to open the back door for PLO involvement 
in negotiations, he could not have countenanced direct talks with that 
organization. Moreover his ideological nature and his emotional attachment to 
Eretz Israel would never have allowed him to contemplate the type of agreement 
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that Oslo was meant for-that is, laying the groundwork for a Palestinian state on 
these very lands. 
Given the highly centralized nature of Israeli decision-making institutions, 
both Shamir and Rabin, as prime minister, were able to block or enable policies 
reflecting their ideas on these issues. Shamir was able to block Labor and 
American efforts at peace, while Rabin was able to give the Oslo channel the 
necessary authority it needed and, indeed, translate it into official government 
policy. As Beilin himself notes, without Rabin "the Oslo concept wou1d have 
become just another instance of missed opportunity, and since there have been so 
many of these in the Middle East, this one might not even have merited a 
footnote" (Beilin 1999, 137). 
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Chapter Six 
The Institutional and Ideational Setting 
in Turkey 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the second case study, the shift in foreign policy under 
Turkey's second Islamist prime minister toward joining the European Union 
(EU). As in Chapter 4, it is necessary to trace the historical development of 
Turkey' s institutional and ideational structures, in order to measure the 
centralization of its decision-making institutions and determine the prevailing 
national ideas about EU membership. 
To this end, the chapter is set out in the following manner. The first 
section discusses the institutional setting in Turkey, detailing the events that led to 
the rise of a de-centralized polit y, where the primary decision maker has been 
constrained from real autonomy in foreign policy decision-making. This stems 
from the actions of the early Kemalists upon the creation of modem Turkey 
(1923) and then the repeated military interventions in politics. This section goes 
on to discuss the role of the Constitution and the military as the institutional 
constraints on decision-making. The next part focuses on the ideational structures 
of Turkey, divided into two opposing elements: Westemism and Islamism. Both 
will be considered in sorne detail, and what they mean in foreign policy terms. 
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Understanding this dichotomy will help us understand why the Islamist shift to 
advocacy for membership in the European Union is such a puzzle. 
Institutional Setting 
Contemporary Turkish decision-making is not centralized. Although the 
Turkish Constitution intended the prime minister to be the primary decision 
maker in a parliamentary system (Article 1121), in practice the prime minister has, 
especially since 1960, been subject to the influence, control, and direct 
intervention of a number of other state actors, including the military, the 
president, the judiciary, and the civil service. 
This resulted from the historical development of Turkey' s political 
institutions dating back to the practice of the Ottoman Empire, in which a strong 
state autonomous from society and political elites was deemed necessary for the 
extraction of resources and the ability to wage war (see Heper 1985). The 
expansion of the Empire also necessitated an expanding bureaucracy capable of 
dealing with the myriad administrative issues inherent in any large political 
entity.2 This trend continued into the republican period (beginning with the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923), as the country's leaders sought 
to stabilize the polit Y and strengthen it internally (vis-à-vis those opposed to the 
laicist nature of the polit Y and its economic, political, and social institutions) and 
externally (vis-à-vis its enemies and allies in the international system). 
1 AlI references to the Constitution are from the Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General 
of Press and Information (http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm). 
2 For a good history of the Ottoman Empire, see inalclk (1973); also Lewis (2002, 107-123). 
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Efforts to surround the primary decision maker with a series of constraints 
preventing him from using his decision-making authority autonomous1y in the 
modem period grew out of two deve10pments. First, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in 
his zea1 to strengthen and modemize Turkey from the early 1920s to the late 
1930s, created state institutions that were insulated from public or po1itical 
pressure. This was necessary, he believed, because a strong state was required to 
correct the backwardness in which Turkey was mired, and because the people 
were not yet ready to act responsibly enough to govem themselves (Kinross 1964, 
392). Second, the three military coups (1960, 1971, 1980) in which the army 
overthrew the govemment subsequently led to increasingly tight restrictions on 
the civilian authorities, hemming them in through a series of legal and po1itica1 
structures that gave the military tremendous powers of oversight. 
This de-centralization of power is reflected in two key institutions: the 
Constitution and the armed forces. Both institutions developed into powerful 
mechanisms for control over the parliamentary process, inc1uding the capacity for 
the prime minister to make decisions autonomously. This concentration has meant 
that new policy ideas matter much less than old ideas (i.e., ideas held by the 
constraining actors). This inhibits the role of individuals in determining foreign 
policy that are at variance with the general policy parameters preferred by the 
constraining actors. An analysis of the restrictive nature of the Constitution and 
the military follows. 
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I~ The Constitution 
An examination of Turkey' s Constitution is relevant because it pro vides 
the legal and institutional basis for the de-centralization of Turkish decision-
making, and facilitates the intervention of other state actors-primarily the 
military-into the decision-making process. Almost a contradiction, the 
Constitution identifies the prime minister as the key decision maker but also 
curtails his power by ascribing a powerful role to other state actors to make 
decisions and even change the prime minister's own policies. 
Turkey has had three Constitutions, each building on the last. The first, in 
1924, essentially was used to enshrine and provide legitimacy to the political and 
social reforms passed throughout the 1920s and 1930s. It remained in force until 
1961, when the military government that had taken power in the 1960 coup 
convened a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new Constitution to replace the 
1924 document. 
The 1961 Constitution was a contradiction in terms. On the one hand, it 
was the most liberal Constitution in Turkey's history, creating space for civil 
societal organizations and autonomy from the state. On the other hand, it 
established a series of checks and balances against the government, out of the fear 
ofrepression that the Demokrat Parti had engaged in during the second half of the 
1950s? These inc1uded: dividing the parliament into a lower House of 
Representatives and a higher Senate (150 members were elected, fifteen were 
nominated by the president, and the rest were Life Members from the military 
3 These checks and balances are also sometimes considered to be part of the liberal nature of the 
state, since they are presumed to inhibit any autocratie tendencies among governrnents. 
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govemment); establishing the Constitutional Court to ensure laws conformed to 
that document; allowing for greater autonomy for universities and the press; and, 
most importantly for our purposes, it created the National Security Council, an 
advisory body dominated by the military (see below). It also made the Chief of 
Staff directly responsible to the prime minister, rather than the defense minister as 
he had been previously, and put in place an electoral system based on proportional 
representation. 
Although the military after the 1971 coup did not write up a new 
Constitution, it did pressure the govemment to pass a number of constitutional 
amendments and laws that restricted civil freedoms and the institutional autonomy 
of non-state actors (see Hale 1994, 198-199), including the establishment of State 
Security Courts, which tried crimes against the Turkish state as defined by the 
Constitution.4 The violence and instability of the 1960s, it was feared, was the 
direct result of the liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution. The changes enhanced 
the capacity of the govemment to de al with threats to national security and public 
order, and increased the autonomy of the military to do the same (Harris 1988, 
188). However, because these were only piecemeal changes and there was no 
overhaul of the system, the same conditions continued into the 1970s, leading to a 
coup in 1980 and military govemment from 1980-1983. More importantly, 
though, was the beginning of the re-definition of national security threats to 
internaI elements. 
4 One of its three judges came from the military. These courts "died" when the government failed 
to renew them in 1976, but were later written into the 1982 Constitution. They were abolished in 
2004. 
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The 1982 Constitution was designed specifically to remove the liberal 
freedoms from 1961 in a comprehensive and definitive manner, by furthering the 
tradition of the strong state and setting powerful limits on what the civilian 
governments could do. Given the complete breakdown in public law and order 
and the inability of the politicians to resolve their personal differences and deal 
with the ongoing crisis, there was simply no choice but to intervene: the army 
believed it was trying to "save Turkish democracy from itself' (Harris 1988, 193; 
see also Hale 1994,231-238). 
The 1982 Constitution strengthened the capacity of both the government 
to act to protect it and, failing that, the state itself (mostly through the military and 
the judiciary\ The limits of the Constitution and the Turkish polit y are set by 
surrounding them with the Kemalist legacy, making Atatürk's reforms the 
framework for Turkish society and politics and anything outside of it a threat. The 
Preamble states specifically that the Constitution is founded on Atatürk's 
princip les and reforms, that no activity can be allowed to disrupt these, and that 
there will be no "interference" of religion in "state affairs and politics.,,6 In 
addition, Article 1 proclaims the state as a Republic, and Article 2 explicitly 
de fines the state as "secular." According to Article 4, neither ofthese articles can 
be amended, "nor shall their amendment be proposed." Thus, all the institutions 
created by the Constitution and any subsequent laws must be based on the 
Kemalist ideational structure. 
5 One observer remarked that the 1982 Constitution was so effective at entrenching the military's 
power that "it made crude military intervention into politics redundant" (Sakallioglu 1997, 153-
154). 
6 Although a series of amendments took place in 2001, the elements discussed here were not 
changed. 
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In addition to enshrining these princip les, the Constitution also protects 
them by specifying where they might be undermined-designating these as 
threats that can be responded to accordingly by the state. Article 5, which 
succinctly captures the essence of the Kemalist revolution and the legacy that the 
military considers itself upholding, specifies that "The fundamental aims and 
duties of the state are; to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish 
Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy," while 
Article 14 stipulates that "None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the 
Constitution shaH be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity 
of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the 
democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights." 
Article 81, the oath swom by members of the Grand National Assembly (GNA, 
Turkey's parliament) taking up their duties, includes the provision: "1 swear upon 
my honour and integrity, before the great Turkish Nation ... to remain loyal to the 
supremacy of law, to the democratic and secular Republic, and to Atatürk's 
princip les and reforms." 
The Constitution also pro vides specific roles for specific state actors, to 
protect these (Kemalist) principles. In addition to the military, as discussed below, 
the president and the judiciary have cri tic al functions in this regard. The judiciary, 
in the form of the Constitutional Court, has final sayon wh ether or not a political 
party, a policy, or any legislation is contrary to the princip les enshrined in the 
Constitution (Article 148). It can, therefore, annul these changes. The president, 
despite being designated as the head of state, also has wide latitude of 
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enforcement. Article 104 entrusts the president with the dut y to "ensure the 
implementation of the Constitution," and with the ability to "to retum laws to the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly to be reconsidered." The president can also 
appeal to the Constitutional Court if he thinks specific laws are contrary to the 
Constitution. And he has the dut y to appoint sorne of the country' s highest civil 
servants, including to the judiciary, education, and the Chief of Staff, and he 
chairs the National Security Council (Article 118). 
The Military 
Of all the state institutions, it is the military that is the strongest, and the 
institution with the greatest sense of self-identity and mission. As an institution, 
the military7 has exerted a constraining role on the prime minister since the 1960 
coup, curtailing the autonomy of the individual meant to be Turkey' s primary 
decision maker. Understanding the development of the military and its self-
perceived role within Turkey will help us better understand the de-centralized 
nature of the Turkish polity. 
The growth of the TSK's institutional controls and contemporary role has 
been historically conditioned by four main elements, all of which have instilled 
within the military a sense of near-complete identification with the state (see also 
Hale 1994). These include: the warrior tradition of the Turks; the army's premier 
role in instigating and benefiting from reforms during the Ottoman period; the 
strict guidelines set out by Atatürk himself on the role of the military; and the 
military as the embodiment of the Turkish people's most important values. 
7 Most commentators use the terrus "military," "arrny," and "armed forces" (also known as the 
Türk Silahh Kuvvetleri-TSK, Turkish Armed Forces) interchangeably. 1 will follow this custom. 
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First, the martial tradition of the Turkic peoples from Central Asia and 
more importantly the Ottoman Empire provided the army with a sense of strength, 
tradition, and a mission ofprotecting the Turkish state (Karpat 2004,235). As the 
oldest surviving institution in Turkey, the army was the primary vehicle of 
expansion, integration, consolidation, and the bedrock of internaI support. 8 Until 
its decline, the Ottoman army was one of the most powerful and feared forces of 
its time. Internally, the Janissaries that formed the core of the army could also 
depose the Sultan when he was considered to be harming the Empire. These 
developments meant that the army prospered and declined in tandem with the 
state, thus fusing its identity with that of the state. The role of the military in 
defeating the Greek invasion (widely considered to have galvanized the 
nationalist resistance [see Hale 1994, 60; Lewis 2002, 242]) continued this 
tradition. It was critical also in that as the leading element in the resistance against 
both the Greeks and the Allied attempts to divide and weaken Turkey, the War of 
Independence fostered the notion that the army embodied the nation's values 
(independence, nationalism) and was its highest protector. 
Second, the military' s role in reforming and protecting the state from both 
internaI and external enemies stems from its complete identification with the 
reforms of the Ottoman era. Although education and administration were marked 
as necessary, the military was identified as the most important institution needing 
reform, since without the necessary protection, "any other kind of political 
8 It also acted as the instrument of the state in other areas, such as by collecting taxes and 
adrninistering the provinces (KarakartaI1985, 47). 
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reconstruction seemed pointless" (Hale 1994, l3).9 It was in the vanguard of 
modernization in two ways: One, as an institution it underwent restructuring and 
change to strengthen it. Two, it promoted reform in general. The army, for 
example, established the first secular schools in the Empire, considered to be weIl 
run for the most part. Because reforms were based on Western-European-
models, modernization came to be associated with Westernization, and the 
military became the primary vehicle ofthis effort. 
Third, the military followed the guidelines established by Atatürk: that it 
had no place in politics, unless the Turkish state itself or its guiding principles, as 
laid down by Atatürk himself, were under dire threat. Atatürk said that "'[t]he 
Turkish nation ... considers its army the guardian of its ideals, '" and that '" [o]ur 
Republic respects only the will of the people and the guidance of the military'" 
(cited in Maniruzzaman 1987, 71). As early as 1919 he called the army the 
"willing servant of the national will" (Atatürk 1963,37), and put it on equal status 
with the civil administration in safeguarding "the independence of the State and 
the Nation" (ibid.). This princip le is reflected in Article 35 of the Turkish Armed 
Forces InternaI Service Law (1960), which specificàlly notes that the military is 
the guardian of the republic: it is the army's dut y is to "'safeguard and defend 
Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by the constitution'" 
(cited in Yavuz 2003,245).10 
9 See Hale (1994, Chapter 2) for a fuller discussion ofthese reforms. 
10 This is also reflected in the army's efforts to ensure that Islamists do not enter its own officer 
ranks. Its Suprerne Military Council has expelled hundreds of officers suspected of Islamist 
sympathies or activities; sorne banned officers have even reported that they were required to show 
family photographs when being recruited, to determine if the parents had overt signs of piety 
(beards, headscarves), which was considered an indication ofIslamist ernpathy (Jenkins 2001, 23). 
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Fourth, the military was and is identified as the embodiment of the highest 
virtues and values of the Turkish nation. The Janissaries supplied many of the 
government ministers and civil servants during the Ottoman era, and most of the 
leaders of the post-World War One national movement were from the military. 
Beyond the instrumental role of the army, it has been argued that based on its 
collectivist culture and patriarchal and hierarchical tendencies, Turkish society 
respects an institution that promo tes loyalty to the group (the military, the state). 
It thus sees the military as embodying the very notion of "Turkishness" (Jenkins 
2001, 12-14).11 In December 1996 a survey found that 81.3% of the public trusted 
the military; the figure was 78.8% in January 1997, and 78.9% in June 1999. Even 
after a devastating earthquake struck in August 1999, and public resentment at the 
slow and inept response of the state was high, 65.1 % still trusted the armed 
forces, compared to 15% for politicians (see Jenkins 2001, 16). An August 2003 
polI found that 88% Turks considered the military the most trustworthy institution 
in the country (Mango 2004, 134). 
In sum, the military has come to be seen by the vast majority of Turks as 
the most important actor in Turkish politics, even above the prime minister. This 
has been reflected the levels of support for or lack of concem at the various 
military interventions, which the public has typically seen as necessary and 
acceptable. 
11 The nùlitary sees itself in these tenus, as well. See Jenkins (2001, Chapter 2) for a full 
discussion. 
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The National Security Council 
The military' s institutional autonomy and capacity for restriction and 
control is set out primarily by the Constitution, which in addition to setting out the 
framework of princip les the army must protect, provides an institutional structure 
and policy tool in the form of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik 
Konseyi-MGK).12 This provides the army with the capacity for ongoing 
participation in decision-making, particularly by setting policy limits beyond 
which civilian politicians cannot go.13 
The MGK was created by the 1961 Constitution to assist the government 
in decision-making related to national security. Article 111 gave it advisory status 
only. Ar! amendment in spring 1962 strengthened it, by giving it the ability to set 
the govemment agenda in this arena through participation in cabinet discussions 
(see Ozbudun 2000, 107-108). !ts main purpose was to provide a legal and 
constitutional vehicle for the military to pass its ideas and preferences on to the 
civilian government; the capacity for influence was reflected in the nature of its 
decisions, which were required by law to be taken into account by the 
government. 
12 There were/are other institutional privileges, but the MGK is the main instrument used by the 
military to restrict civilian leaders. For example, the State Supervisory Council (Article 108 of the 
Constitution) is given the role of supervising other state agencies in accordance with the 
Constitution's principles; but the army is excluded from its purview. The Defense Ministry has no 
control over the military as an institution: its job, advised by the army itself, is weapons 
procurement, conscription, and relations with other minis tries; in protocol, the Chief of Staff ranks 
above the Defense Minister, second only to the Prime Minister (Jenkins, 2001: 22). The military 
also has an internaI research departrnent to monitor the political orientations of public institutions 
and leaders (see Cizre 2003, 218-219). 
\3 On the military's role in various foreign policies, see Jenkins (2001, 72-82) and Robins (2003, 
75-79). 
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The 1961 Constitution also set the participants on the council: they 
inc1uded the Chief of Staff and the commanders of the army, navy, and air force. 
(The head of the Gendarmerie was later added; these five members have not 
changed since.) Civilians included the prime minister and other ministers as 
determined by Iaw, sorne of who were left to the prime minister's discretion 
(which gave the civilians potentially greater numerical weight than the military 
members). The council is chaired by the president. 
After the 1971 coup, the military pressured the government into passing a 
set of Iaws designed to strengthen the capacity of the state for restriction. One of 
the legaI changes made the MGK's decisions "recommendations," as opposed to 
the "presentations" they had been before (Harris 1988, 188), thus giving its 
decisions added weight. Its role to "assist" the government was aIso changed, with 
"as si st" being removed (Ozbudun 2000, 108). 
The MGK's authority, and the authority of the military within it, was 
increased substantially in the 1982 Constitution. First, the civilian members were 
set as the prime minister and ministers of defense, internaI affairs; and foreign 
affairs. The military members were specified as the Chief of Staff and the service 
commanders, with the Deputy Chief of Staff serving as the secretary. Second, the 
weight of its decisions increased: the government was now required to give 
"priority consideration" to its decisions. This severely constrained the government 
from acting on its own in national security affairs, without miIitary input and 
direction. 
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The MGK's authority vis-à-vis the underlying princip les of the Turkish 
state were specified in the 1983 Law on the National Security Council: Article 2 
defined national security as the constitutional order of the state (that is, the 
principles outlined in the Preamble and Articles 1-4 in the Constitution) and the 
integrity of the state (in territorial and ideological tenns) (Ozbudun 2000, 108). 
This meant that the anny was specifically identified as the guardian of the 
Kemalist ideational structures of the state, but it also meant the military has great 
leeway in defining what matters faU within its national security ambit and 
responding to that threat in a manner it deems appropriate. The key to the anny's 
official power is thus this broad definition of national security (see Cizre 2003). 
The military' s website illustrates this expansive understanding of national 
security. It notes that, in addition to combat, the anned forces' mission includes 
"operations other than war" and "crisis management" which includes "internaI 
and external risks" (Turkish General Staff website, Mission), while its defense 
policy lists "religious extremism" as one of its basic security concerns (Turkish 
General Staff website, Turkey's Defense Policy). 
Finally, the MGK is responsible for collecting infonnation and putting 
together the National Security Policy Document, which sets out the main threats 
to national security and how to respond to them. It is a classified document. 
Amendments passed in October 2001 reduced sorne of the MGK's legal 
capacity. Article 118 on the National Security Council has increased the number 
of civilians vis-à-vis the military. More importantly, the government is no longer 
required to give priority to the MGK's decisions; instead, it is only to "evaluate" 
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them, and may or may not act on them. Although institutionally this may seem 
like a major change, the army's authority and influence remains strong in national 
security affairs-as Philip Robins put it, although the MGK's position has been 
legally reduced, "in practice it is virtually unheard of for cabinets and parliaments 
to publicly question its views" (Robins, 2003: 76). 
Drawing on its institutional authority, and despite its general reluctance, 
the army has intervened four times in politics-twice directly taking over the 
govemment (1960-1961 and 1980-1983), and twice ousting the govemment in 
favor of another civilian administration through indirect means (1971 and 1997).14 
Aside from the 1997 coup (see Chapter 7) these interventions will not be 
discussed, as they are not part of the case study.15 But these four incidents do 
provide excellent ex amples of the constraining nature of the army, its persistent 
influence in policymaking, and the justifications and motivations for its 
involvement. 
In sum, despite the removal of sorne of its constitutional and legal 
privileges, the military remains the key actor constraining prime ministers and the 
govemment from complete independence, at least in the realm of national 
security, while at the same time its informaI influence remains relatively 
undiminished. In Jenkins' words, "[t]he result is a system in which civilian 
authority is primary, rather than supreme, and where the military is able to 
14 Prior to 1960, the military did not play an active role in politics. To the extent that it was 
involved, it was primarily as members of cabinet and parliament, and provincial governors, 
especially in the early days of the republic (Karpat 2004,239). 
15 On the 1960 coup, see Ahmad (1977, Chapters 2, 6); Hale (1994, Chapter 5-6); Karpat (2004). 
On the 1971 coup, see Ahmad (1977, Chapter 7); Hale (1994, Chapters 7-8). On the 1980 coup, 
see Hale (1994, Chapters 9-10). 
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prevent policy from straying outside specific parameters" (2001, 8). It is thus well 
placed to influence foreign policy. As the next chapter demonstrates, the military 
was the critical element in the leaming process that differentiates the two Islamist 
prime ministers, Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and their foreign 
policies. 
To the question of centralization in Turkish decision-making institutions, 
we can now answer in the negative. This historical discussion has illustrated the 
de-centralized nature of decision making in Turkey, with the prime minister 
constrained by Constitutional mandates and army-induced institutional and 
practical limits. We can expect, therefore, that individuals will matter less in 
forming foreign policy, unless it follows the guidelines set by the constraining 
actors. What ideas were held by the two Islamist prime ministers and what their 
eventual foreign policies looked like, and the differences between them, is further 
elaborated in the next section and in Chapter 7. 
Ideational Structures 
In its ideational context, examination of its historical development 
provides the key to understanding the differences in today' s Turkey between 
Kemalism and Westemism on the one hand, and Islamism on the other. Not only 
does understanding these differences help us identify what goes on in Turkish 
politics, but it also directly impacts on the case study. Since membership in the 
EU has been considered the outgrowth of Westem-oriented identity and policy, 
the event of one Islamist party and prime minister changing tack and pursuing the 
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same foreign policy as Kemalists (and in contrast to the prevlOUS Islamist 
government) provides the empirical puzzle. It also offers a good case with which 
to test the alternate explanations set out in Chapter 2. 
Much like Turkey' s institutional structures, its ideational structures are 
drawn from its pasto We may categorize structures into two opposing poles: 
Westernism and Islamism. The former drew on the Ottoman and republican des ire 
to join the West, adopt its ideas, and emulate its structures; while the latter 
generally opposed the wholesale adoption of Western modes of behavior and to 
sorne extent of its techniques, and preferred to draw for its models and inspiration 
from Islam. As one scholar put it, "[m]odern Turkish history is one of continuous 
struggle between these two tendencies" (Müftüler-Bac 1999, 243). Although the 
clash between the two is primarily over domestic affairs, it is also weIl 
represented in the foreign policy arena, particularly as it relates to relations with 
the European Union. By examining the differences in their preferred foreign 
policies, we are able to identify the puzzle in Turkish foreign policy that ensued 
when the Islamist government of 2002 decided to actively seek EU membership. 
Westernism 
The advent of Westernism dates to the Ottoman period, particularly the 
two main periods of reform, the eras of the Young Ottomans and the Young 
Turks. The decline of the Ottoman Empire encouraged the adoption of methods 
and ideas that could be used to strengthen it and help prevent the hemorrhaging of 
its territorial possessions. Since the Empire was in direct contact with the West 
(defined at this point as Europe) through trade and war, and since it was the West 
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that was beating the Empire, it made sense to look to that same place for models 
for reform (much as the Japanese did during the Meiji Restoration). Strategically 
located, the Ottoman Empire was also brought into Great Power geopolitical 
struggles. 16 This gave it an enhanced awareness of its inferior position, at least in 
military and organizational terms, and a realization that failure to adapt to the 
clearly predominant West would mean the end of the Empire. This feeling was 
taken up wholeheartedly by the Kemalists during their struggle for independence. 
As Atatürk and his supporters came to dominate, then control, the resistance, they 
also came to shape the structures of the emerging country. These reflected their 
belief in the adoption of Western ideas and political, social, and cultural norms. 
Indeed, they came to adopt an emotional attachment to Westernism. 
Reform as Westernization meant not only adopting certain models and 
structures from Europe, but also referred to identification-it was, according to 
Berkes, an "appropriation" of European civilization (Berkes 1964, 463). Thus, in 
addition to helping Turkey develop, Westernization meant running the country' s 
polit y, society, and economy along Western dimensions not only because it was 
helplul, but also because it was the right thing to do if one wanted to join the 
community of civilized states. Atatürk often stressed this during his reform efforts 
(see Berkes 1964,463-464, Chapter 16). 
16 Though Philip Robins cautions us to avoid the impression that the place of the Empire in 
European Great Power politics meant Turkey was European: "to infer from this that the Ottoman 
Empire and the successor state of Turkey is somehow intrinsically European as a result of such an 
experience is simply the i11 informed product ofwishful thinking" (2003, 102). 
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Westemism relied on Kemalism.anideology of six gui ding principles 
(republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism).17 
These were enshrined in the Constitution, and they form the basic understanding 
of the military in its actions toward policymaking. In the context of this study, 
secularism is the key element. It is the flip side to the coin of Westemization. 
If the stated objective was modemization, and modemization meant 
Westemization, then everything associated with the past was regressive and 
negative, and prevented Turkey from becoming strong and civilized. The past was 
Islam and the Ottoman Empire. Both had dragged the country down, it was 
argued, straitjacketing it in old ideas and concepts and preventing any progress 
and development from taking place. Islam was seen as a backward-Iooking 
religion that could not adjust to modem life, full as it is of "superstition, false 
ideals, and dogmas" (Ayata 1996, 41). Anything that represented Islam had no 
place in modem Turkey. In his great thirty-six hour speech to the Grand National 
Assembly in 1927, Atatürk referred several times to the Caliphate as dangerous 
for the country (Atatürk 1963, 698-9, 702). As a representation of everything that 
Atatürk perceived Islam to stand for, he also argued it was "necessary to abolish 
the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to 
progress and civilization" (Atatürk 1963, 738; also Berkes 1964, 457-460). The 
17. Republicanism referred to the shift from an Islamic- and Ottoman-based system to a modem 
one, inc1uding constitutional and parliamentary democracy; nationalism meant the creation of an 
ethnically and culturally homogenous Turkish nation-state; populism was about popular 
sovereignty, and the notion that the Turkish nation was an undivided whole without class 
distinctions; statism meant heavy government involvement in Turkish societal and economic life; 
secularism was the removal of Islam from the public sphere; and reforrnism (revolutionism) 
underlay the others-it meant the implementation of radical reforrns of the country's structures. 
For discussions of Kemalism, see Karal (1981); Poulton (1997, Chapter 4). 
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past had broken the Ottoman state; the future therefore had to be free of Ottoman 
and Islamic influence. 
Rather than a separation of religion and state, secularism as a Kemalist 
principle more appropriately referred to "laicism." It is about the predominance 
and control of the state and its values over religion (see Berkes 1964,479-481). It 
is not, nor was it ever, about the eradication of Islam (there was a role for an 
Islam "friendly to the state" [Zürcher 1998, 303]), but about the disestablishment 
of it from the public sphere (Lewis 2002, 412-416). The practice oflslam was not 
forbidden; but its role in the construction of Turkish identity and institutional 
structures had to be, since it would hamper development in these areas (Berkes 
1964,483-490).18 
Such ideas were enshrined throughout the Constitution: Article 24 states 
that "No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or 
things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of 
personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, 
social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets." Article 
136 furthers the state's control over it, by giving the Department of Religious 
Affairs the capacity to direct Islamic activities "in accordance with the princip les 
of secularism." 
Article 174 adds the last constraint against any use of religion in politics: 
Referring to many of the major reforms passed against Islam in the 1920s and 
18 The de1egitimization of religious education was also a key facet to these reforms. The 
introduction of secular curriculum across the country was meant to replace Koranic and prayer 
classes with courses that emphasized science, rationality, secularism, and other elements the 
Kemalists believed were representative of a modem civilization and educational system (Gôle 
1997,49; Kadioglu 1996, 186). 
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1930s, it states that "No provlSlon of the Constitution shall be construed or 
interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which 
aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to 
safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on the 
date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey.,,19 (See also 
Berkes 1964; Kinross 1964, Part Three.) 
After 1960, when the military became the leading element of the state 
defending the Kemalist reforms and continuing with the Kemalist developmental 
path, Islam was gradually securitized. It came to represent a threat to both the 
Kemalist order (especially laicism) and to its main foreign policy objectives-
1 
affiliation with Europe. Islamist demands for a re-shaping of the political and 
social configurations of the country and of its foreign relations is seen as an 
existential threat to the Turkish nation and state, as defined in the Constitution. 
These domestic priorities were reflected in the foreign policy arena. At 
first, Westernism was translated into neutralism ("non-internationalist" [V âli 
1971, 55]). In the beginning years of the republic, its two main leaders, Atatürk 
and Ismet In6nü, were careful to keep Turkey as neutral as possible in 
international affairs, but the threat from the Soviet Union combined with the 
Kemalist elite's orientation toward the West inevitably drew Ankara into the 
19 These reforms included: the abolishment of the Caliphate (the preeminent symbol connecting 
the Ottoman Empire and Islam); the abolishment of the religious court system and enforcement of 
a secular justice system; the banning of the fez; the outlawing of the religious order (tarikats) and 
worship at Islamic shrines and tombs; the replacement of the Islamic calendar with the Gregorian 
one; the substitution of the Seriat (Islamic law) with the Swiss civil code; and the replacement of 
the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet. In one of the more far-reaching reforms, the Kemalists 
removed the clause from the 1924 Constitution proclaiming the religion of the state to be Islam; in 
1937 Article 2 of the Constitution was amended to specifically proclaim the state as secular, as it 
has remained since then. Finally, Atatürk enhanced the status of women in society, giving them 
the right to vote and become members ofparliament. 
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Western camp during the Cold War, but primariIy in strategie terms (as a buIwark 
against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East). Once the European Economic 
Community was established during the 1950s, it became the objective to join 
what it perceived as the institutional expression of Western-European civilization. 
As 6ni~ put it, "eventual membership in the EU has been interpreted as a 
necessary counterpart of the westernization and modernization drive" (2003, 17). 
It became, in Andrew Mango's words, the "Red Apple" for Turkey-a legendary 
objective of the Ottomans that symbolized both their greatest achievements (the 
conquest of Constantinople) but also their un-obtained goals as well (Vienna) 
(Mango 2004, 233). 
Islamism 
In direct contrast to Kemalist preferences, Islamism refers to the 
foundation of the economic, social, and political system on religious values and 
on the ideas set out by Mohammed the Prophet in the 17th century,z° Given its 
deep historical ties to the Turkish people, Islamism has always played an 
important role in mobilizing society for whatever purposes deemed important by 
the state: during the Ottoman period it was used for control and keeping together 
the various regions of the empire (Yavuz 2003, 43_45),21 and indeed it played a 
critical role in motivating and inspiring the Islamic warriors who conquered 
Constantinople and expanded the Ottoman boundaries. The fusing of the 
20 Scholars have also used the terms "political Islam" to describe this ideology. Vertigans (2003) 
caUs it "praxist Islam." It has been described as "a political movement which utilizes the dis course 
and symbols of Islam to come to power and to establish a non-secular social order based upon 
shar'a" (Akinci 1999,75, fn.1). More generally, it is a commitment "to see Islam play a greater 
role in the society and/or the polit y" (Heper 1997, 33). Much like Kemalism, Islamism combines a 
religious commitment (in place of a laicist commitment) with a political consciousness and social 
action format (Gôle 1997,46). 
21 The 1876 Constitution defined Ottomans in terms oftheir religion. 
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Sultanate as the temporal authority with the Caliphate as the religious head of aIl 
Muslims in 1517 entrenched the notion that religious princip les formed an 
essential element of the state structures. Lewis notes that even aside from the 
Caliphate, Islam was seen as the primary justification for the empire îtself: "From 
its foundation until its faIl the Ottoman Empire was astate dedicated to the 
advancement or defence of the power and faith of Islam" (2002, 13; see also 
Yavuz 2003, Chapter 3). 
Even after the faH of the Ottoman Empire, Islam was considered a crucial 
element in state action. In the War of Independence it was appealed to for the sake 
of nationalist unit y, given that the religious leaders formed an important 
contingent of the resistance. Atatürk himself exhorted his foIlowers in the name of 
the Caliph (Kinross 1964, 216-217). With the increasing predominance of the 
Kemalists after 1923, it was used by the state to control its activities (e.g., the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs). Finally, during the pluralist period it was used 
by the various parties to mobilize votes, through appeal to Islamic consciousness 
and concessions toward the more open practice of it in the public sphere. The very 
fact that Islam could be used in these ways highlights the deep and abiding 
connection Turks feel toward it. 
The Islamist agenda and its increasing re1evance to the public particularly 
after the 1960s is best encapsulated in the National Outlook framework, an 
amalgam of "tradition al Sunni-based Islamic culture and Sufi worldview 
embedded within a developmentalist discourse" (YlldlZ 2003, 189) and underlain 
with a historical view of Turkey' s glorious past and potential for great future-
184 
both based on Islam. The latter is also founded on economlC and industrial 
development. Necmettin Erbakan, the first Islamist prime minister, was himself 
the founder of this framework of thought (see Chapter 7). The National Outlook 
reflected aIl the changes described above that strengthened the appeal of Islam 
within society and made it a viable alternate paradigm for many Turks. 
In the foreign policy arena, this framework meant a rejection of Western 
orientation, since the West had nothing to offer except perhaps in technological 
terms. Identification and alliance with the West was seen as a denial of Turkey' s 
own Islamic roots and proper orientation. Islamists frequently criticized the EU 
and rejected it as the natural home of Turkey, something that was a fundamental 
assumption for the Kemalists. 
At the same time, ties with the Islamic world were highlighted as being 
necessary for both Turkish development and Turkish identity. The various 
incarnations of Islamist political parties were unconvinced that Turkish ideational 
structures (Ottomanism, Islam, Turkish nationalism) and European ideational 
structures (liberal democracy, free market capitalism) were compatible. For them, 
democracy "was seen as a component of an infected Western system" (Ayata 
2004, 243-244). In short, orientation toward the EU-much less membership in-
was something the Islamists not only disagreed with, but also actively believed 
was harmful to Turkey. Turkey was a Muslim country, with roots in Islam that 
had once made it the most feared empire in the world. Regaining that heritage and 
applying it to the present was possible only by a reassertion of Islam within 
Turkey. Membership in the EU could only stifle and kill this endeavour. 
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Islamism has become a powerful, and thus relevant, force in Turkey, 
particularly since the 1980s,22 for three main reasons. First, while the Kemalists 
succeeded in removing Islam from the public sphere, they could not reduce its 
influence among the population, particularly in the considerably more traditional 
rural areas. Islamic consciousness remained deeply rooted, not least because the 
private practice of it was never banned. This failure left much of the traditional 
social structures and loyalties in place. This imposition from above of laicism was 
designed to induce a "general state of amnesia which would lead to a process of 
estrangement of the people from some of their own cultural practices" (Kadioglu 
1996, 186). !ts failure alienated large segments of society from the state, and 
made them more inc1ined to follow Islamist principles when they were offered as 
political and social choices (Yavuz 2003,55; 1997,64). 
Second, the ons et of severe economic problems and the socio-economic 
dislocations that have resulted from them have left many Turks struggling on a 
daily basis to meet their basic requirements (see White 2002). Islam has been able 
to provide a viable alternative paradigm for both the physical and the spiritual 
needs of Turks, in a way that Kemalism could not. Islamist groups were able to 
take advantage of this to mobilize support for their political parties. In this sense, 
the growing strength of Islamist parties in the 1990s and 2000s is less sudden 
discovery of religion, but rather an "awakening" or "resurgence" (Vertigans 2003; 
Yavuz 2003). 
22 Though Uriel Heyd argues that the "revival" of Islam began as early as in the 1940s (Heyd 
1968). 
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Although there is debate over the impact of economic conditions on the 
rise of Islamist consciousness and action in Turkey,23 there is certainly a link of 
sorne kind. The shift to economic neo-liberalism at the beginning of the 1980s has 
led to a series of socio-economic changes in society, including spreading 
urbanization due to migration from rural to urban areas; unemployment; capacity 
for corruption; inflation; fluctuation in interest rates; growing gaps between the 
haves and the have-nots; and strict International Monetary Fund-mandated 
privatization and structural reform schemes (see Ayata 1996; Barkey 1996, 45; 
White 1997; Yavuz 2003, Chapter 4; Zürcher 1998, 304). The spectacle of 
politicians squabbling incessantly among themselves and paying more attention to 
their personal needs than those of society has only enhanced these feelings of 
alienation (Çarkoglu 1998, 544, 553; Heper 1997, 36; Sakallioglu 1996,231). 
Third, the economic and political liberalizations beginning in the 1980s 
provided an opening for Islamist groups to mobilize more widely and publicly, 
and engage in political participation (Yavuz 2003, 4)?4 The appeal of Islamist 
groups in this context is two-fold: One, Islamist parties have been very successful 
at engaging in intimate and personal contact with people, canvassing door-to-
door, holding public meetings, and arranging for foodstuffs and other necessities 
to be given to those most in need. Two, Islam has a durable and continuous 
political connection to the past, a language for communication, easily 
recognisable symbols, and is an outlet for despair, making it an effective and, 
23 White (2002) and Vertigans (2003) provide strong arguments and evidence against this linkage, 
pointing out that such explanations cannot account for the rise of Islamist sentiment among the 
middle and wealthier classes in society. See also Yavuz (2003). 
24 For an account of the liberalization policies in this period, see Saracoglu (1994). 
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importantly, a familiar paradigm to seek comfort in (see Bulliet 1993; Turan 
1994). 
Politically, the military regime of 1980-1983 decided that although Islam 
still had no role in public life, there was a clear role for it to play within the 
country. First, it became identified with the right end of the political spectrum, 
and thus a useful counter-measure against radicalleftist forces (Yavuz 2003, 62). 
Second, the army believed that if the people had sorne contact with Islam, it 
would lessen their need to tum to it for political purposes (ibid., 69-75). Toward 
these ends, it created the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, an artificial construction 
designed to fuse Turkish nationalism and Kemalism with a compatible Islam. 
Common ideas between the two were stressed, such as a sense of justice, belief in 
the immortal soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and morality (see Poulton 
1997, 184). The military govemment encouraged the spread ofreligious education 
and the religious brotherhoods, which had been banned in 1925. It even tried to 
portray Atatürk as a pious Muslim trying to purge Islam of negative elements and 
helping it grow stronger, publishing a three-volume biography on his life that 
stressed his religious commitments and beliefs (Yavuz 2003, 70-71). The Ozal 
govemment that followed (1983-1989) continued the tolerance of Islam-Ozal 
himself was known to be relatively pious and open about his practice of it. These 
actions generated a widespread rise in Islamic awareness, culminating in the 
incredible increase in the number of religious foundations, religious schools, 
mosques, and Korans,z5 
25 A 1990 Directorate of Religious Affairs report found that the number of imam-hatip schools 
rose from 2,688 in 1973 to 39,907 in 1988; 1500 new mosques were built each year; and the 
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/--------" Other related patterns have also been noted: rising levels of education 
produced Turks who both were able to read and discuss religious texts and ideas, 
and provided more traditional leaning Turks with the capacity advance higher up 
the social and economic ladder, taking their Islamist sentiments with them. The 
spread of the media has been noted as particularly helpful (see Yavuz 2003, 
Chapter 5). This trend, particularly regarding newspapers, gave Turks the ability 
to compare their society with others, and to see what was happening elsewhere. 
The spread of the Islamic media (newspapers, radio, television, tapes, the 
Internet) contributed to the direct distribution of the Islamist message. The rise of 
a new class of wealth and businesspeople, Anatolians from traditional and rural 
background, brought Islam into the cities without associating it with poorer and 
more marginal classes. These individuals have helped extend the reach of Islamist 
ideas through their capacity for investment and other supportive efforts. 
AlI these trends have contributed to the growth in power of Islamist 
political parties (see Chapter 7).26 Before 1950 there was little public space for 
Islamist to operate, Islamic groups operated either on the fringes of the political 
process (Çarkoglu 1998, 544) or within larger center-right parties such as the DP 
and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP). The advent of multi-party politics in 
1950 began the process of encouraging political Islam (in large part because 
Inonü believed democracy and Islam were compatible [see Heper 1998]). This set 
number of Korans inspected and official approved by the military government leaped from 31,075 
in 1979 to 259,731 in 1981 (Poulton 1997,186). 
26 In addition to political parties, Islamist sentiments have also been manifested in radical, militant 
forms as well-much like Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Middle East. However, radical Islam is 
not relevant to the case study, and so will not be dealt with. See Karmon (1997) for more on this 
segment of Islamism. 
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the stage for the promotion of lslamist ideational structures at the expense of 
Kemalist structures. This has led, in the 1990s and after, to a direct clash between 
the two frameworks, and in political terms resulted in the Kemalist elites trying to 
limit the advancement of lslamist parties in the political process. The 
confrontation between the two has been played out in the foreign policy arena, 
and helps explain the variation in foreign policy discussed in Chapter 7. 
This chapter has summarized the historie al development of Turkey' s 
institutional and ideational structures. Chapter 7 fi1ls in the last piece of the 
model, by focusing on the different individuals who are responsible for the 
variation in Turkish foreign policy discussed in this study. 
The existence of the strong state tradition, coupled with the early efforts 
by the Kemalists and then the repeated military interventions, has created a de-
centralized policymaking structure in Turkey. Prime ministers have been subject 
to oversight and influence by a host of state actors, but primarily the army, that 
have constrained their capacity for autonomous decision-making. This prevents 
both individuals from translating their own ideas into policy, but also promotes 
the longevity of adaptable individuals who can work within such constraining 
frameworks. ldeological individuals emotionally attached to policies or objectives 
at odds with those of the stronger political actors are less likely to survive in 
office, since they are likely to warrant the intervention of these other actors. More 
specifically, in Turkey's case, the very different ideas held by the Kemalists (who 
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are typically those actors that constrain the prime minister) and the Islamists 
creates a large space for collision between these opposing worldviews. 
Chapter 7 builds on these understandings by comparing the two Islamist 
prime ministers and their different ideas about EU membership. Because of the 
de-centralized nature of the system, neither was able to implement their preferred 
Islamist agendas. But in the case of one, he leamed to both work within this 
system and that by following the ideas promoted by the constraining actors, he 
could actually benefit the Islamist agenda by protecting it from these very actors. 
While Necmettin Erbakan neglected the EU and continued to bang his head 
against the wall of the military's staunch Kemalism, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was 
pragrnatic enough to leam from Erbakan's mistakes and work within the Kemalist 
constraints, and carne to understand that EU membership would be beneficial for 
the Islamists because the military would have to follow EU political standards. 
The role of individuals helps us better understand this foreign policy variation. 
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Chapter Seven 
From Neglect to Advocacy: 
EU Membership and 
Foreign Policy Variation in Turkey 
Introduction 
An analysis of the historical development of the institutional and ideational 
structures of Turkey tell us that (a) Turkey is a de-centralized polit y, in which 
state actors often severely constrain the primary decision maker (the prime 
minister) from acting autonomously; and (b) that Turkey has long been split along 
a Kemalist-Islamist axis, with each ideational framework identifying very 
different domestic priorities and foreign policies. Because Turkey is a de-
centralized polit y, we can expect that its prime ministers will matter less in 
charting an independent foreign policy course than in a centralized polit Y such as 
Israel. Leaders are constrained to confonn to the ideas held by those actors who 
constrain them-in this case, the Kemalist elements of the state, especially the 
military. Whether they do so depends on the nature of the individual in office. In 
addition, by mapping out the dichotomous ideational structures of Turkey, we can 
recognize when a variation in foreign policy occurs, because it does not fit with 
traditional ideas coming out of these frameworks. In this case study, one Islamist 
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prime minister oriented his foreign policy away from Europe, in keeping with the 
Islamist agenda, while the other moved c10ser toward Europe, in stark contrast to 
the Islamist agenda. 
The dynamic variable that best represents this shift is the individualleader. 
Focusing on institutions and ideas does not tell the whole the story. Therefore, 
this chapter will complete the empirical analysis by focusing on the differences in 
the raIe of emotion in the belief structures of Prime Ministers N ecmettin Erbakan 
and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and their consequent foreign policies is the basis for 
the following discussion. 
The chapter is laid out in the following manner. The first part, an analysis 
of the independent variable, will compare the belief structures between Erbakan 
and Erdogan, the individuals who made these foreign policy decisions. We will 
look at their basic conception of and attachment to Islam and what role they 
wanted for it within Turkey. Then we will examine the consequences this had for 
their behavior on specifie issues. The next section will focus on the dependent 
variable, policy toward the European Union. Here we will also analyze Erdogan's 
leaming process, since this highlights the critical difference between his and 
Erbakan's belief structures. The last part will summarize what this discussion has 
meant for the effectiveness ofthe model as presented in Chapter 3. 
The Role of Individuals: Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
Erbakan and Erdogan were both committed Islamists. But they their belief 
structures incorporated affective attachment to their religion in different ways. 
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This is underlined by a discussion of these differences and the impact they had on 
policy toward the EU. After discussing Islam as the core of their belief systems, 
we will tum to the impact this had on two (non-EU) policy issues: the focus they 
engineered for the political parties they led and their domestic political priorities. 
Examining these policies is critical for avoiding the tautological conclusion that 
would be derived from a focus only on their policy toward the EU. 
The Independent Variable: Necmettin Erbakan 
The foundation of Erbakan's beliefs is rooted in Islamism. He did not have 
a pious education (there were no religious educations aIlowed at the time) and 
indeed his schooling was secular-including his Ph.D. in engineering in 
Germany-and he pursued activities not considered at the time aIl that religious.! 
Yet Erbakan was a very devout Muslim with close ties to the Nak~ibendi religious 
brotherhood (indeed, piety was a requirement for membership). He developed a 
powerful emotional attachment to Islam, which conditioned his belief in the 
importance and relevance of Islam for Turks and for Turkey. At least in part 
because the public practice of Islam was suppressed, his religiosity became a 
focus on moral qualities and moral development for the country (Ozdalga 2002, 
138-142). He believed that the moral core of society came from Islam: this is 
what had made Turkey great in the past, and what would make it great again in 
the future. In his undergraduate pro gram he was remembered as a religious person 
who spent half his time praying (White 2002, 142). This aIl had the cumulative 
1 He founded a motor factory in Istanbul and made contacts in the business community and in 
industry, which helped him gain the presidency of the Union of the Chambers of Commerce and 
Stock Exchange in 1969. 
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effect of constructing cognitive structures based on affective judgments and thus 
policy inflexibility. 
Erbakan's political actions reflected his deep religious convictions. As 
founder of the National Outlook movement, he represented the desire for Islam to 
be the structuring framework of Turkish politics, society, and economy. When he 
set up the first Islamist political party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam 
Partisi-MNP) in 1970, it was with the help of the religious Nak~ibendi and 
Nurcu tarikats. When he went into self-imposed exile after the c10sure of the 
MNP, his supporters referred to this as "the Hegira," after the flight of the Prophet 
Muhammed who left Mecca for Medina for safety reasons (Ozdalga 2002, 130). 
Whenever divisions appeared within the Islamist political parties between more 
traditional-conservative and more moderate-progressive factions Erbakan was 
drawn to the former,where his own sympathies lay. 
Erbakan's strong beliefin Islamism led him to a political career marked by 
continuous efforts, in the face of successive c10sures by the armed forces, to form 
a political party that would represent the Islamist agenda, work to bring it to 
fruition, and in so doing re-structure Turkey along what he was convinced was the 
most appropriate lifestyle. (The most overt displays occurred in September, 1980, 
when Erbakan led a massive demonstration in Konya, where public calls for the 
establishment of an Islamic state were made [Hale 1994, 237-238].) Each time a 
newer version of this attempt was manifested, it had a slightly different emphasis 
in political terms, but it never removed its core belief that Islamism should be the 
guiding framework for Turkey. The parties an had the same leaders, publications, 
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ideologies, and policy recommendations, and much of the same support groups 
across the country. 
Political Party Focus 
Because Erbakan has been at the center of an efforts to establish Islamist 
political parties since the 1970s until the split into two Islamist parties in 2001, we 
can identify his belief structures (and his consequent policies) more easily if we 
examine these parties and what they stood for. Although it would be a mistake to 
refer to Erbakan's parties and their policies as Islamic fundamentalism, their 
primary emphasis on Islam and the benefits it would bestow upon Turkey-as 
opposed to the decay and decline that occurred under a secular regime-lead to 
his categorization as an ideological individual for whom affective appeal trumps 
pragmatic flexibility. 
The first avowedly Islamist party, the MNP, was established in January 
1970. It was shut down in the wake of the 1971 military coup, on the grounds that 
it was trying to set up an Islamic state. In support of the dissolution of the party, 
prosecutors cited a speech made by Erbakan in October 1970, in which he said 
'" [ w ]hen we say the National Order we underline the fact that it is more important 
to study the Traditions of the Prophet and the works of Imam Ghazali and Imam 
Rabbani than leaming the sociology and ethics now taught in schools. For the 
believers .... shouldjoin the National Order by pronouncing the Islamic formula ... 
['In the Name of God']" (cited in Ozdalga 2002, 130). As the first political 
manifestation of the National Outlook, the MNP argued that Islam would be the 
motor that would drive Turkey' s economic development and expansion of 
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political power to heights reminiscent of its glorious past (see YlldlZ 2003). 
Because this celebrated past was associated with Islam-indeed, was due to 
Islam-the MNP under Erbakan believed that re-adoption of Islam in society and 
polit Y would lead to the same magnificent outcome in the present. 
While Erbakan was in Switzerland, where he had fled during the trial 
against him, supporters set up in October 1972 the National Salvation Party (Milli 
Se/amet Partisi-MSP). He took up its leadership after the 1973 elections, 
leading it until it was banned with aU other politica1 parties during the 1980-1983 
military govemment. Fear of the military and of the fate of the MNP motivated 
the party to de-emphasize Islam in its pro gram. Instead, it advocated a series of 
socio-economic transformations (rapid industrialization, social and populi st 
economic justice, and equitable distribution of wealth) underlined by a strong 
moral component, inc1uding an emphasis on the importance of family life (Yavuz 
2003, 210). At the same time, it looked to the Ottoman era for inspiration. These 
non-Islamic elements hid, according to many observers, an ideology that was 
"embedded in a thinly veiled pro gram to restore Islam in state and society and 
tum it into the major factor in Turkey" (Landau 1997). It was obvious that for the 
MSP Islam remained the underlying ideal on which Turkish society and policy 
should be based, and that its focus on "moral development" was a euphemism for 
religious piety. 
When the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlz Kuvvetleri-TSK) 
overthrew the govemment on 12 September 1980, it banned aU political parties 
inc1uding the MSP and forbade the leading politicians from participating in 
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politics. Without Erbakan's active involvement but with his clear blessing and 
guidance, MSP supporters established the Welfare Party (Re/ah Partisi-RP) on 
19 July 1983. Although in speeches and in its pro gram it stressed the new Just 
Order (Adil Düzen) as its policy platform, its ideology remained closely 
associated with the MSP's, and its pro gram retained many of the same elements. 
This included sorne support for the free market but also greater social and 
economic justice, particularly in social reform, pensions, health care, 
employment, and housing (White 1997, 26).2 It also distinguished between 
Westemization and modemization, with the former being bad for Turkey and the 
latter being something Turks could achieve on their own. But everything was still 
couched vaguely and surreptitiously in Islamic concepts. It was, according to 
Jenny White, "a political party defined by its relation to Islam" (2002, 131). 
In the wake of the 28 February process (see below) and the closure of the 
RP, Erbakan set up yet another Islamist political party in December 1997, the 
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP), under the nominal leadership of Recai Kutan. 
For aU intents and purposes the FP was the RP under a different name: it retained, 
for example, most of the RP's seats in the Grand National Assembly (GNA). 
From behind the scenes Erbakan was much more careful to avoid any rhetoric or 
policy that might aggravate the military any more than it already was. The FP 
tried to take a less hard-line stance on the issue of headscarves for women in 
public places, avoided segregated party social events, and tried to recruit women 
in high profile positions (Narli 1999, 43-44; see also YIldlZ 2003, 198-200). It 
2 Erbakan had an aversion to free market economics (Robins 2003, 147-148), but inc1uded this 
provision for political purposes. 
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also advocated more free-market economic policies, contrary to the state-Ied 
economy that formed part of the Just Order framework of the RF. But most 
observers saw this as a mere tactical shift to avoid the same fate as Re/ah (e.g., 
YlldlZ 2003, 199), and the incident sUITounding FP member Merve Kavakçi 
revealed for many the true nature of the FP. Despite a long-time ban on 
headscarves (a traditional signal of religious devotioIi for women in Turkey) in 
public buildings/ in May 1999, Kavakçi came to the GNA to be sworn in but 
wearing the headscarf. Parliament erupted into shouting and insulting, but she 
refused to remove the offending piece of clothing. Eventually she was forced out 
of the chamber and, later, stripped of her Turkish citizenship through a legal 
loophole (though she later regained it). White (2002, 145) asserts her stance was 
done at Erbakan's direction. If so, it is an excellent example of his Islamist 
agenda. 
The final and CUITent manifestation of Erbakan's Islamist parties is the 
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP). In June 2001 Fazilet was dissolved by the 
Constitution al Court, also for engaging in activities contrary to the secular nature 
of the republic. Following past trends, its former deputies began to organize 
themselves into a new party, except this time the divisions between the 
conservatives and the moderates could not be contained. The traditionalists (the 
gelenekçi) established the SP while the moderates (also known as the 
reformers/renewers, the yenilikçi) formed the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkznma Partisi-AKP) (see White 2002, Chapter 4, for a good 
discussion ofthis division). 
3 For a good discussion of the veiling issue, see Ozdalga (1998). 
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The SP tried hard to recast itself as a "nonnal" party in Turkish politics. It 
has avoided any outward display of Islamism-indeed, its official party pro gram 
makes no mention of Islam, focusing instead on human happiness, love, 
compassion, and social justice (see Saadet Partisi website, http://www.sp.org.tr). 
It also explicitly accepts the principle of laicism. Still, it is widely recognized as 
working within the mold of past Islamist parties, particularly given that the 
moderates have aIl moved out of the party. Its calI for greater compassion and 
love are seen as only contemporary manifestations of the "moral development" 
pro gram of the MNP and MSP. It has lost the power of fonner Erbakan parties, 
gamering only 2.5% of the vote in the 2002 elections, not enough to pass the 10% 
threshold required for membership in parliament. The AKP-the first Islamist 
party not led by Erbakan-has come to represent the Islamist agenda in politics, 
effectively ending the relevance of Erbakan and his ideas to national politics. 
Erbakan's Domestic Priorities 
Given that Erbakan's devotion to Islamic ideals and policies was never 
diluted over the years, despite repeated efforts by the military to shut his parties 
down and continued waming signs from many laicists during Refah' s tenure, we 
can successfully argue that Erbakan is an ideological individual with a powerful 
emotional attachment to Islam. The repeated attempts to for an Islamist political is 
strong evidence of his commitment to Islam and its role in public life. We can 
gain a better understanding of this categorization by looking at his policies, not 
only toward the EU but also on domestic issues. This will help us c1assify him as 
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ideological separate from an examination only of the foreign policy we are trying 
to explain. 
It is considered normal for Turkish political parties to fill the govemment 
agencies they come to control when they attain power with sympathizers and 
supporters and pursue policies with their own interests in mind (see Sayan 2002). 
The National Salvation Party was no exception (the National Order Party did not 
exist long enough to enter govemment). What is different is the particular changes 
the MSP was interested in. When it joined a series of coalition govemments in the 
1970s, the MNP concentrated especially on education, long seen as a key barrier 
imposed by the laicist authorities in order to prevent the inculcation of religion 
into young students. The MSP succeeded in passing legislation that put the 
religious (imam-hatip) schools on par with secular schools, and that allowed 
graduates from these programs to attend university (Narli 1999, 39). This would 
allow those instilled (critics would say indoctrinated) with Islamic values and 
beliefs to go on to higher education and, beyond that, play more significant roles 
in society, economy, and polity. 
But the most effective means of judging Erbakan's domestic priorities is 
by examining the domestic policies of the Welfare Party. This is because it was 
the largest and best organized to date of aU the Islamist parties, and more 
importantly it formed the senior partner in a coalition govemment from the end of 
June 1996 to June 1997; as such, it was in an ideal position to translate its ideas 
about Islam into concrete policies. 
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At first Erbakan was careful to avoid the impression that he and his party 
were interested solely in advancing the Islamist agenda. At his press conference 
the day after announcing the formation of the govemment, Erbakan stressed his 
commitment to Kemalism, noting of the govemment coalition that "'[t]he 
essential basis of the partnership is that the Turkish Republic is a democratic, 
secular and social state based on law and the princip les of Ataturk " , while 
emphasizing that Turkey would continue its strong relations with the West 
(Turkish Daily News 30 June 1996). At the party's first convention since taking 
office, there were no public displays of religion and Erbakan and others were 
careful to heap praise on Atatürk and emphasize their commitment to secularism 
(see Turkish Probe 18 October 1996). 
But by December 1996 this caution had dissipated, as a result of both his 
own increasing confidence and criticism from harder-line elements in the party 
that he was not doing enough for the cause. Without changing the underlying 
legal structures, he engaged in a series of efforts to slip the practice of Islam more 
directly into the public sphere. He proposed amending the work hours of 
govemment employees to make it easier for them to observe the Ramazan fast; on 
Il January 1997 he hosted a meal in the prime minister's office with leaders from 
various religious sects (which also angered the staunchly secular Turkish Jurists 
Association); and there were reports that he was considering allowing for 
Supreme Military Council4 decisions to be appealed to civilian courts, as a way of 
getting around the expulsion of alleged Islamist officers (Jenkins 2001, 61). He 
further public1y mused about building a mosque in Istanbul's Taksim Square 
4 The (primarily) military body that decides on promotions in and expulsions from the military. 
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(Turkish Daily News 30 January 1997), the site of several laicist monuments. 
Although he had made this suggestion two years earlier, and in fact other laicist 
parties had been promising it for several years already-to meet the area's 
growing traditional community' s needs-what made it relevant this time was that 
it came on the heels of Erbakan's suggestion that the Islamists would "re-
conquer" Istanbul (ibid.). 5 
At the same time, a senes of developments occurred that, while not 
completely under Erbakan's control or direction, nonetheless indicate the general 
direction of his preferences. There was an increase of incidents during Ramazan 
in which people who were smoking and drinking in public were attacked (Zürcher 
1998, 304). Radicals within the party often shifted non-Islamist civil servants, 
inc1uding judges, to rural areas or to unpleasant, even unnecessary, jobs in order 
to induce early retirement (see White 2002, 135). In poorer areas, where less 
attention was paid by the media and the state, Islamist activists c10sed down 
libraries and educational centers and replaced them with Koranic courses, while 
others harassed, intimidated, or interrupted non-Islamist activities and 
organizations until they either c10sed or move elsewhere (ibid., 136). Finally, in 
what has often been c1assified as the beginning of the end of the Re/ah 
government, on 31 J anuary 1997 the RP mayor of Sincan hosted the Iranian 
ambassador for a "Jerusalem night" rally. The ambassador gave a speech praising 
Islamic government, while signs supporting the Palestinian terrorist group Ramas 
were displayed. When the Re/ah Justice Minister visited the mayor in prison after 
5 For further examples, see Shmuelevitz (1999, 12-16). 
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the military arrested him, it was seen as a signal of support for the mayor's 
actions. 
The Dependent Variable: 
Erbakan's Policy Toward the European Union 
Having examined Erbakan's ideas about Islam and his domestic political 
priorities, we can conc1ude that his affective attachment to Islam and what he 
considered it meant for Turkey helps his categorization as ideological. In this way 
we have avoided a tautological reasoning whereby we judge his categorization 
based on his policy toward the EU-the very dependent variable we are trying to 
explain. We can now turn to an examination ofthis policy. 
Erbakan's foreign policy agenda reflected his domestic ideas and 
preferences. He saw the Western world as at best irre1evant to Turkey, at worst a 
purposeful contributor to its dec1ine. In 1977 he described the EU as a three-story 
building: on the top floor were the Zionist capitalists, running everything; in the 
middle were the Europeans, who served the Zionists; and at the bottom floor were 
the lackeys and others, which is where he argued Europe wanted to place Turkey 
(Ahmad 1977, 382-383; Robins 2003, 146). 
Under his guidance, Refah took decidedly anti-Western positions. 
Although in his inaugural press conference Erbakan was careful to stress that 
Turkey would continue its strong relations with Europe, he also noted that Turkey 
would strengthen its relations with the Islamic world (Turkish Daily News 30 June 
1996). The party public1y dec1ared that "the weakness and backwardness of the 
Islamic society is not due to Islam but to Western domination of Muslims" (Ayata 
1996, 54), which caused the "degeneration of morals in society" and that if 
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/ ' society lived according to Islamist principles, things would get better (Turan 
1994, 46). Refah also displayed anti-Israel and anti-Zionist arguments that 
bordered on anti-Semitism (Kiri9Çi 1997, 7), which although not directly 
concerning the EU nonetheless indicate his general worldview. As early as 
J anuary 1970, Erbakan stated that the MNP was against Freemasons, 
Communists, and Zionists, and stood for promotion of stronger moral values in 
society, implying that these ideologies were immoral (Poulton 1997, 176). He had 
a "deeply held belief' that a Jewish conspiracy to control the world existed and 
had suckered Europe into it (Nicole and Hugh Pope 1997, 321). The RP's official 
daily, after it forrned the govemment in 1996, published daily reports asserting 
that Israel was backing terrorism within Turkey, and argued that aU ties to the 
J ewish state had to be severed (Bengio 2004, 11 0). He further told a private 
meeting in the middle of 1996 that he did not like the Jews, and later told others 
that he had trouble coming to terrns with the sight of the Israeli flag (see Ma 'ariv 
14 August 1996). 
Erbakan did not engage in any foreign policies to attack or underrnine 
Europe. Instead, despite evidence of the growing importance of Europe for 
Turkish economy activity, particularly trade, he chose to neglect it and direct his 
priorities and efforts toward the Islamic world-the diarnetricaUy opposite 
manifestation of a Western orientation that he had long disparaged (see Robins 
2003, 149-159 for a concise description).6 Ties with the Islamic world were 
6 It has been argued that the coalition government engaged in a division of labor, with Deputy 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller given responsibility for the economy and 
Europe, while Erbakan concentrated on the Islamic world. But this is not satisfactory: Erbakan 
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highlighted as being necessary for both Turkish development and Turkish identity 
(see, for example, Turkish Daily News 12 August 1996; 17 August 1996). In 
1994, Erbakan argued that a new Islamic world order should be created, 
consisting of an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic NATO, an Islamic UNICEF, 
and an Islarnic common market and currency (see Robins 1997, 89). 
Erbakan also displayed an affinity for radical Islamic regirnes and 
organizations. During Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's one-day visit to 
Turkey in July 1996, Erbakan told Mubarak that the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, elements of which have been engaged in a long, violent struggle 
against the regime, was not so bad as made out to be and that Cairo should 
reconcile itself with the Brotherhood (Turkish Daily News 16 July 1996).7 His 
first trip abroad in August 1996 was a ten-day visit focused on boosting economic 
ties to Asia, to Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Singapore-the first four 
are among the most populous Muslim states in the world and the first three 
inc1ude sorne of its most fundamentalist elements. In Iran Erbakan signed a $23 
billion, 23-year deal for the supply of Iranian natural gas to Turkey.8 
That same month he sent emissaries to Iraq to strengthen ties between the 
two states. In October Erbakan went to Africa, visiting Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria. 
Again, the first two are Islamic states while the last has a substantial Muslim 
was the prime minister and so had final sayon the direction of Turkish policy, both because of his 
office and his personality. 
7 Mubarak's reply, somewhat embarrassing to Erbakan, was that if the prime minister liked the 
Brotherhood so much he could have them in Turkey. 
8 It should be noted that the agreement had been in negotiations for sorne years before, and that 
Erbakan was merely finalizing the efforts of laicist leaders before him. Still, the fact that the deal 
came just days after the US enacted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (to punish foreign companies 
that invested over $40 million in these countries' energy sections) was taken by many as 
purposeful. 
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population, among whom elements have installed strict Islamic laws to regulate 
social behavior.9 In December, Erbakan public1y mused that Turkey and Iran 
might cooperate in the defense industry field (though both the Foreign Ministry 
and the arrny blocked any movement toward this end). Finally, Erbakan pushed 
for the establishment of the D-8, a group of eight developing Muslim states, as a 
new economic and power bloc in international affairs; his initial preference to 
refer to it as the M-8 (Muslim Eight) provides an indication of his ultimate 
intention (Turkish Daily News 23 October 1996). 
This examination has illustrated the ideological nature of Erbakan' s belief 
structures, and the consequent impact it had on his foreign policy toward the EU. 
He did not try to actively harrn Turkish-EU relations, but his concentration on the 
Islamic world was both a sign of where he believed Turkey' s true interests and 
affiliations lay, and an indication of what he thought of Europe and its place on 
Turkey's foreign policy agenda. This international orientation stemmed directly 
from his staunch belief in Islam as the only proper guiding framework for Turkey, 
in both its domestic and international contexts. Because he was prime minister, 
Erbakan was able to shunt Europe aside in favour of the Muslim world. The 
constraints on the power of the prime minister to act independently were ignored. 
In the end they could not be overcome, and Erbakan was eased out of office 
amidst a clampdown on the Islamist movement in general. But the evident nature 
9 The Libyan trip, against the advice of both Çil1er and AbduUuh Gül, a leading moderate within 
Refah, was widely perceived as a disaster, as Erbakan was forced to endure a public harangue by 
Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi on Turkey's Kurdish policies (inc1uding his caUs for an 
independent Kurdish homeland) and its relationship with the West and Israel (see Robins 2003, 
158-159). (A visit to Sudan during this trip was exc1uded on the insistent advice of Gül and the 
foreign rninistry.) 
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of these constraints was not enough to push Erbakan to change his foreign 
policies. His affective attachment to Islam and what it could do for Turkey were 
too strong 
But under a different Islamist prime minister, who held different ideas 
about the benefits and necessity of EU membership, that policy changed. The next 
section discusses the new prime minister' s own belief structures, and how this 
impacted on his foreign policy. This will help us understand why there was a 
variation in Turkish policy toward EU affiliation. 
The Independent Variable: Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
Like Erbakan, Erdogan's belief structures are based on a commitment to 
Islamism. Yet, where Erbakan's Islamism retained a rigid, ideological structure 
based on the emotional appeal of Islam, Erdogan was adaptable enough that he 
could first shift sorne of the priorities of an Islamist agenda, and second that he 
could pursue this agenda within the acknowledged institutional constraints in the 
Turkish foreign policymaking arena. Emotion played less of a role in his 
information-processing, and therefore he was able to be more flexible in his 
foreign policies. 
Paradoxically, Erdogan's religious devotion was evident from the 
beginning. In primary school he was the only student to volunteer when the 
headmaster once called on students to pray (Economist 18 December 2004, 74). 
Erdogan was later enrolled in an imam-hatip (prayer-Ieader and preacher) school. 
Here his piety was nurtured and strengthened; a good soccer player, he later 
refused to shave off his beard (considered a sign of a devout Muslim) when 
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offered a spot on one of the country's top team with a policy of hiring clean-
shaven players only (Mango 2004, 108-109). Like Erbakan, he did not pursue a 
religious career, but obtained a degree in accounting and management at Marmara 
University. But his Islamist sympathies were expressed in other avenues: He was 
a member of the MNP's youth branch-at a time when the party was much more 
openly Islamist in its princip les and preferences-and participated in the 
ideological clashes of the 1970s (Mango 2004, 109). Several observers have noted 
that Erbakan was in many ways a hero for Erdogan when he began his work in the 
Islamist political parties, joining the RP in 1983, going so far as to name one of 
his sons after Erbakan (Heper and Tokta~ 2003, 162). 
Erdogan is considered to have long had two mam goals: "to gam 
recognition for the repressed culture of Muslim believers in Turkey, and to 
advance their social status" (Mango 2004, 109). The former especially reflects 
Erdogan's commitment to Islamist principles, and he is often thought of as having 
been quite ideological before the split in Fazilet. It is reported by those who have 
worked with Erdogan as mayor of Istanbul that he has said that "women should 
try first to find fulfilment in family life, and, failing that, should confine 
themselves to voluntary work for the party" (Nicole and Hugh Pope 1997, 327). 
As mayor he also banned alcohol in city cafes. Ozbudun cites him as saying, in 
July 1996, that democracy was not a goal, but an instrument for Welfare (2000, 
88). 
And yet Erdogan is an adaptable individual, not ideological like his 
predecessor. The different personal experiences of Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak 
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Shamir help us better understand why one was adaptable and the other 
ideological. But this is less clear in the case of Erdogan and Erbakan. Both grew 
up feeling devout, and yet one proved to be less ideological about it. We cannot 
identify the specifie internaI causal mechanisms that prompted Erdogan to be 
more adaptable; this illustrates the inherent difficult in any study of individuals. 
Since we cannot get inside his head, we cannot point to any specifie genetic or 
physical traits that made him pragmatic rather than rigid. But we can point to a 
cognitive process that prompted him to become adaptable: the crackdown by the 
military on the Islamists after the 1997 "soft coup." In this way we can still 
identify the learning process Erdogan went through on issues other than policy 
toward the EU, which means we can categorize him as adaptable apart from the 
dependent variable. 
Political Party Focus 
The AKP won the 2002 elections with 34.2% of the vote and, based on the 
electoral system, 363 seats in the 550-seat GNA-making it the first party since 
1987 to earn an outright majority and the ability to form a govemment alone. 
(Only one other party passed the required threshold for representation in the 
GNA.) Portraying itself as socially conservative and economically lib eral , the 
AKP's pro gram is a blend of Westernism, nationalism, and (an underlying) 
Islamism (Yavuz 2003, 258). Erdogan himself has referred to the party as being 
of a "conservative democratic" nature (Office of the Prime Minister 2003). 
From the beginning Erdogan was careful not to present his party and 
govemment as anti-Kemalist or pro-Islamist, but as pro-Turkey; and unlike 
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Erbakan in 1996-1997, Erdogan maintained this distinction. In presenting his 
government's program in March 2003, Erdogan began by praising both Atatürk 
for his contributions to Turkey and the military for their victory at Çanakkale 
during World War One, and stressed that the legitimacy for any govemment in 
Turkey cornes from the Constitution, implying recognition of its entrenched 
'laicist order. He also asserted that his government "views democratic culture as 
the main principle of its policy" (Office of the Prime Minister 2003). The AKP' s 
platform inc1udes the stipulation that secularism is a pre-requisite for democracy 
(http://www.akparti.org.tr). Erdogan has repeatedly pledged allegiance to the 
laicist state and Atatürk's vision for Turkey, stressing that the party does not have 
an Islamic agenda (Turkish Daily News 5 November 2002). Although he views 
Kemalism as a religion and therefore a constraint on freedom of expression, 
Erdogan supports secularism (as the separation of religion and state) and has said 
that for him the Seriat is about maintaining a just society, rather than a 
fundamentalist structure based on seripture (White 2002, 139). 
The difference in the foei of Erbakan's and Erdogan's political parties can 
be found clearlY in their party programs. Where the SP has couched its pro gram in 
language designed to reflect core Islamic values (happiness, love, compassion), 
the AKP's platform explieitly focuses on the individual rights and freedoms 
associated with democracy and political pluralism (see the party website, 
http://www.akparti.org.tr).This is aU the more striking when we consider the 
results of a poU taken just after the elections: of AKP voters, 81 % saw themselves 
as Muslims first and Turks second, and 60% said that religious values had 
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precedence over "secular" values such as democracy and human rights (J enkins 
2003,55). 
Erdogan's Domestic Priorities 
The AKP's focus is reflected III the priority Erdogan has placed on 
expending most of his and the governrnent' s energy on reforming Turkey' s legal 
and political structures, to make them less authoritarian and reduce the influence 
of non-elected state actors (such as the military) in policyrnaking. This has left it 
both with little time and less interest in concentrating on restructuring Turkey 
along Islamist lines. 
First, Erdogan has made a concerted effort (even in the face of sorne 
misgivings of party members) not to disrupt the national consensus on sensitive 
social issues. Before the 2002 election, for example, the Ecevit governrnent had 
passed as part of a series of constitutional amendments a civil code that increased 
the status of women in society, giving aU "spouses" equal rights over property, 
the ability to petition for divorce or alimony, and legislating that wives can keep 
their maiden names. Erdogan has made no attempt to change this law, despite the 
evident unhappiness of many Islamists. On a more contentious issue, although he 
had campaigned partly on the headscarf issue, Erdogan softened his rhetoric soon 
after the election, refusing to set a date by which he would try and overtum the 
ban on headscarves in public buildings, announcing that his wife (who does wear 
the headscarf) would not accompany him into public spaces, and even asserting 
that he would not push for a ban in aU public places (Turkish Daily News 8 
November 2002). 
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At the same time, despite the inevitability of a clash between the staunchly 
Kemalist TSK and an Islamist party, Erdogan has gone out of his way to avoid 
antagonizing the military, even going so far as to criticize AKP parliamentarians 
in favor of the TSK (see Heper 2005, 222-223 for examples). This has not 
altogether prevented friction between the AKP and the armed forces, who 
continue to see any Isiamist-rooted party as dangerous to the Kemalist order,10 but 
it highlights the efforts on the part of Erdogan to avoid antagonizing the military 
by engaging in activities that would be deemed too religious by the army. 
Second, the AKP has enacted in rapid succession a series of 
"Harmonization packages" and other reforms required by accession agreements 
with the EU. ll Under Erdogan's guidance, the AKP government has passed four 
Harmonization packages (December 2002, January 2003, and July 2003) and a 
reformed press law (June 2004).12 Changes in the first two packages include 
removing provisions for banning politicians and c10sing poiiticai parties, 
strengthening punishment for those who commit torture, and greater protection 
and options for those being tried for criminai activities. The third package focused 
mostly on providing for more cultural rights for Kurds, while the Iast set de aIt 
primariIy with reducing the military' s influence in politics and allowing greater 
organizational freedom of association and expression. The government aiso 
passed in September 2004 a new penal code with sweepi.ng changes. Altogether it 
10 See, for examples, The Economist (3 May 2003, 55; 14 June 2003, 48); Heper (2005, 225-226); 
and Jenkins (2003, 56). 
11 Previous packages adopted by non-Islamist governments were passed in October 2001 and 
February 2002. For a good discussion of sorne of the legislative changes Turkey has made 
regarding human and civil rights, see Hale (2003). 
12 For complete details of these changes, see the website of the Office of the Prime Minister, 
Directorate General of Press and Information, available at: http://www.byegm.gov.tr. 
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has passed over 500 laws-mostly to reform older laws-in the short time it has 
been in power. 
The Dependent Variable: 
Erdogan's Policy toward the European Union 
The above discussion allows us to categorize Erdogan as adaptable. He 
was flexible enough in the domestic political arena that we can conclude he did 
not hold to such a powerful affective attachment to Islam that he could not 
conceive of changing policy to achieve his objectives. We tum now to an 
examination ofhow this adaptability applies to his foreign policy toward the EU. 
In foreign policy terms Erdogan and the AKP under his leadership have 
stressed that it will continue Turkey's efforts to obtain EU membership. Although 
Erbakan and the RP also paid lip service to the notion that Turkey would retain 
good relations with the West, Erdogan and his associates have explicitly and 
repeatedly pledged not only that such good relations would continue, but also that 
Turkey under his leadership would actively ensure that they improve. The most 
important of these pledges is the decision to enthusiastically and vigorously lobby 
for entry into the EU. 
In a post-election interview, Abdullah Gül, a leader of the AKP and a 
close colleague of Erdogan, said that the AKP govemment would not let its 
foreign policy be clouded by religious convictions, and that entry into the EU 
remained a priority (Turkish Daily News 8 November 2002). In presenting his 
govemment to the GNA, Erdogan specified that since Turkey is "a part of the 
European political values system," attaining membership in the EU would be 
"[o]ne of the foremost objectives" of the AKP govemment." Turkey, he 
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concluded, has a "rightful place" in Europe (Office of the Prime Minister 2003). 
In March 2003, Kemal UnakItan, the AKP's finance minister, told a party meeting 
that "You must realize that our way leads to Europe .... Turkey's place is in the 
European Union" (cited Mango 2004, 234). And in May 2005, after French voters 
rejected the proposed EU constitution and concems arose over the potential 
electoral defeat of the Social-Democrat govemment in Germany, Erdogan stuck 
by his decision to appoint a chief negotiator for the upcoming talks scheduled for 
October, and specifically stated that: "Those who are seeking to impede this 
process [beginning of accession negotiations] are wasting their energy .... We will 
probably face problems, but they will never weaken Turkey's basic objective, 
which is full membership in the European Union" (AFX News, at Forbes.com 24 
May 2005). 
More specifically, however, Erdogan began to press European leaders to 
support an immediate announcement of a date for the commencement of 
accession talks, traveling throughout the EU even though he was not yet the head 
of the AKP or the govemment. In fact, Europe was Erdogan's first foreign visit 
after the AKP victory, in sharp contrast to the places Erbakan went t~. In 
December 2002, Erdogan finally accompli shed something no laicist govemment 
in Turkey had ever come close t~: the European Council summit in Copenhagen 
decided that Turkey had fulfilled enough of the Copenhagen criteria for 
membership, and accession negotiations would begin "without delay" (European 
Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency 2002, 5). To this end, 
Erdogan and his deputies immediately and actively again began pushing, this time 
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for a set date on which to begin official accession negotiations. These efforts paid 
off: at the European Council summit in Brussels in December 2004, a date was 
finally established-3 October 2005. This represents an historie achievement for 
any Turkish government, no less an Islamist one, and Erdogan's efforts in this 
regard cannot be under-emphasized. 
Erdogan's Leaming Process 
As noted above, Erdogan was at the beginning as staunch an Islamist as 
Erbakan. He wanted to see Islam play a greater-if not predominant-role in 
Turkish society and public life, and he gave little consideration to Europe as an 
important element in Turkey' s foreign policy agenda. However, by the spring of 
1997, he had begun to think differently about both these things, eventually 
coming to a completely opposite conclusion regarding the EU and how important 
it was for Turkey to become a member of it. The culmination of this realization 
was Erdogan's active lobbying efforts to convince EU members that Turkey 
should be admitted, and his pursuit of domestic legal and political reforms to 
bring Turkey in line with EU standards. The key to explaining this variation in 
foreign policy between two Islamist prime ministers is the leaming process 
Erdogan underwent. 13 
The key factor in Erdogan's leaming process was the 28 February process. 
This convinced him that butting heads with the Kemalists only hurt the Islamists 
in the end, and that EU membership would actually protect the Islamists from the 
Kemalists. A third element underlining his leaming process was his awareness 
\3 For a similar reeent argument on the Islamist movement as a whole, see Meeham (2004). 
Meeham focuses on the iteration involved in this process over time. 
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~ .. that the AKP's support did not aU come from staunch Islamists, but from others 
who wanted the party to concentrate on improving socio-economic conditions for 
the country. These developments persuaded Erdogan that membership would be 
good for Turkey and good for Islam in Turkey, and that he should actively pursue 
such an outcome. 
As in the case of Shamir, Erbakan was unable to undergo a leaming 
process that taught him EU membership should be a priority for Turkey. There is 
no doubt that the FP, under Erbakan's covert leadership, 1eamed its 1essons from 
the shock of the 1996 coup; this was reflected in its rhetoric. But with its split into 
a conservative and a moderate party, it became obvious that the AKP was most 
committed to the implementation of the democracy rhetoric. 14 The affective 
appea1 of Islam was so great for Erbakan that he cou1d not conceive of 
compromising on it even to achieve his objectives. 
At the same time, there is no doubt that Erbakan himse1f discovered, even 
during his short tenure, that constraints prevented him from engaging 
who1ehearted1y in his preferred po1icies (see Robins 1997). But this was not a 
1eaming process, because when Erbakan did temper his actions, it was because he 
was prevented from doing so, not because he learned not to. In contrast, Erdogan 
became known as pragmatist in the aftermath of the 28 February process. One 
observer commented that although he has retained his Is1amic beliefs, he does not 
re1y on dogma to guide his po1icymaking (White, 2002: 138-139). Sorne, in fact, 
14 Referring to Erbakan and the RF, Toprak writes: "Whenever Erbakan or other leaders discussed 
the question of democratization in Turkey, it became increasingly clear that what they understood 
from liberal democracy was greater freedom to the Islamists, a sectarian understanding that was 
solely confined to issues of concem for the party's following" (2005, 175). 
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have argued that Erdogan has for a long time been a moderate and not interested 
in imposing a strict form ofIslam on others (e.g., Heper and Tokta~ 2003).15 
The 28 February process refers to a campaign orchestrated by the military 
to increase pressure on Erbakan and the RP until the government finaUy feU 
(often called a "soft coup"), while easing out of political, economic, and 
educational life those suspected of Islamist tendencies and continuing even after 
the fall of the coalition. 16 At the 28 February 1997 meeting of the National 
Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi-MGK), the army presented Erbakan 
with a list of eighteen directives and demanded that he implement them. The 
document essentially declared that Islamic fundamentalism (irtica) was the main 
internaI security threat to Turkey, even above the Kurdish separatist menace. 17 
Erbakan eventuaUy signed the implementation <?rder but continued to avoid 
applying them in practice. In response the military began organizing various 
sectors of society against the RP-led government, including the press, the legal 
and business community, trade unions, women's groups, the bureaucracy, and 
other political parties. 
15 It should be noted that many analysts have questioned the sincerity of Erdogan's (and the 
AKP's) shift (è.g., Tachau 2002; Robins 2003, 148). But this eamestness is not necessary for a 
leaming process to occur. As with Rabin, who continued until his murder to believe that Yasser 
Arafat and the PLO were not fully committed to accepting Israel as a normal state in the region but 
yet still negotiated directly with both, Erdogan has come to accept that EU membership is 
instrumental for his own ultimate goals-greater freedom for Islam in Turkey. 
16 There seems to be disagreement over the role of the military in pushing for the dissolution of 
Refah: Yavuz (2003, 247) writes that the military did put pressure on the Constitutional Court to 
ban the party, while Jenkins (2001, 54) says the army played no part in the prosecution or closure 
of the RP. Toprak (2005) argues that widespread public oppositionto Erbakan and the Refah 
govemment would likely have forced out the Islamists regardless of military intervention. This is 
supported by Atacan, who points to the cooperation of the major industrialists, labor, and 
tradespeople in actively opposing the govemment (2005,293). 
17 For the complete list of the directives, see Yavuz (2003, 275-276). 
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Vnder intense and continuous pressure, Erbakan finally resigned on 18 
June 1997, hoping to re-form the govemment with his deputy, Çiller, as prime 
minister and Erbakan in second place. Instead, the mandate to form the next 
govemment was given to another party and Erbakan's govemment was ended. 
But the process continued: Refah was taken to the Constitutional Court by the 
chief prosecutor, Vural Savas (known to be a hard-line Kemalist) in May 1997. 
The Court closed down the RF on 16 January 1998, then banned Erbakan and six 
other Refah leaders (including Erdogan) from politics for five years, for 
contravening Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and engaging in anti-secular 
activities. 
The 28 Pebruary process had two effects on Erdogan. Pirst, he came to the 
realization that pushing too hard against entrenched Kemalist interests (by 
aggressively advocating for a greater role for Islam in public life) would rebound 
negatively on the AKP. Struggling against them was futile, if not counter-
productive, meant a diversion of resources toward fighting and not serious 
policymaking, and stirred the military to action. The 28 Pebruary process 
demonstrated the lengths to which the army would go to suppress Islamism: 
military leaders even visited former extremist left-wingers, who had been jailed 
and even tortured in the wake of the 1980 coup, for support against the Islamists 
(Jenkins 2001, 62-63). According to Mango, after Erdogan was jailed (though for 
four months only) and lost his job as Istanbul mayor under Kemalist pressure, 
sorne of ms "rough edges" were rubbed off and he leamed "a lesson in prudence" 
(2004, 110). Erdogan himself said after serving his jail sentence that he would no 
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longer use religious symbols in politics (see Heper and Tokta~ 2003, 175-176). 
Commenting in August 2001 on what Islam meant for him, he specified that 
"[m]y reference is to Islam at a personallevel. Political speaking, my reference is 
the constitution and democratic principles" (cited in Heper and Tokta~ 2003, 170). 
Second, and perhaps most important, Erdogan came to understand and 
accept that membership in the EU would be good for Islam in Turkey. The notion 
previously prominent among the Islamists-that Turkey was too different from 
Europe to be inc1uded in it-was no longer acceptable, viable, or even relevant. 18 
Instead, Erdogan realized that Islamist sentiments could be better protected within 
the EU, since its provisions on religious and other freedoms guaranteed that a 
person could not be prosecuted for advocating an Islamist agenda. At the same 
time, Turkish entry would force the TSK to conform to patterns of civil-military 
relations standard to all EU member-states-that is, full civilian control over the 
army. Outside the EU there was nothing to stop the military from exercising its 
formaI and informaI power over decision-making. Inside the EU, its role would 
have to be severely circumscribed. 
Underlying the above two realizations, but perhaps less importantly, is a 
third factor contributing to Erdogan's learning process. This is his recognition that 
many ofthe AKP's supporters voted for the party not for ideological motivations, 
but for practical socio-economic concerns. 19 The loss of support for the center-
18 Abdullah Gül, who works c10sely with Erdogan, once said that '''our opposition to the European 
Union is based on the ide a that we are from a different culture, we have a different identity and a 
different economic structure than European countries'" (cited in Robins 1997,86). 
19 Estimates that about 25% of eligible voters did not vote at all (due to spoiled or uncast ballots) 
strengthens this realization; as weIl, the fact that all but two parties failed to pass the 10% 
threshold means that about 46% of votes were "wasted" on non-AKP parties (see Oze12003, 82). 
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right parties, traditionally accounting for about 60% of the vote, meant an increase 
in support for the AKP. This could only indicate unhappiness with these other 
parties (Ayata 2004, 249). Islamic businesses and the growing Islamic middle 
class (i.e., those who with conservative, traditional, or more fundamentalist 
leanings) have also come to appreciate the benefits for the Turkish economy of 
strong ties to Europe (Ayat a, 2004: 264-266, 270). Moreover, Yavuz (2003) 
argues that the Islamist movement in general has become less radical and more 
committed to "secularization"-that is, working within Western-style political 
and economic frameworks. Together, these meant that AKP support relied on 
meeting its voters' needs, which was not more religion but more economic 
security. 
Erdogan's pragmatism thus underlay his learning process. He came to the 
conclusion that, first, pursuing an Islamist agenda in Turkey would backfire on 
the Islamists themselves, because the Kemalists were resolutely against allowing 
this to happen and because the public was more interested in improving its socio-
economic conditions. Second, Erdogan came to understand that a modified 
Islamist agenda-that is, one that did not threaten to overturn the existing laicist 
political and social structures of Turkey but that did allow for greater acceptance 
of Islam in public life-would be better served through the EU. A European 
orientation was not the bogeyman that Erbakan had long believed it to be, and in 
fact could be helpful for the Islamists. He did not see the EU as a threat to 
Turkey's economic development or cultural independence, as Erbakan had, but 
rather as an instrument for advancing Turkey' s cultural and economic 
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development by shielding Islam from the Kemalists. Without an emotional 
attachment to Islam, Erdogan could think more pragmatically about how to 
protect Islam in Turkey. 
Summary 
This analysis leads us to the same conclusion reached in Chapter 5: that 
the role of the relevant individual leaders is the most convincing explanation for 
foreign policy variation in the case study examined here. Both Erbakan and 
Erdogan had the option of EU membership as a strategie model before them: 
efforts to join the EU had been long-standing by then, particularly by the late 
1980s. Yet Erbakan' s ideological belief structures prevented him from accepting 
this option, while Erdogan's pragmatism encouraged him to do so. The idea of 
EU membership was attractive to Erdogan because of the shock of the ouster of 
Erbakan in 1997 and the 28 February process. These developments led him to 
conclude that a new policy of Islamism, one that would be less aggressive and 
less antagonistic to the Kemalists, was necessary, and that in foreign policy terms 
EU membership would actually benefit the Islamists rather than harm them. This 
is not to say that Erdogan gave up on implementing an Islamist agenda; but it was 
a much-modified agenda, and his ultimate framework still draws on Islam (Sufi 
Islam, in particular). His pragmatism is, therefore, used in service of his Islamist 
goals. But the important element here is that this pragmatism allowed him to try 
different policies to meet the same ulterior objectives. 
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For his part, Erbakan was simply unable to contemplate such a drastic 
shift in the Islamist outlook and agenda. His ideal of Islam colored his thinking on 
politics. He had long condemned the EU as an organization purposefully 
committed to undermining Turkey and preventing it from regaining its past 
magnificence (either because the Zionists controlled it or because it was an 
exclusive Christian club with no tolerance for an Islamic country). Moreover, his 
basic understanding of the importance of Islam for Turkey and its rootedness in 
Turkish culture and identity pu shed him to regard the Islamic world as the most 
appropriate locus for his foreign policy efforts. Turkey, he believed, would be 
better served by developing doser relations with this world at the expense of the 
West. Even though the option of EU membership was there (at least to try for it), 
he refused to adopt it. 
The decentralized nature of Turkish decision-making institutions is a 
critical element in this case study. Turkish prime minister do not have autonomy 
in foreign policymaking; they are constrained by other state actors, primarily the 
military, who limit the foreign policy agenda to Kemalist policies-in foreign 
policy, a Western orientation. In Erbakan's case, this certainty led to his downfall. 
Unhappy with his orientation toward the Islamic world, the laicist elements of the 
state, especially the army, engineered his ouster, banning him and his party from. 
politics. In Erdogan's case, it provided the key element in his learning process. 
Erdogan was determined not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor, and he was 
careful to avoid stirring the military' s retribution. In the end, this helped push him 
in the direction of the military's generally preferred path-better relations with 
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the EU and away from the Islamic world. Erdogan ended up conforming, in other 
words, to the ideas advocated by the constraining actors in Turkish policymaking. 
But only as à pragmatic individual could he do so. 
The Turkish case study also underlines the importance of institutions in 
any study of foreign policy. How a country's decision-making institutions are set 
up matters, since it prohibits or allows individual leaders to pursue their own 
personal ideas free from interference from other actors. This seems to highlight 
the necessary and sufficient nature of institutions, downplaying the role of the 
individual. But institutions are specified in this model as part of the conditions 
under which individuals matter. That is, institutions are important variables but, if 
we are examining foreign policy change, they cannot tell us why a particular 
decision (or variation) is made. After aIl, both Erbakan and Erdogan faced the 
same institutional constraints-yet one refused to follow the guidelines set out by 
these institutions, while the other accepted them. This difference led to a foreign 
policy variation among Islamist prime ministers. The difference therefore lies in 
the individuals themselves. Institutions might help us understand one individual's 
decisions, but are not helpful for comparing decision variation. 
An approach based on individuals and institutions provides the most 
effective account in explaining the foreign policy variation between the two 
Islamist prime ministers. Given their differing natures (ideological versus 
adaptable), one was unable to avoid clashing head-on with the laicist elements of 
the state, while the other was able to leam how to prevent such a collision and 
continue to advance his goals. 
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FinaIly, as in the Israeli case study, Erdogan as an adaptable individual 
differs from the definition of pragmatism offered by the widely accepted literature 
on the subject, as detailed in Chapter 3. Erdogan did actually risk the discontent of 
significant segments of the Islamist movement in going along with negotiations 
for EU membership-there was, after aIl, a second Islamist party that was much 
more conservative than the AKP. But Erdogan engaged in this policy even in light 
of this unhappiness-he was not interested therefore in gaining, as standard 
definitions of pragmatic individuals argue, assurances and agreement from others, 
but rather pursued his foreign policy because he genuinely believed it would best 
serve the Islamist movement, regardless of wh ether or not there was complete 
agreement on this. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion: Implications of the Model 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw out the general implications of the model 
and the empirical research that supports it. It does this by highlighting the 
contributions the model makes to our understanding of Israeli and Turkish foreign 
policy, foreign policy analysis (FP A) and International Relations (IR), and foreign 
policy variation. 
To this end, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section will 
compare the two case studies examined in the dissertation. Because the model is 
designed to explain foreign policy variation across a range of cases, a comparison 
of the examples can help shed more light on this. Understanding what is divergent 
in the two cases studies helps us understand how different historical and national 
circumstances can impact on the foreign policy decision-making process, as well 
as what elements of the model require further refinement and research. 
The next segment focuses on the implication of this research for studying 
Israeli and Turkish foreign policy. This is done by focusing on the theoretical and 
empirical gaps in such studies, which the dissertation addresses. The fifth part 
examines the implications of the model for theory development. It highlights the 
literatures that it builds upon, as well as its contributions to the study of foreign 
policy more generally. A crucial piece of this section is the importance of the 
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model in demonstrating the integration of Middle East studies into IR theory more 
generally. Typically considered too unique to be part of general theoretical 
construction, this section illustrates that this is a false understanding that prevents 
effective explanation. The final section will present the policy implications of the 
theory, namely the critical importance of understanding who the individual 
decision-makers are in one's adversaries, allies, and friends. 
Comparing the Case Studies 
A comparative discussion of the two cases analyzed in the dissertation is 
helpful because it illustrates the applicability of the model to different states and 
different foreign policy decisions. Comparison of the two examples also filters out 
any necessary further empirical and theoretical research and refinements. 
Despite the similarities between the two cases, as highlighted in Chapter 
One, there are significant differences between the case studies, as well. These 
include: the nature of decision-making institutions, coalition politics, and societal 
and elite agreement on the particular foreign policies examined here. The 
differences are perhaps more important than the similarities: if the model can be 
used to understand foreign policy variation in diverse states, its theoretical 
benefits are proved again and it is strengthened as a viable approach to foreign 
policyanalysis. 
The most important distinction in the two case studies is, of course, the 
nature of the decision-making institutions. Israel is a centralized polit y, while 
Turkey is de-centralized. That is, Israeli prime ministers have much greater 
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leeway in making poliey beeause they are not eonstrained by other actors, while 
Turkish prime ministers are restrained in their capacity for autonomous action by 
the Constitution and a host of state actors, including the civil service, the 
judieiary, and especially the armed forces. We can expect in such cases that 
individual decision-makers matter less. This is what happened with Erdogan, who 
adopted the idea of EU membership after leaming that the eonstraints on Islamist 
prime ministers were too great, and that membership would, in fact, benefit the 
Islamists in Turkey. As the evidenc'e shows, there was a range of altemate polieies 
available that previous decision-makers (Shamir and Erbakan) in fact chose, 
whieh means that Rabin and Erdogan's own (leamed) decisions were not the only 
available options. That individu al leaders matter in both centralized and de-
eentralized systems is thus emphasized, strengthening our understanding of the 
role of individual leaders and the theoretical importance of decision-making 
institutions. In sorne eountries (such as Turkey), other actors can constrain leaders 
and impact on their policymaking to a greater extent. Thus outcomes can be 
shaped not only directly by individuals, but also by institutions, which act on 
individuals. The conditions under which individuals operate matter, and are thus 
critical elements of a model of foreign policy change. 
A second difference ean be found in the nature of the govemmental 
coalitions in Israel and Turkey. In the former, at the time of Oslo, Rabin's 
govemment depended on the support of an unwieldy, as it later proved, coalition, 
with Labor balanced between the more left-wing Meretz and the religious and 
more right-wing Shas. This impacted to sorne degree on both the urgency and the 
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timing of making policy but not the final decision itself. In Turkey, in contrast, 
the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkznma Partisi-AKP) he Id a 
majority of seats in the Grand National Assembly and formed the government 
alone; it could thus make policy without having to worry about engaging in trade-
offs with other parties. But in both cases foreign policy was still decided on by the 
individualleaders; it was their decisions that mattered. 
A third disparity lies is the nature ofpublic support for the foreign policies 
examined here. Public opinion in Turkey, as well as the bulk of Turkish state and 
political actors, favored a foreign policy orientation toward Europe. Only the 
Islamists and, to a lesser degree the ultra-nationalists, disputed this attachment. In 
Israel, however, while public opinion was in general more supportive of peace 
efforts with the Palestinians than not, significant segments of the population as 
well as many members of the political elite disagreed with this support; moreover, 
the type of support (how much, what kind, etc.) was even more intensely debated. 
Improving relations with the Palestinians was widely supported, but a Palestinian 
state was not. Yet again, in both cases the model proves useful for explanation, 
since it was the individuals that mattered most and-regardless of public or elite 
support-that best account for the foreign policy variation. 
Areas for Further Research 
This part considers possible areas for further research, building on the 
theory presented in Chapter 3 and suggesting other theoretical and empirical 
avenues. The first point to note is that although case study methodology is widely 
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recognized as an important method for explanation and theory development 
(Eckstein 1975; Jervis 1985b; Rogowski 1995), falsifiability-considered the 
mark of strong theory-is demonstrated the more case studies there are in an 
evaluation of a theory (see King, Keohane, Verba 1994). Examining different 
examples from different regions will also strengthen the model by providing 
insight into how widely applicable the model is, and how similar or dissimilar 
cases need be in order to test the mode!. 
Second, the cases examined in this dissertation are from democratic 
polities. This has been to control for type of political system. These systems were 
also chosen because they provided harder tests for the model, since democracies 
are usually considered to be more open to numerous influences that di lute the 
importance of individual decision-makers. But we c1early need to study the 
foreign policy decisions of quasi-democracies, as weIl. The trend toward 
democratization across the world has affected every state differently; many of 
those that have been affected have become stuck in a middle-position between 
democracy and authoritarianism. The role of individuals in these systems is 
under-studied, and would provide a crucial testing ground for the model, as weIl 
as the study of foreign policy change more generaIly. 
Third, although the role of individuals is weIl developed in foreign policy 
analysis, it is less commonly used in International Relations, where broader 
patterns of state behavior are more often the subject of investigation. Because the 
variables in the model are not specific to the countries examined here, their 
applicability to other foreign policy variations is a particularly rich area of 
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potential future research. In addition, foreign policy variation occurs more often 
than one might think:, if one were only to examine the case studies examined in 
both FP A and IR. Still, if we are to highlight the importance of foreign policy 
variation to IR, we could distinguish important variations not only because of 
their contemporary significance for the country involved, but also for their impact 
on international politics-which constitutes the critical element in IR. Each of the 
potential empirical cases listed below includes the role of specific individual 
decision-makers who were central to the foreign policy change. This strengthens 
the argument for focusing on the impact of individuals in International Relations. 
Sorne examples of foreign policy variations with significant impact on 
international politics include: Russian foreign policy variation from Boris Yeltsin 
to Vladimir Putin. Putin, compared to Yeltsin, has displayed greater willingness to 
assert Russian political and economic interests in Asia and parts of Europe (any 
number of specific decisions from within this broad shift might be chosen). This 
has complicated American foreign policymaking, as the United States (US) has 
sought to claim and defend its own political-economic interests. A second good 
example is the transition from Spanish president l José Maria Aznar to José Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero. Aznar was a staunch backer of the American "war on 
terrorism" and supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq, including contributing troops 
to the campaign. His successor, Zapatero, made opposition to the war a central 
part of his campaign in the national elections in 2004; once elected he withdrew 
Spanish soldiers from Iraq. Zapatero has also oriented Spanish foreign policy 
1 The institution of the Spanish presidency is very similar to that of a prime minister; Spain is 
identified as a parliamentary democracy. 
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away from the close alliance with the US Aznar had eultivated, and more toward 
the United Nations and Latin America. 
Iranian foreign poliey has undergone signifieant change in reeent years. 
Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was widely reeognized as a 
moderate and a reformer, both by internaI and external observers. Although he did 
not preside over a dramatie turnaround in Iranian poliey toward the West and the 
region, he did injeet a major amount of moderation in Iranian foreign poliey 
toward Iran's former antagonists in the region and even toward the United States. 
His predeeessor in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has adopted a very different 
foreign poliey. Instead of trying to show the world a more moderate Iran willing 
to work with the international eommunity, he has alienated even many supporters 
in Europe by ealling the Holoeaust a lie and for the destruction of Israel, 
aggressively prompting Iran's nuclear pro gram, and antagonizing the US on a 
host of foreign poliey issues. The different polieies of the two leaders is quite 
clear. 
Finally, the seemingly sudden burst of Ameriean unilateralism under 
George W. Bush provides a final example, perhaps the most important in terms of 
its impact on international polities. The ideologieal framework that Bush operates 
under, eompared to the mueh more multilateral structure of his predeeessor Bill 
Clinton, has led to a serious shift in foreign poliey in a number of areas (though in 
sorne cases momentum toward a specifie poliey was already building under 
Clinton). The desire to assert American interests and protect them with military 
force (eneapsulated espeeially in the "war on terrorism") even in the face of 
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discomfort from allies, has clearly been the result ofBush's particular view of the 
world and America's place in it. 
It is important that foreign policy variation be explained by reference to 
different leaders. Of course this sounds self-evident-that different leaders will 
enact different policies. But this is not necessarily so-for a long time different 
Israeli leaders, from both Labor and Likud, did not change Israeli policy toward 
the PLO or a Palestinian state. At the same time, we must be careful how we 
utilize individuals in such a study. There are examples of foreign policy change 
occurring under a single leader-the case of Ariel Sharon and the disengagement 
from Gaza is perhaps the most dramatic recent example-but this raises problems 
of falsifiability for the model. If a leader can simply change her mind, we might 
say that she is capable of leaming. But if a leader appears to be ideological (as 
Sharon certainly was) and then changes his mind and therefore foreign policy, the 
theory cannot be falsified because we could simply argue that the leader was 
adaptable aU along. We would not be able to explain whether an individual is 
ideological or adaptable except according to his behavior on the relevant issue; 
but as pointed out in Chapter 3, this is not an acceptable method for constructing 
falsifiable theories. 
Whether this means that a single individual' s belief structures and foreign 
poli ci es can or cannot be studied as an explanation of foreign policy variation is 
unclear at this point; more research and development is clearly necessary. 2 The 
2 Lebow and Stein (1993) have argued that foreign pohcy change can be explained by reference to 
a single leader, by showing how US President Jimmy Carter genuinely changed his views on the 
Soviet Union. But as even they argue, a researcher might utihze any one ofmany cognitive models 
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~ ..• model as currently forrnulated is not designed to explain foreign policy variation 
according to a single leader, but since there are cases of one leader changing her 
mind and the state's foreign policy, this is a fruitful avenue for future 
consideration. 
Finally, there is no doubt that individuals are not always able to make new 
policy, no matter how centralized their decision-making institutions are. If there 
are specifie conditions that make an individual leader more important, these 
conditions should be identified and catalogued. Are there times when external 
forces or domestic politics constrain leaders from making a specifie foreign policy 
decision? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions at play during these 
moments? Further research on these questions would be useful for both the model 
and FP A more generally. 
Implications for Israeli and Turkish Foreign Policy Analysis 
The research conducted in this study contributes much to the study of 
Israeli and Turkish foreign policy. Although much has been written about both 
countries, there are sorne specific gaps in these literatures that this dissertation 
addresses. The most important element here is the widely considered uniqueness 
of both states. This exceptionalism, it has been assumed, prevents either country 
from being considered appropriate test cases for general IR theory development. 3 
to explain an individualleader's foreign policy change, making such an analyses too circular and 
difficult to falsify since we could only know if a leader had changed his mind after the fact. 
3 This is not the case in comparative politics, where Turkish case studies have been extensively 
used in the context of studies on civil-military relations. 
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In the case of Israel, the fact that it is the only J ewish state in the world, 
that it is an advanced industrial democracy in a region of underdeveloped 
authoritarianism, that it is part of the West yet has been engaged in a protracted 
conflict punctured by several wars, and that it utilizes a mix of socialist and 
capitalist economic structures has led many scholars to ignore it when 
constructing general theoretical and empirical conclusions for international 
politics. In Barnett's words, "[fJor many social scientists the Israeli case 
represents an unapproachable challenge" (1996b, 3). Sorne scholars have tried to 
redress this unnecessary situation (see for examples Barnett 1996a; Telhami and 
Barnett 2002; Yishai 1991), and this study continues this effort. 
In addition, there have been only a handful of theoretical works dealing 
with Israeli foreign policy over the last fi ft y years, which is surprising given the 
attention given to the country in the media, academia, and international politics, 
and its existence in a crucial and turbulent strategic region of the world. At the 
same time, while the Oslo Accords have been analyzed in numerous studies, 
rigorous theoretical analysis of the decision to sign them has been neglected in 
favor of overly descriptive efforts. 
In addition to these theoretical lacuna, this study contributes to the 
analysis of Israe1i foreign policy in two more ways: First, it shows that although 
Israeli foreign policy is often thought of as responsive to material forces-that is, 
security threats from surrounding Arab states and from Palestinians or domestic 
political pressures4-this is less often the case than is generally assumed. Second, 
4 Clive Jones has referred to this as an "axiom" in the study of Israeli foreign poliey (Jones 2002, 
115) 
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relatedly, it provides more insight into the nature of Israeli foreign policymaking 
by focusing on those who make such decisions, rather than on the structural or 
domestic political forces impinging on Israel. 
Turkey, too, has often been assumed to be too distinctive for general IR 
theory. It is identified as a Muslim-majority state that is staunchly secular, with a 
Constitutionally-mandated lack of role of Islam in public life-both at odds with 
other Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East. As a country directly 
between Europe and the Middle East, it is seen as geographically, culturally, and 
politically idiosyncratic, being pushed and pulled both East and West. At the same 
time, as William Hale argues, "[t]he process of foreign policy-making is one of 
the least well-studied aspects of Turkish foreign policy, and suggestions can often 
only be speculative, or illustrated by occasional examples" (2002, 205). In 
addition, the question of Turkey's membership in the EU, despite the critical 
significance of it for Turkey (touching as it does on virtually aIl aspects of its 
identity, economy, society, and polit y), is usually examined in purely descriptive 
terms, with little rigorous theoretical analysis. 
Attempts to explain Erdogan's decision have often focused on his own 
belief that EU membership wou Id be better for Turkey and for Islam in Turkey. 
But these have remained surface analyses, and moreover have been primarily 
descriptive in nature, with little in the way of more general conclusions drawn for 
the study of Turkish foreign policy or foreign policy variation in general. 
Empirically, the dissertation highlights two are as that require more 
attention in studying Turkish foreign policy. First, examinations of Turkish 
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foreign policy that have focused on domestic politics have highlighted the 
interaction between the military and civilian leaders and the impact of the military 
on decision-making. While the army cannot be exc1uded from analysis, the role of 
individual decision-makers is stronger than is often assumed. Individuals are 
relevant, and they can make foreign policy decisions. This has recently become 
more recognized in comparative political discussions (see Aknur 2005), but it has 
yet to trickle into FP A. Second, this necessary shift to individuals and their impact 
on policymaking necessitates a shift from comparative politics arguments (civil-
military relations) to models and approaches used more often in FP A. This study 
is part of this new trend. 
FinaHy, as this study has shown, both Turkey and Israel can contribute to 
IR and FP A theory building. Case study methodology, in particular, is one way to 
inc1ude these states. AH states have special historical and national circumstances 
that contribute to their foreign policy. We cannot assume these pressures emanate 
from the same sources, to the same degrees, or are identical over time. Yet if other 
countries can be used in the development of theory, then so should Israel and 
Turkey. The variables used in the model are not unique to these countries: 
individuals and institutions are present in aH polities. 
Implications for Theory 
My study also has several implications for theory development, in both 
FP A and IR. First, it builds on several literatures, extending our understanding in 
these fields and contributing to debates within them. This inc1udes: One, and most 
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importantly, it strengthens our understanding of the role of individuals in FPA 
and, where it is especially lacking, in IR and the conditions under which they 
matter. This strengthens the arguments made by those focusing on psychological 
aspects ofindividualleaders and their impact on foreign policy. 
Psychological analyses are often considered unique to the individual 
involved. My model illustrates that such approaches can be used more generally 
as well, by placing them on a continuum of ideological-adaptable. This builds on 
the work by others who have defined individuals similarly, but the model used 
here provides a more effective definition of these categories. Most significantly, 
the inclusion of affect in explaining foreign policy addresses a major gap in the 
FPA and IR literatures (see Crawford 2000). IR has generally borrowed concepts 
from psychology several years after they have already become popular in the 
latter. The study of affect and emotion on decision-making is already well 
developed in the psychology, decision research, and neural science literatures. My 
study brings these concepts into IR and thus provides original understandings of 
foreign policy decision-making. 
At the same time, because of the impact the specifie foreign policy 
variations analyzed here have on international politics more generally, my study 
answers the calI to advance our understanding of the role of individuals in IR, 
particularly in areas outside of the traditional IR purview such as the causes of 
war and alliance formation (see Byrnan and Pollack 2001). The changes in the 
Israeli-Palestinian relationship since 1993 have had a profound impact on regional 
politics, while the changes in Turkey' s domestic structures and foreign relations 
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stemming from its desire for EU membership have also have a critical impact on 
the region. In addition, any improvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will 
help us better understand protracted conflict elsewhere, while the c10ser Turkey 
cornes to joining the EU the better understanding we will have of the development 
of global institutions and the factors (material, ideational) that lead to their 
maintenance and expansion. 
Two, this study expands the literature on strong-weak states and their 
relations to society. The focus on institutional capacity in the context of 
policymaking, as presented here, underlines the importance of state capacity vis-
à-vis societal elements. Three, the importance of understanding national historie al 
development contributes to the rapidly expanding historical institutionalism 
literature. The importance of understanding the development of decision-making 
institutions-a main concem of historie al institutionalism-is underlined here. 
The blending of individuals and institutions opens up exciting new avenues of 
research in this area. 
Four, the ideational structures of a country do matter-the ideational 
literature has been explicit about this. But how they matter is not so well 
understood. Understanding the conditions under which these structures impact on 
foreign policymaking would strengthen the study of the role of ideas in IR. 
Finally, this study expands our understanding of foreign policymaking in 
parliamentary systems. This fi1ls a gap in the study of leaders of democracies, 
which has for the most part focused in presidents, especially American presidents. 
It is often assumed that prime ministers, by the very nature of the parliamentary 
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system, are constrained from exerting too much of an autonomous role 
policymaking, due to the collective, factional, and coalitional nature of 
government (Kaarbo 1997, 559). This may weIl be the case in sorne countries, but 
as this study demonstrates, it is not the case everywhere. The ability of individual 
leaders to break free from these constraints-or even operate within them-is 
highlighted here and demonstrates the importance of individuals even in 
parliamentary systems to the foreign policy. 
Second, my study contributes to our understanding of state behavior by 
analyzing two examples of foreign policy variation. Most analyses of foreign 
policy focus on either foreign policy continuity (i.e., why a specifie state has a 
specifie foreign policy) or on a particular foreign policy (i.e., policy toward 
another state or an issue-area in international politics). But less attention has been 
directed at variation in foreign policy. Yet this is a crucial area for FP A and IR, 
because it can help us understand the conditions under which state behavior 
changes. After all, states do not have the same policy aIl the time; policies change. 
In order to understand why they change (i.e., what are the circumstances that lead 
to change), we must analyze variation in policy. Only by doing so can we 
understand the conditions that have led to this shift. 
Third, underlining all this, my study is a commitment to theoretical 
synthesis, including a bridge connecting International Relations with comparative 
politics. As noted in Chapter 1, scholars have for long been emphasizing that 
researchers should draw together various literatures, levels of analyses, and 
disciplines in order to construct more multi-causal explanations. l believe this 
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amalgamation is more effective at explanation and identifying the relevant factors 
in foreign policy variation. 
Fourth, the comparative nature of this study also allows for better 
understanding of the conditions that underlie foreign policymaking and foreign 
policy variation. Typically, studies of foreign policy focus on one country only, 
unless there is a grouping within an edited volume. But including more than one 
case study helps identify the most relevant factors; comparing case studies 
highlights the similarities and differences between them, and this allows for the 
scholar to tease out what is most important for understanding foreign policy 
variation, and what is specifie to a country and what can be generalized to other 
countries. 
The Middle East in IR Theory 
A final contribution of this study brings the Middle East into FP A and IR 
theory development. Like the two countries examined in the dissertation, this 
region has too often been considered too unique for general theory construction. 
This has not always been the case: older studies using the Middle East often came 
under a Realist-type framework (see, for example Walt 1987; for more on this, 
see Jacoby and Sasley 2002, 3-5). But more recent studies of Middle Eastern 
foreign policy have tended to utilize a country- or region-specifie analytical 
framework that does not travel easily to other areas of the world. Ideational 
factors .such as culture, identity, and religion tend to be the dominant themes used 
in these approaches. 
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A recent study found that of the top three journals in the field of IR (World 
PoUties, International Studies Quarterly, and International Organization), there is 
a "relative absence" of studies utilizing the Middle East that is "noteworthy" 
(Breuning, Bredehoft, and Walton 2005, 456). While there are numerous books 
on the foreign policy of individual states in the Middle East, the lack of studies on 
the region in general IR the ory development in journals, where much of this work 
is done, indicates a general belief that the Middle East may not be that relevant for 
IR theory development. 5 An additional problem in this context is that when 
studies do try to draw out general patterns ofbehavior for theory development, the 
focus is on the Arab world, since Arab states form the overwhelming bulk of the 
region (see, for example, Gause 1999). My study aims to rectify this unbalanced 
condition, by showing that the Middle East and its countries (including Israel and 
Turkey) are perfectly acceptable cases to use for general theory development. 
Three points are relevant here. First, studies on the role of ideas have not 
examined the developing world in general or the Middle East in particular. The 
focus has been on the advanced industrial democracies or certain other states 
closely integrated into the Western-dominated international system with a critical 
role to play in it, such as Russia. Where the role of ideas has been extended to 
non-Western are as (e.g., Sikkink 1991), the focus has been Latin America, and on 
domestic issues. Michael Barnett is a notable, nearly lone, example of a scholar 
who has sought to bring the role of ide as to the study of the Middle East, in both 
the Arab world (1998) and Israel (2002), but there is clearly a large gap that still 
needs to be filled. This study aims to address this disparity. 
5 A notable exception is Korany, Noble, and Brynen (1993). 
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Second, this study is essentially an argument that theoretical and empirical 
insights from the Middle East can be relevant not only to other developing regions 
of the world, but to foreign policymaking and variation in the developed world as 
well. The incorporation of individuals and institutions (all relevant in general IR, 
even political science) through Middle Eastern examples confirms both the 
importance and necessity of studying models beyond Western world application 
only. Because the model utilizes these general variables, it may be applicable to 
any state anywhere in the world. Further research on this is, of course, necessary, 
but a first-cut use of the model suggests that this may weIl be the case. 
Finally, underlying the above points is the importance, perhaps ev en 
necessity, of drawing bridges between area studies and IR (for good overall 
discussions see Brynen 1993 and TessIer 1999). Given the complexity of foreign 
policymaking and the importance of understanding foreign policy in general and 
foreign policy variation in particular, scholars must have an appreciation of the 
distinct historical development and cultural, economic, social, and political 
elements relevant to any given state or region. Area studies specialists have this 
knowledge. But in the study of Middle East foreign policy, these scholars have 
primarily highlighted the overriding importance of state- or region-specifie 
factors, such identity or culture (e.g., the impact of Islam). This inhibits effective 
comparison between states across the global system. 
But by using their intimate understandings of the Middle East to construct 
more general understandings of international relations and foreign policy, these 
researchers can contribute to a richer, more nuanced understanding of these 
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issues. The accusation that area studies scholars are too parochial, too concerned 
with descriptive exercises only, and too little versed in general IR theory may 
have been true at one point, but this is not the case any longer. This study 
continues the trend toward greater integration of these two fields, by bringing the 
Middle East into general IR theory development through rigorous theoretical 
construction and deep empirical research. 
Policy Implications 
The model has an important policy implication, namely, the value of 
understanding who the individual decision-makers are in any given polity. This is 
critical for policymakers in other countries. A better understanding of leaders can 
provide not only an explanation for their actions, but sorne predictive value as 
well-how they might react when presented with specific policy options. 
Knowledge of a state's external environment, security situation, and domestic 
politics are all relevant, but none of these can cause an individual's policy-
examples abound of leaders who have given in to such pressure, but also of 
leaders who have not. The unchanged variable here is the individual decision-
maker. 
Ideological leaders are more likely to resist new policy ideas that do not 
conform to their pre-existing beliefs, while adaptable leaders are more likely to 
shift foreign policy to meet the challenges and problems of international politics. 
In Israel, where Yitzhak Rabin was willing to do what he could to improve 
relations with the United States, his predecessor, Yitzhak Shamir, resisted 
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strenuous American efforts to fashion a peace framework because he had no 
intention of giving up any part of the West Bank or Gaza to Palestinian control 
outside of overall Israeli sovereignty. The Americans, having been told about the 
existence of the Oslo track early on, might have given it more consideration as the 
Washington talks continued to stall, had they understood Rabin's pragmatic 
nature and his strong desire to move ahead on the peace front with the 
Palestinians. Instead, they were as surprised and unprepared as anyone when 
Shimon Peres and the Norwegian foreign minister presented it to them in the final 
draft. 
This implication is critically important, for example, in conflict resolution 
efforts. It can do so by helping policymakers understand the personal motivations 
and decisions of leaders involved in these types of conflict. The actions of 
Protestant, Catholic, and British leaders in the conflict in Northem Ireland; the 
insurgencies in both Sri Lanka and Iraq; and the various low-intensity conflicts 
throughout south-east and central Asia could all be more effectively dealt with if 
we can better understand the actions of the individuals leaders and, therefore, 
what it would take to resolve these prolonged disputes. 
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